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Foreword
It is a rare privilege to read a
personal career history in which so
many of the principal features allow
for reflection and others are
instructive of later developments in
the role of departmental secretaries
in our system of government.
I have observed Andrew Podger’s
career in the Australian Public
Service since the 1970s with
interest, admiration and gratitude
for the insight and competence he
has assiduously given to his
increasing responsibilities.
It is timely that the history of reform
in public administration over three
decades is recorded in this
monograph and revealing to study
relationships with Parliament and
government. It is important that leadership development of public administrators
should be a leading objective.
Andrew’s understanding of the support valuable to a minister invokes personal
recollections and experience. My first ministerial appointment was in the Fraser
Caretaker Government in 1975. The support of the secretary and the officers of
the Department of Education is remembered with respect. The Prime Minister’s
guidance to new ministers was to value and seek the advice of the department.
This was indeed pertinent advice, not only initially but throughout my ministerial
appointments from 1975 to 1983.
I noted Andrew’s comments about differing approaches from ministers with
regard to Section 64 of the Constitution. I must say that I was always conscious
of the appointment ‘and to administer the Department of’ and I found that the
closest collaboration with the departments of Social Security and Finance resulted
in the effective implementation of government policy. All ministers are bound
by cabinet’s authority and they should ensure that cabinet is fully informed of
the political and whole-of-government outcomes of decisions taken.
Andrew was exemplary in his anticipation of information needed to support a
cabinet submission or to defeat a conflicting Expenditure Review Committee
imposition. The close association with my office was enhanced by the inclusion
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of a staff member from the department to facilitate a valuable forthright exchange
of views and information.
This monograph is remarkable for the breadth of experience it discloses through
changes of government and some of the questions posed are signposts to the
future. I am confident that Andrew will continue to be a contributor to excellence





Dame Margaret Guilfoyle was Minister for Education (1975), Minister for Social Security (1975–80) and
Minister for Finance (1980–83). (Photo by kind permission of the Parliamentary Library.)
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The Role of Departmental Secretaries
Preface
The purpose of this monograph
is to provide a comprehensive
description of the role of a
departmental secretary today,
how that role has changed, the
range of issues involved in
exercising that role and some
lessons from my experience.
Some of my predecessors have
written on aspects of the role
(for example, Crawford 1954,
1970; Cooley 1974) or provided
a formal enunciation of the role
(for example, Codd 1990). There
is also some previous academic
commentary such as Spann
(1976, to the Coombs Royal
Commission) and Weller (2001).
This account, however, is both
more comprehensive and more
contemplative, drawing
illustrations of the full range of
work involved and the
challenges faced from my personal experience. It is also, of course, more
contemporary. Appendices A and B to the monograph summarise my career in
the Australian Public Service from 1968 until 2005, including the departments
I headed between 1993 and 2002, my time as Public Service Commissioner from
2002 to 2004 and the ministers I served.
It is written primarily for those who might be secretaries in the future and for
those working closely with secretaries including ministers and ministerial staff
as well as other senior public servants, with summaries of the lessons I learned
that others might find helpful. In addition, I hope it is informative for a wider
readership of officials at all levels and parliamentarians, academics, students of
government and others who work closely with the political process such as
journalists, lobbyists and senior people in business and non-governmental
organisations.
The responsibilities of secretaries are substantial and even those who interact
frequently with them rarely see the full picture. From time to time, some elements
will hit the headlines, sometimes as a success but more often as a failure or a
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scandal when responsibility is quickly sheeted home to the minister and the
secretary. The wider context (including whether either the minister or the
secretary was or should have been involved) and the full range of work being
done are, however, rarely appreciated. Political and media judgments of
performance often rest on narrow perspectives, which may or may not accurately
reflect overall performance.
Government has also become more complex and ministers and senior public
servants are facing greater challenges than in the past. There might be more
players on the stage of national politics and public administration, and the Public
Service has long lost its pre-eminent position, but this has not diminished the
role and responsibilities of secretaries: indeed, it has generally added to them.
Notwithstanding the changes to the Public Service during my career, there is
also much that remains substantially the same. The basic principles and values
under our Westminster traditions have remained relevant. The notion of a career
public service attracting and retaining some of the best and the brightest with
lifetime commitment to the Australian community is still important, despite the
benefits and reality of increased mobility; and wider participation in the political
process has not overshadowed the important role of the Public Service. Being a
departmental secretary is a particular privilege, with wonderful opportunities
to influence public policy and to inspire and support public servants whose job
it is to ensure the delivery of quality services to the public.
I am grateful for advice I received from a number of people, most importantly
John Wanna, Pat Weller, John Nethercote, David Stanton and Helen Williams;
I also received helpful comments on a late draft from the two ministers with
whom I worked most closely, Brian Howe and Michael Wooldridge. My wife,
Barbara, provided much more than moral support, commenting on drafts,





Photo: Andrew Podger when Secretary of the Department of Health and Aged Care (photo by kind
permission of the Department of Health and Ageing).
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The Role of Departmental Secretaries
1. Responsibilities of secretaries
The formal responsibilities of departmental secretaries are set out in the Public
Service Act 1999 in Section 57:
(1) The Secretary of a Department, under the Agency Minister, is
responsible for managing the Department and must advise the Agency
Minister in matters relating to the Department.
(2) The Secretary of a Department must assist the Agency Minister to
fulfil the Agency Minister’s accountability obligations to the Parliament
to provide factual information, as required by the Parliament, in relation
to the operation and administration of the Department.
The Public Service Act also requires agency heads to promote (not just uphold)
the Australian Public Service (APS) Values and binds them to the Code of Conduct
(ss 12, 14).
The Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 also identifies special
responsibilities for what it terms ‘Chief Executives’ (Part 7). These include in
particular (s. 44) that they must manage the affairs of the agency in a way that
promotes the proper use (that is, efficient, effective and ethical use) of
Commonwealth resources for which the chief executive is responsible.
These two acts, and the regulations and directions made under them, establish
the generic framework within which all departmental secretaries operate: their
responsibilities, their authority and their accountability. Employees of their
departments must obey their lawful directions and secretaries may issue Chief
Executive Instructions. They must present annual financial statements to the
Auditor-General that give a true and fair view of the finances of the department
and they must provide an annual report to their minister for presentation to the
Parliament in line with the requirements of the Joint Committee on Public
Accounts and Audit.
Each secretary also has specific responsibilities. The Administrative Arrangements
Order issued from time to time by the Governor-General on the advice of the
Prime Minister sets out for each ministry the areas of responsibility and the
legislation to be administered ‘by the minister’. In the case of the Health portfolio,
nearly 50 pieces of legislation were listed in 2001 (and more now). Most but not
all are administered by the department and, in many cases, there are specific
references to the powers and responsibilities of the secretary, or of the minister
who in turn delegates them to the secretary.
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Table 1.1 Health and ageing legislative responsibilities
The Administrative Arrangements Order in 2001, when I was the
secretary, set out the functions of the Health and Ageing portfolio and
the legislation administered by the minister. Among the 48 pieces of
legislation listed, the following provide a flavour of the responsibilities
involved:
Aged Care Act 1997
Australian Hearing Services Act 1991
Gene Technology Act 2000
Health Insurance Act 1973
Home and Community Care Act 1985
National Health Act 1953
Quarantine Act 1908 (relating to human quarantine)
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989
Most of these acts authorise the secretary and/or the minister (who
frequently delegates authority to the secretary) to make decisions
exercising public power over individuals and organisations in order to
deliver services, provide benefits or regulate behaviour, and hold them
responsible for how that power is exercised.
For example, under the Aged Care Act 1997, the secretary is responsible
for approving aged-care providers (s. 8) and planning and allocating
places (ss 12, 14). The secretary mostly delegates such powers to officers
in the department, but is held responsible overall for the management
of the program and the exercise of the delegated powers. I was made
acutely aware of this on several occasions, as mentioned in a number of
later chapters in this monograph (see, for example, the ‘Kerosene baths’
case in Chapter 3).
In addition, in exercising their generic and specific responsibilities, secretaries
are bound by administrative law and, in some cases, may hold specific authority
under the legislation.
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Table 1.2 Examples of administrative law provisions
Under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (s. 25[4]), the tribunal
has power to review any decisions under any act. Secretaries or their
delegates are constantly making decisions under various laws, which
are therefore subject to possible Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT)
review.
Under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (s. 5[1]),
a person aggrieved by a decision may apply for an order of review on a
wide range of grounds, including a breach of natural justice, that legal
procedures have not been observed and that the making of the decision
is an improper exercise of power.
Under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (s. 5[1]), the Ombudsman shall investigate
administrative action by a department where there is a complaint, and
may on his own motion investigate any administrative action, with
reports going to the minister and, if he is not satisfied with the
department’s response, to the Prime Minister and possibly the Parliament.
Under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (s. 9[2]), ‘principal officers’
(including secretaries) are responsible for making documents available
and making arrangements for decisions; under s. 36(3), ministers are
responsible for any certificates denying access to internal working
documents on public interest grounds—a power frequently delegated
to secretaries.
Legally, the responsibilities of secretaries relate to the operation and
administration of the department and the programs the department manages. In
practice, the responsibilities go much wider. Since the late-1980s, the term
‘portfolio secretary’ has come into common use. It does not appear in legislation.
It reflects, however, the expectation that a secretary will help the minister to
coordinate the activities of the multitude of agencies reporting to that minister
(Table 1.3). This is particularly relevant in a portfolio with several ministers,
one of whom has overarching responsibilities and sits in cabinet, and where
there are quite a few agencies, big and small, in addition to the department. The
‘portfolio secretary’, for example, is responsible for helping the senior minister
to prepare the ‘portfolio budget submission’ and will ensure preparation of the
‘portfolio budget paper’ for Parliament, and will probably be present throughout
Senate Committee hearings on budget matters, including those relating to the
agencies over which the secretary has no legal authority.
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Table 1.3 Health and ageing: portfolio agencies in 2001
• Aged Care Standards and Accreditation Agency Ltd
• General Practice Education and Training
• Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
• Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
• Food Safety Australia New Zealand
• Health Insurance Commission
• Health Services Australia
• Hearing Services
• Medibank Private
• National Blood Authority
• National Health and Medical Research Council
• National Institute of Clinical Studies Ltd
• Private Health Insurance Administration Council
• Private Health Insurance Ombudsman
• Professional Services Review
In addition, there is a large number of independent committees, councils
and authorities (many statutory) without their own employees—for
example, Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee, Medical Benefits
Advisory Committee, Australian Community Pharmacy Authority, Gene
Technology Standing Committee, Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing
Authority.
Aspects of this portfolio responsibility have more recently been formalised after
the Howard Government’s response to the Uhrig Report on the governance of
statutory authorities and statutory office-holders. This provides a role for
secretaries in advising on appointments and on performance, while not
constraining the statutory responsibilities of the authorities and office-holders
involved. The Rudd Government has since strengthened the role of secretaries
(and the Public Service Commissioner) further in providing advice to support
merit-based selection of agency heads and statutory office-holders.
Secretaries also have a collective responsibility, partly reflected in the
Management Advisory Committee (MAC) (Public Service Act, s. 64) to which all
secretaries must belong. Significantly, the fact that the Prime Minister appoints
secretaries (s. 58) makes it clear that, notwithstanding their formal accountability
to their own ministers, they are to serve the government as a whole.
Introduction of performance-based pay for secretaries in 1999, although since
dropped, provided an opportunity to summarise the different dimensions of the
responsibilities of secretaries for the purpose of assessing their performance.
The then Public Service Commissioner suggested five criteria—support for the
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minister, support for the government as a whole, management, leadership and
promoting the APS Values—to which subsequently was added a sixth:
implementation of government decisions. The APS Commission’s Senior Executive
Service (SES) leadership capabilities also provide a useful insight into the skills
required at the top of the Public Service to perform competently. These are
summarised under the headings ‘shapes strategic thinking’, ‘communicates with
influence’, ‘cultivates productive working relationships’, ‘achieves results’ and
‘exemplifies personal drive and integrity’.
These responsibilities are in fact very broad, so the first questions I address (in
Chapter 2) are how much time secretaries spend on the range of responsibilities
with which they have been charged and what personal styles different secretaries
use in meeting their responsibilities.
The remainder of this monograph is structured around the following headings,
which encompass the range of responsibilities and the main areas of personal
activity from my own experience:
• Chapter 3: Support for the minister
• Chapter 4: Support for the Prime Minister, cabinet and whole-of-government
processes
• Chapter 5: Working with the Parliament
• Chapter 6: Management of the department
• Chapter 7: Management of the portfolio
• Chapter 8: External relationships (including with other governments and
with non-governmental organisations and businesses)
• Chapter 9: Working with the media
• Chapter 10: Promoting the values and contributing to APS capability.
Chapter 11 addresses the development of and personal support for secretaries,
and performance appraisal. Chapter 12 examines the role of the Public Service
Commissioner, which differs in important ways from that of secretaries, with





2. Know and pace yourself: personal
style and time allocation
The time secretaries devote personally to different aspects of their responsibilities
depends on a number of factors including the functional responsibilities and
size of the portfolio and department, the style of the minister(s) and the personal
preferences and style of the secretary.
Personal style
Personal style is not a minor factor. Notwithstanding the development by the
APS Commission of its generic SES leadership capabilities, each secretary (and
each SES officer) has his or her own style of leadership. This affects how they
do their job as secretary and how they allocate their scarce time. Being aware of
this themselves is also important, to be mindful of the importance of roles that
are not natural strengths but require personal effort and also to look to others
in the senior team to complement their own strengths and preferences.
Among the secretaries of my era (first as an SES officer and then as a secretary
of three successive departments) who I admired and learned from, there was a
significant variation in styles:
 
Tony Ayers (former Secretary of the departments of Defence,
Aboriginal Affairs, Social Security and Health and
Community Services) was a wonderful manager of people
and had a keen sense of what was feasible: a can-do operator
rather than a policy analyst, close to ministers, with a great
political ‘nose’, a delegator of authority to others (but
insisting on being kept fully informed)
 
Ian Castles (former Secretary of the Department of Finance
and Australian Government Statistician) was the top
intellectual throughout my time in the APS, a careful
researcher and analyst and consummate presenter of the
evidence at the right time, but allowing others to lead in
the management of his agencies
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Mike Keating (former Secretary of the departments of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet, Finance and Employment and
Industrial Relations) was a driver of reform, a hands-on
developer of policy with government ministers and a hard




Helen Williams (former Public Service Commissioner and
secretary of many departments, including Education,
Tourism, Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Information
Technology and the Arts, and Human Services) was always
insistent on rigour, whether in advice or in financial
management, putting great effort into marshalling the
expertise and resources of her agency while always taking
personal responsibility for the advice given and the
programs managed.
 
All of these devoted considerable time to supporting their ministers, but while
Ayers would be in frequent personal contact by phone or in meetings, Williams
divided that with marshalling the work in her department and testing it for
accuracy and appropriateness; Castles would be doing personal research and
analysis with a small number of key staff; and Keating would be personally
switching between ministers, his own officers, officers in other agencies and
senior people in the states to drive the reforms he was enthusiastically pursuing,
looking for common ground without compromising anything he regarded as
important.
Table 2.1 The Castles’ policy art
Ian Castles’ personal contribution to policy research and advice was
extraordinary. His staff tended either to love him for this or to despair,
as he appeared to ignore other matters. I was clearly in the first camp,
perhaps because I was fortunate to find our interests often coincided.
I had the privilege to work with him on family allowances reform (1976),
income tax reform (1977–78 and 1985) and superannuation reform (1983
and 1985), among many major policy initiatives. He had a great sense of
timing and a brilliant capacity to identify a radical alternative option
and to present the arguments in favour—he was never happier than
8
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when taking on well-entrenched views, either within the bureaucracy
or among famous outside commentators.
An example of his style was his paper ‘Economists and anti-economists’,
prepared for ANZAAS in 1984 when he was Secretary of the Department
of Finance.
This paper, much larger than an article but shorter than a book, was
ostensibly about the role and contribution of economists in the century
after the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776. It was also,
however, a comprehensive rebuttal of internationally prominent scholars
and television presenters Kenneth Clark and John Kenneth Galbraith
who had been misrepresenting economists to pursue their own agendas,
and a cry for economists to continue to contribute to the scientific study
of social and economic issues. Castles marshalled the resources of the
National Library of Australia to help him demonstrate the concern for
public welfare of economists such as Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus and
David Ricardo, and their challenging of the establishment of their day,
taking on power and privilege gained from abuse of markets and from
inadequate government involvement in areas such as education, and
promoting what were radical views at the time on matters such as civil
liberties and the role of women.
Castles spent hours for days at a time in the National Library preparing
this superb paper, managing, for example, to draw on personal
correspondence during the Irish potato famine. The paper, however,
had no direct impact on current policy, let alone on financial
management.
Did he neglect his other duties? There were those in the Finance
department who felt he did, but I look back on the 1980s as the period
during which Finance built its reputation as a powerhouse of policy and
financial management reform. Castles’ efforts inspired many to raise their
standards of policy analysis, emphasising research and evidence.
Peter Walsh (Minister for Finance, 1984–90) has since written that,
despite rarely seeing Castles, he was impressed with the quality of written
advice Castles provided and the support provided by the whole
department under Castles’ leadership. He said that, when they did meet,
Castles spoke to him as if he were at a university seminar.
I suspect that in allocating time to different responsibilities, Williams put more
effort into managing her department than the others, ensuring its financial
robustness in particular. Ayers also gave particular emphasis to management
matters, in his case focusing very strongly on people. Whichever department
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he led, he also played a major role in mentoring people and advising heads of
the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) on succession
management. Keating and Castles spent more of their own personal energy in
developing and advising on policy, Castles being probably least involved of the
four in managing the department, relying extensively on other senior officials
to help him in that role.
There have also been some secretaries I have not admired. Their styles also
varied, but the aspects that I most disliked were the effort of some to win personal
political favour at the expense of rigorous policy advice or proper process, and
the willingness of some to avoid responsibility or to bully and attach blame to
others, including within their own organisations, in order to curry favour.
Allocation of time
Summarising my own allocation of time in different departments is not easy. I
have no data on the time I spent at home on various activities and only limited
records of time in the office or attending external meetings. It is also not always
easy to allocate particular activities to one of the range of responsibilities listed
in Chapter 1. Moreover, some activities are cyclical, such as the budget and
Senate Committee hearings, requiring some way of averaging time allocation
over the year.
The following is a very rough estimate of my allocation of time as Secretary of
the Department of Housing and Regional Development in 1995, as Secretary of
the Department of Health and Family Services in 1997 and as Secretary of the
Department of Health and Aged Care in 2000. On average, I would probably
spend between 50 and 60 hours each working week in the office or elsewhere
on departmental business and another 10 to 15 hours a week working from home.
This pace was maintained for the 11 years I was a secretary or Public Service
Commissioner, though a similar effort was also required when I was a deputy
in the Department of Defence and a division head in the Department of Finance.
Table 2.2 Time allocation







403550(a) Supporting the minister
5<5<5(b) Supporting the government as
a whole
<5<5<5(c) Working with the Parliament
253015(d) Management of the
department/agency


















<5<5<5(g) Contributing to APS capability
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A number of activities could be allocated to several of these areas. A key rule
in preparing this table is that I have allocated time involved in policy analysis
or review to ‘supporting the minister’ where my work was on specific policy
matters leading to advice to the minister; if it involved broader management of
policy advising, including policy forums in the department, I have allocated it
to ‘management of the department/agency’.
The Health department is a large organisation, in a large portfolio with extensive
stakeholders and interest groups. Despite the huge policy agenda involved, it
is not surprising that I spent more time on management and on external
relationships there than I did when in the Department of Housing and Regional
Development, which has a far smaller policy-oriented department. I had more
time when in the Housing department to contribute personally to the policy
agenda and to APS capability matters (this was the period when the Public Service
Act was first being reviewed).
The increased time with the Parliament in 2000 reflected a period of intense
scrutiny of the health portfolio and my decision to lead the departmental team
personally during the relevant Senate Committee hearings.
I suspect my personal interest and capacity in policy contributed to the allocation
of time to policy development throughout my time as secretary, and similarly I
might have spent more time than some colleagues on external relationships,
particularly beyond the confines of government (for example, with academics
and international networks).
Changes over time
As discussed in more detail in later chapters, there has been a shift in the balance
of responsibilities particularly as a result of the public sector reforms during the
1980s and 1990s. These increased the management responsibilities of secretaries,
both in running their departments and overseeing their portfolios, and tended
to reduce the time they could personally devote to policy development and
review.
The expectation of greater responsiveness to ministers, and of helping them
manage the pressures they face from the 24/7 media cycle, has also made it more
difficult to devote personal time and departmental resources to longer-term
policy research and analysis.
Nonetheless, heads of Commonwealth departments are still expected to contribute
more personally to policy development than those heading state departments.
The pressures of the past 20 years might also have caused some convergence of
styles and possibly some increased emphasis on generalist skills among secretaries.
This has been offset in part, however, by greater mobility in and out of the
Public Service, including at more senior levels. The mobility is still modest and
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most external appointments are of people well experienced in the public sector,
albeit more nowadays have state government backgrounds. While there has
been movement from the top level of the Public Service to academia, the private
sector and the community sector, there has been little if any real movement in
the other direction.
Any convergence of styles has also been offset by modest improvements in
gender diversity. Williams is no longer the only female departmental secretary,
particularly since the appointment of three women in 2004 along with Lynelle
Briggs as Public Service Commissioner. I well remember the coasters Sue Vardon
(CEO of Centrelink, 1997–2004) gave me for my office in the APS Commission
calling for ‘five in five’ (five female departmental secretaries within the next
five years); she was one of many pleased to see the shift occur so quickly. That
shift will almost certainly continue, as female representation in the APS is steadily
moving up the hierarchy.
Issues concerning styles and competencies
The increase in management responsibilities has reduced the time secretaries
have to focus on high-quality policy advising. This impact can be exaggerated,
however. Commonwealth departmental secretaries still spend considerable time
personally on policy advice and on marshalling policy analysis in their
departments. I believe the overall quality has diminished for the reasons outlined
above, but many secretaries still have formidable competence in their various
policy fields and can and do win the policy arguments against the views of
external ‘experts’ in confidential ministerial forums. Notwithstanding the
emphasis on generalist skills (which are indeed important, particularly those
relating to deep understanding of parliamentary and government processes),
most secretaries do have considerable expertise relevant to the particular
responsibilities of their departments.
The increase in engagement outside the Public Service has also given senior
public servants wider perspectives than they might have had in the past, from
which to draw on when giving advice. Moreover, arguably, the increased
involvement of external groups in the political process has offset some of the
reduced capacity within the Public Service.
A perennial criticism of the senior echelons of the APS has been that they
represent a narrow and privileged group in the Australian community with a
common orthodoxy about social and economic policy. I do not share that view,
notwithstanding the obvious fact that white, Anglo-Saxon males have dominated
the SES since Federation, and the many efforts (my own included) to ensure
better opportunities for women and Indigenous people in particular to succeed
in the APS.
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As Ian Castles highlighted some years ago, the APS is not a bastion of privilege
and it might be that the senior echelons are more representative of their society
and culture than counterparts in other countries. The APS certainly does have
further to go, but it leads most state public services (though not some overseas,
such as New Zealand and Canada) and private sector companies in the
employment of senior women and Indigenous Australians. With the exception
of people with a disability, the trend lines for senior jobs are consistently in the
right direction in terms of broadening participation. Mobility is also increasing,
though modestly.
Table 2.3 Secretaries: an elite class or a reflection of an egalitarian,
upwardly mobile community?
Ian Castles defended the Public Service against criticism in the 1980s
that it represented an elite and powerful class. He did so by detailing
the personal background of the then five most recent Secretaries to the
Treasury, highlighting how many came from modest family backgrounds
and had risen to the top through great personal sacrifice along with
strong family and government support.
The four secretaries I have highlighted as people I particularly respected
and learned from over my career also have varied backgrounds.
• Tony Ayers was born in modest circumstances in Fitzroy. The son
of a junior public servant in the Customs Service, he had a good
education through scholarships including to St Kevin’s College. He
also supported his education for a while earning pocket money
working for an SP bookie. He gained a social work degree and then
worked in Victorian prisons as a parole officer before joining the
Commonwealth.
• Ian Castles was from Sale in country Victoria, where his father was
a hardware merchant. He completed his schooling at Wesley College
after attending state schools in Sale, going on to do a commerce degree
at Melbourne University.
• Mike Keating was also brought up in rural Victoria, by his widowed
mother, who relied on her War Widows Pension while he was young.
He gained various government scholarships to pursue his education,
going on to complete an economics degree at Melbourne University,
and later obtaining his PhD.
• Helen Williams was born in Adelaide but spent much of her
childhood in England, where her father was a senior academic in
economics. She completed a history and sociology degree at Reading
13
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University, a ‘redbrick’ establishment. She returned to Australia
when her father was appointed Vice-Chancellor of Sydney University.
None of the four could be said to have come from a highly privileged
background. Two progressed from modest rural backgrounds and one
from the inner Melbourne working class.
My own background is middle class. My father was an engineer in the
NSW Public Service and my mother a casual teacher at Asquith Girls
High School. I am one of seven children and attended public schools in
Sydney until my final two years at Shore before going to Sydney
University, completing a science degree in pure mathematics.
The criticism of a narrow orthodoxy among secretaries is harder to refute, partly
because the nature of the job virtually precludes secretaries from holding extreme
views. Most do have strong personal views of broad policies that would enhance
the public interest, while also accepting absolutely the right of the elected
government to set policy. Most, and certainly the best, are not blinkered in their
views but are genuinely open-minded and are keen to find the relevant research
and analysis, including evaluation of past policies. There are nonetheless some
common threads about the benefits of free trade and well-functioning markets,
with governments intervening only where clearly justified in order to redistribute
resources to those not able to rely on markets, to address market failures and to
provide public goods and to support social capital. All those whose views I know
believe firmly in a very substantial role for government to enhance the wellbeing
of Australians. Beyond these broad threads, however, there are wide variations
of views among secretaries: from liberal to conservative, from strong support
for redistribution to strong belief in self-reliance, from philistines to disciples
of the arts, from mathematicians and physicists to historians and sociologists to
economists and accountants.
A related criticism even harder to refute is the ‘clubbish’ nature of the
departmental secretary clique in Canberra. I have certainly found great support
through regular informal lunches with colleagues. It is lonely at the top and
such networking provides valuable opportunities to compare notes. For years,
I shared the common criticism in the 1970s of the Commonwealth Club as the
centre of public service power, yet for a long time failed to see that our lunches
were not really all that different.
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Table 2.4 Tony Ayers’ club
In the 1970s, it was de rigueur for permanent secretaries to be members
of the Commonwealth Club. A challenge for some Whitlamite
appointments was to break down the barriers to this perceived
establishment power base including by widening membership. I recall
vividly the evening Marie Coleman, Chair of the Social Welfare
Commission, was escorted to the club for dinner by Sir Frederick
Wheeler, Secretary to the Treasury.
By the time my generation joined the ranks of secretaries, most of us
shunned any association with that apparent bastion of establishment
power. Tony Ayers had already set the example with his working-class
club, the Emperor’s Court Chinese Restaurant in Yarralumla. We joined
him there or met at other no more salubrious restaurants around Canberra.
My pride in our rejection of prestigious places of establishment power
was effectively pricked, however, when a member of my staff told me
bluntly: ‘Wherever you blokes meet is the centre of establishment power
in Canberra.’
People appointed from outside do face a challenge if they are not included quickly
into such networks. Stephen Duckett (Secretary of the Health department,
1994–96) certainly told me how much he appreciated our invitation to him to
join the lunches Tony Blunn (then Secretary of the Social Security department)
and I hosted of heads of the social policy departments at that time, finding these
enormously helpful for breaking into the Canberra scene.
I am not sure that the reliance on such informal networks is unique to the
Australian Public Service. All governments have elaborate systems for collective
decision making and anyone wanting to influence decisions has to build formal
and informal networks; it comes with the territory. Perhaps, however, the
networks in Canberra can present an obstacle to the broadening of perspectives
that might be expected from an increasingly mobile public sector executive
workforce.
Lessons about time and pace
Secretaries generally work very long hours, in the office and at home. Most
spend at least half a day every weekend just trying to catch up on the previous
week’s work and prepare for the week ahead.
Each secretary has an individual style, but all struggle to balance the
responsibilities involved and to stop the urgent getting in the way of the
important. Those I admired most put great effort into preserving a medium to
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long-term perspective and fostering a depth of knowledge and analysis to draw
on, avoiding the danger of being overly reactive.
This can be done in various ways: having a strong team of able officers, insisting
on ‘due process’, ensuring robust information systems, constantly testing the
analysis provided, exhibiting a healthy scepticism and an understanding of
practical realities. Usually all of these are required, though the mix will differ
with each personality.
Setting priorities is always a challenge. In most portfolios, it is simply impossible
to keep on top of the detail, and it is dangerous to try. Equally, however, never
delving into details can leave a secretary (and the minister and department)
vulnerable when things go wrong. Rolling up the sleeves is, in my view, an
essential quality to ensure a minister’s priorities are addressed and to demonstrate
to staff from time to time the importance of getting the details right.
Establishing priorities also involves taking advantage of cycles. Parliamentary
breaks are a useful opportunity to review longer-term strategies. Trips abroad
(possibly with the minister) are a time to reflect on policies and performance in
the light of international experience. When things go wrong (which happens to
all secretaries sometime), it is all hands to the pump, and there is little if any
time to reflect on the crisis or to attend to all the other responsibilities not in
crisis.
Families inevitably suffer, though most secretaries attempt to set aside some
regular period for families, whether through an annual two or three-week
holiday, or a Sunday evening dinner, or chauffeuring the children to Saturday
morning sport.
Sharing the experience with peers in informal settings also relieves the pressure
of work. It is not always possible to discuss issues within the department, or
with family and friends, but I have always found having lunch regularly with
some other secretaries with whom I share views on the Public Service provides
great reassurance. There is a risk, however, that such networks present barriers
to newcomers.
Photo acknowledgments
Tony Ayers when Secretary of the Department of Defence (photo by kind permission of the Department
of Defence)
Ian Castles when Australian Government Statistician (photo by kind permission of the Australian Bureau
of Statistics)
Michael Keating (photo by kind permission of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet)
Helen Williams when Secretary of the Department of Human Services (photo with kind permission of the
Department of Human Services)
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3. Know the boss: working with and
supporting the minister
Elements of this role
Supporting the minister encompasses a range of activities designed to ensure
the minister is well informed when making decisions, is well positioned for
influencing collective decision making by the government and can be confident
that decisions for the portfolio are effectively implemented in the way intended.
The secretary’s role involves:
• informing and educating the minister about the department’s responsibilities
and programs and, indeed, about the processes of government and public
service
• communicating to the department the minister’s objectives, priorities and
preferred style of working, as well as the minister’s decisions to be put into
effect
• marshalling advice from the department on policy matters, ensuring high
quality in terms of analysis, time lines, relevance, understanding of different
perspectives and style of presentation
• ensuring timely and quality advice on appointments, grants and other
program administration matters requiring ministerial decisions
• overseeing the handling of ministerial correspondence, briefing for Question
Time in the Parliament and other briefing (for example, meetings with
stakeholders, visits) and the preparation of speech notes, and so on.
In carrying out this role, the secretary needs to build a close, personal relationship
with the minister, each understanding the other’s style as well as the other’s
role. They are mutually interdependent.
It is easy for public servants upholding their professional value of being
non-partisan and ‘apolitical’ (a term used in the Public Service Act) to
underestimate the commitment, skills and idealism of parliamentarians, including
those of their own ministers. Without exception, the ministers I served as
secretary or while Public Service Commissioner were hardworking and dedicated.
I disagreed on occasions with every one of them, but I do not doubt they
sincerely believed their positions reflected the public interest tempered by
political realities.
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Some, like Michael Wooldridge (Minister for Health,
1996–2001) and Brian Howe (Minister for Housing and
Regional Development, 1994–96 and Deputy Prime
Minister, 1994–95), placed particular emphasis on
technical expertise and research evidence in developing
their policies. Others, such as John Howard (Prime
Minister, 1996–2007), Tony Abbott (Minister Assisting
the Prime Minister on the Public Service, 2002–03) and
Bronwyn Bishop (Minister for Aged Care, 1998–2001),
tended to emphasise their political philosophies. Some,
such as Warwick Smith (Minister for Family Services,
1997–98), seemed particularly comfortable with the Public Service, while others,
including Howe and Bishop, remained suspicious of the loyalty and competence
of public servants who had not yet proved themselves in the minister’s eyes.
Working practices also differ. Wooldridge was very
comfortable working with email and also liked to ring
officers personally for information and advice. Abbott
preferred written advice consistent with journalistic
practice, with the essential details in the first few
paragraphs and with mounting detail so the
reader—the minister—could choose to stop at any
point without missing something critical. Wooldridge
was a ‘crammer’: he would finalise his position for the
Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) in the days and hours before the meeting,
well after his formal cabinet submission was distributed, and absorb an
astonishing amount of information with an almost photographic memory. Howard
also had a remarkable memory for detail, not only for the short term but over
months and years.
All the ministers were acutely conscious of the electoral cycle and the need to
demonstrate achievements and to be seen to have addressed any significant
problems arising on their watch. This is most often the source of tension between
politics and administration, as public servants are responsible for bringing to
ministers depth and perspective, while politicians must respond to the immediate
on anything and everything that might arise, with a close eye on the next
election. No minister I served wanted to ignore the longer-term issues, but some,
such as Howe and Wooldridge, had more interest in such issues than others;
nonetheless, Wooldridge constantly asked for reform ideas with tangible,
short-term as well as long-term gains. Abbott also was more willing than his
colleagues to address structural reform in health when I was advising the Prime
Minister on health services delivery in 2005.
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Sometimes, of course, the short-term political pressures simply overwhelm, as
happened to Bishop in 2000—despite the real improvements I believe she should
be given credit for in the quality and appropriateness of care for older
Australians.
Informing and educating the minister
There can be a considerable learning process involved for the minister and the
secretary, particularly with a new minister and a new government or with a
new secretary. Wooldridge spoke of his first days as a minister finding the Public
Service had its own values, with a different language and different ways of
operating: it was a different world. He had rarely met any public servants in his
time in the House of Representatives and had had no experience of public service
processes. He sought advice from people who had been ministers on all sides of
politics and was told that after a long period in opposition, a new minister tended
to be suspicious. One of the best things he did, he said, was to place on his
personal staff a former senior public servant as his chief of staff: ‘It was like
turning up on a desert island, full of hostile natives and finding someone who
spoke my language’ (interview in Health Affairs 2000). He also adopted some
advice he had received from a former senior state public servant to delay detailed
briefings from the Public Service—for at least a week—until he had conferred
with other key stakeholders, to avoid being perceived to be too dependent on
the Public Service from the onset of his ministry. (To my continuing dismay, he
publicly endorsed this advice on several occasions over the years, despite being
privately highly complimentary about the introductory briefings we provided.)
Table 3.1 Suggestions for working with a new minister
• Establish regular (say, weekly) one-on-one meetings.
• Encourage direct contact between the minister and senior
departmental officers, with regular feedback from officers to the
secretary re the minister’s interests, concerns, styles, and so on.
• Advise the minister of standard cabinet processes, including budget
arrangements, consultation processes and central agency roles.
• Advise the minister of standard public service processes and
portfolio-specific processes (key legislative requirements,
arrangements with states, and so on).
• Clarify the minister’s preferred approach to briefing, correspondence
and other administrative processes; gain agreement to access the
minister’s diary.
• Develop regular (say, monthly) one-on-one meetings with the
minister’s chief of staff to discuss office/departmental relations.
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Ensure clear understanding of allocation of responsibilities among
the minister’s advisers.
• Establish a process for a new strategic plan for the department or
portfolio, involving the minister directly and also key stakeholders.
• Open channels of communication with people and organisations the
minister draws on (with appropriate sensitivity).
• Arrange twice-yearly policy review days with the minister involving
senior departmental officers and senior advisers, with agreed agenda,
short papers and presentations and ample time for discussion.
Source: Drawn in part from advice Ken Baxter has given informally to new ministers on occasion,
including Wooldridge in 1996.
The education role is both generic and subject specific. Secretaries bring to the
relationship a keen appreciation of the processes of government: the cabinet and
budget processes and how the Public Service supports them, the parliamentary
and legislative processes, the operations of administrative law and the
requirements of financial management. New ministers might not understand
these well or at all and a secretary needs to find a diplomatic way to educate the
minister and gain his or her confidence in the secretary’s advice on due and
effective processes.
Ministers expect even new secretaries to know about the department’s (and the
portfolio’s) responsibilities and programs, or at least to ensure the minister has
ready access to experience and expertise, which the secretary must be able to
complement even in the early days. The secretary is expected quickly to have
sufficient knowledge and understanding to add value in discussions about
programs and policies, drawing on broader experience of government such as
the culture and orientation of central agencies, the perspective of state
governments, the time and other practical constraints of legislation and
administration. The secretary needs to command the minister’s confidence in
his/her, and the department’s, corporate knowledge and expertise in the subject
matter. This can be a particular challenge for a new secretary with a minister
who has expertise in the department’s area of responsibility (this was particularly
the case when Wooldridge, a doctor, was my minister in 1996, but was also true
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of Howe, an expert in social and town planning, whom I served in the Department
of Housing and Regional Development from 1994 to 1996).
Andrew Podger and Michael Wooldridge in the early days of the Department of Health and Family Services
(photo by kind permission of the Department of Health and Ageing)
Table 3.2 Learning together
When Michael Wooldridge became Minister for Health and Family
Services, I too was new to the portfolio. At his initiative, we engaged in
an extensive program of visits and meetings with key people throughout
Australia with experience in the portfolio’s business, including:
• past ministers from both sides of politics
• leaders of several colleges (GPs, pathologists, radiologists)
• an Australian Medical Association (AMA) leader
• the dean of a medical school
• leaders of key associations (Consumer Health Forum, public health,
public hospitals, private hospitals, private health insurance)
• other key individuals in the sector.
It was enormously valuable to each of us and to building the working
relationship between us.
With his agreement, I also retained the former secretary, Dr Stephen
Duckett, for three months as an adviser to help with the transition,
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including by participating in a series of internal workshops I called to
explore issues in each program area.
Communicating to the department
Communicating to the department the requirements of the minister is most
important in the initial period with a new minister and/or a new government.
It requires knowledge of the party platform, key speeches and statements, but
also the Prime Minister’s charter letters (Table 3.3) or similar directions and
listening closely to the minister and the ministerial staff, understanding the
minister’s relationship with colleagues and external stakeholders and appreciating
broader priorities and philosophies. It involves understanding the particular
style of the minister, including the way he or she likes to communicate.
Table 3.3 Charter letters
‘Charter letters’ from the Prime Minister to ministers became increasingly
important under the Howard Government as a formal framework for
keeping the government focused on its political priorities. Surprisingly,
given Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s reputation for bureaucratic processes
and early advice that he would continue the practice, charter letters have
not been issued yet under the Rudd Government.
Each minister received a detailed letter from the Prime Minister at the
beginning of each term of office setting out the Prime Minister’s
expectations and priorities. The letters complemented the Administrative
Arrangements Order, which is the legal instrument setting out the
principal matters dealt with by departments and portfolio ministers, and
identified for each minister (whether a portfolio minister or not) the
particular priorities the Prime Minister wished him or her to pursue in
the next three years. The letters effectively identified the respective
responsibilities of the portfolio minister and any junior ministers, though
details might be left to the portfolio minister to settle (including the
responsibilities of any parliamentary secretary).
The letters incorporated election commitments, but went further to
specify broader policy directions and particular targets, whether or not
in the publicly available policy platform. The letters were held very
tightly, copied only to the secretary, who might provide access only to
relevant excerpts to senior officers who needed to know.
The letters grew over the years (increasing, as I recall, from three to four
pages in 1996 to 10 or more pages in later years), and the process for
reporting progress against them became more formal. In the first term
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of the Howard Government, Wooldridge chose not to report progress in
writing but to see the Prime Minister from time to time to discuss
directions and priorities. Later, he started to provide written reports
(but not every year) drawing on notes I would provide to his office. I
did not see his final reports.
Maintaining the system of letters and reports became increasingly formal
and bureaucratic and few ministers would risk not reporting in writing
to Prime Minister Howard and most would rely heavily on drafting by
the secretary.
The charter letters, while highly confidential with very limited
circulation, affected the priorities of secretaries as well as ministers. They
played a major role in shaping portfolio budget submissions and also
affected departmental strategic plans and processes.
Ensuring a large department is fully appreciative of the minister’s requirements
can take up to a year or more with a new government: it is easy for even senior
public servants to fail to appreciate the extent to which their processes and styles
have become attuned to the previous regime after a long term of government.
Marshalling advice
Policy advising, and marshalling policy advice from the department, is a central
responsibility of a secretary of an Australian government department. It might
not be as critical at state level, where the emphasis is often more on management
and service delivery. The secretary is expected always to add value, whether
by his or her own analytical capacity and knowledge of the department’s business
or by bringing to bear judgments from long experience and knowledge of the
likely views of key players and the Australian public. The secretary must also
ensure the necessary capability in the department in terms of skilled people,
retrievable data, research and evaluation, access to external expertise and
information, and internal communications and processes that bring the necessary
skills and information together when needed (see Chapter 6).
I usually gave division heads (and indeed branch heads, and often section heads,
who were frequently identified on minutes as the ‘contact officer’) considerable
authority to offer policy advice, while expecting them to liaise with other
interested divisions and portfolio agencies before doing so. The deputy secretaries
and I would normally have been engaged in the earlier deliberations, but did
not often sign off on the minute or brief. Exceptions included budget matters
on which I always took the lead personally. I expected advice to offer options,
but give a clear, preferred position. On rare occasions, I sent the minister a
supplementary note giving a different view from that put forward by a division
head. This occurred several times in 1996 when the new government was still
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developing its position on many matters and I was also new: I wanted to test
the views of several divisions but felt the government was best served by hearing
from them as well as me. The main occasions this occurred concerned child care,
where I was challenging the efficiency and equity of service subsidies over cash
assistance direct to families with young children, and I was seeking to clarify
the new government’s philosophy towards competition in the childcare industry.
(As it turned out, the government took the division’s more conservative
approach.)
I was always personally involved in any significant policy development, as well
as marshalling the advice of responsible officers in the department. This usually
went beyond participation in departmental deliberations to guiding the direction
of the policy advice, whether in housing reform, urban development, Aboriginal
health, primary health care or private health insurance.
Part of the value adding I always tried to provide was to ensure the policy advice
fitted well with the broader and longer-term context. This imposed considerable
discipline, including awareness of international and academic work, consideration
of longer-term reform strategies and understanding of the government’s wider
economic and social policies. It also helped to identify opportunities that a
narrower approach might have missed.
Table 3.4 Child immunisation
Minister Wooldridge should be given great credit for successfully
addressing the alarming drop in child immunisation rates in the period
to 1996. Through careful highlighting of individual cases of deaths from
failure to immunise children against measles in particular, he turned our
bland statistics of falling immunisation rates into headline stories of
personal tragedies and a sense of crisis that had to be addressed.
Our role was to help the minister identify options to reverse the trend.
In late 1996 and early 1997, we explored a range of measures involving
sticks and carrots, some involving our portfolio’s programs and others
involving other portfolios’ programs. The main carrots involved rewards
for GPs if a high proportion of their young patients were immunised,
while the main sticks were the placement of conditions on access to
maternity benefits and childcare subsidies relating to the children’s
immunisation.
The political crisis fostered by Wooldridge made the Prime Minister and
other ministers sympathetic to the measures proposed, which were agreed
to by cabinet in early 1997. The measures achieved remarkable success,
returning immunisation rates to previous high levels (and higher), well
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exceeding the critical ‘herd protection’ levels needed against the
communicable diseases involved.
The rewards for GPs were also consistent with our longer-term strategy
to shift the funding of GPs towards ‘blended payments’, away from pure
fee-for-service, to increase financial incentives for quality care and health
outcomes rather than just throughput.
It was always important also to be ready for opportunities to press policy
initiatives. Much has been written about ‘policy cycles’, from decisions to
implementation to evaluation and advice, contributing to new decisions. That
is a useful normative approach emphasising the importance of systematic review
and evaluation, but it is not an accurate description of real practice. Political
decisions are taken when opportunities arise. Departments and secretaries need
to have a store of good policy ideas to put to ministers at opportune times.
Wooldridge certainly appreciated this, for example, when we had well-developed
proposals to put forward when the Howard Government was looking for a rural
package after the Rural Summit. He has since told me he regards this as among
his major successes that will stand the test of time.
Notwithstanding the time pressures on them, ministers generally are keen to
ensure their policy decisions are well founded and their policies are likely to
have a long-term beneficial impact on Australian society. Howe looked to external
policy analysts who had his confidence, such as Meredith Edwards and Jenny
Macklin (and Bettina Cass in earlier years), to undertake major policy reviews.
When I became secretary of his department, I was aware of his lack of confidence
in the housing division I inherited from his former mega-department and I put
considerable effort into strengthening its capacity while personally directing
the policy development process, drawing on my earlier expertise in social
security. I was not as positive as he was about the National Housing Strategy
review he initiated before my time, but I did accept we had to improve our
policy advising performance, which we did (Table 4.5).
Wooldridge was less enamoured of external reviews and we established an
arrangement whereby at least once a year we would set aside a full day for
discussions on long-term policy directions, led by short presentations by senior
departmental officers highlighting trends and evaluations, and raising longer-term
policy options. These canvassed, for example, increasing Commonwealth
leadership in health, including possible full financial takeover, restructuring
the regulation of private health insurance, broadening the base of primary health
care and strengthening cost-effectiveness criteria for government health benefits.
25
Know the boss: working with and supporting the minister
Supporting the minister’s administrative responsibilities
Supporting the minister in meeting his or her administrative responsibilities
such as appointments and grants also requires good internal processes reflecting
the requirements of administrative law and program legislation and an
appreciation of the public interest in the principles of merit, value for money,
fairness and ethics. Ministers might have considerable discretion in such decision
making and secretaries have a vital role in helping them to exercise that discretion
in a well-informed way. This involves building the necessary culture of
responsiveness to the minister and appreciation of the public interest, and having
the necessary processes in the department.
Ministerial correspondence and briefs
Secretaries cannot afford to rely entirely on others to manage ministerial
correspondence, Question Time briefs, and so on. These directly affect how a
minister is seen to be performing among fellow MPs (including rivals for the
ministry and rivals for the government), the Parliamentary Press Gallery and
with the public, including the minister’s constituents. The secretary needs to
be sure of the people and processes involved and to have constant monitoring
of the department’s performance with regular reports to the secretary and
executive (see also Chapter 10).
Variations in the balance of roles
The role of a secretary in supporting the minister will vary according to the size
and function of the department and the styles of the secretary and minister.
A large department inevitably limits the hands-on role of a secretary and adds
to the coordination and oversight role. In time, this places more emphasis on
internal departmental processes, systems and communications. A department
with a predominantly policy role will usually involve more direct links between
the secretary and minister, while one with more service delivery responsibilities
might involve less direct contact. (Interestingly, however, this is not reflected
in state government practice where, notwithstanding the greater service delivery
role, ministers and secretaries commonly have adjacent offices; the establishment
of the Human Services portfolio by the Commonwealth might also signal
increasing ministerial interest in service delivery as well as policy.)
Secretaries have to accommodate the different styles of ministers. Some ministers
have a very close interest in the operations of the department, while others are
more closely focused on higher levels of political interaction, in cabinet, the
party and the Parliament. Brian Howe, despite being Deputy Prime Minister,
spoke firmly to me about his constitutional responsibility ‘to administer’ the
department (the Constitution, s. 64). On the other hand, Robert Ray, then Minister
for Defence, made it clear he did not need me to bother him on issues of
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management that did not require his personal involvement. Most of my ministers
were more in Ray’s than Howe’s style.
Some secretaries enjoy the buzz of the political environment and some of these
provide a lot of immediate support during current pressures, which ministers
greatly appreciate (though I disapprove of secretaries confusing their role and
that of ministerial staff by constantly visiting or even working from the minister’s
office). Others prefer to marshal the necessary support mostly from a little
distance, allowing them to draw on their particular public service strengths in
terms of longer-term considerations or wider and deeper analysis. Neither
approach is necessarily good or bad, as long as secretaries have in place processes
to complement their own styles and strengths and are able to adjust their styles
for different circumstances. My own style was more in line with the latter
approach, allowing me (I felt) to give weight to the longer-term public interest,
but at times it did lead to vulnerability when political crises developed that
required more immediate and direct support.
Changes in the role over time
The communications revolution and the increased power and pervasiveness of
the media, along with global competitive pressures, have had a profound effect
on the role of secretaries in supporting ministers. This effect can be seen in many
developments:
• the 24/7 focus on politics and the increased capacity required by ministers
to respond and manage the immediate demands of the media
• the increased expectation on government by the public, including immediacy
of action, the linking of all program activities and the almost limitless reach
of government
• the response by governments of greater central control and control of
communications in particular
• the increased role of ministerial staff
• the increased involvement in policy and administration by non-governmental
organisations and individuals.
To some extent, this has introduced more competition to policy advising as well
as program administration, keeping secretaries and their officers on their toes.
It has also affected the way secretaries go about supporting their ministers:
• working very often with the ministerial staff, relying less on direct dealings
with the minister
• building more extensive external relationships, with interest groups and
think tanks in particular
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• establishing more sophisticated communications capacity within the
department, closely linked to the minister’s office, and with closer control
of external communications and relations with the media.
For these reasons, I have included a separate chapter (10) on communications
and dealing with the media, while also describing aspects of the impact on
secretaries in this chapter and the chapter (6) on management.
Increased management responsibilities through the financial and personnel
management reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have also inevitably demanded
more of secretaries’ own time adding to ministers’ tendencies to draw on the
advice of ministerial staff and external groups, and to the need for secretaries
and departments to build close links with advisers and external groups.
Another change since 1987 has been the introduction of portfolio ministers with
junior ministers as well as parliamentary secretaries (who are also, in effect,
junior ministers). Secretaries might now have three or more ministers to support,
requiring them to rely more heavily on deputy secretaries, with ministers in
turn relying more heavily also on their ministerial staff.
Table 3.5 The ‘ministerial team’
We always referred to the group of ministers and parliamentary
secretaries as ‘the ministerial team’. The term was without exception
somewhat of an oxymoron. The competition between ministers is always
a central factor to take into account.
When Brian Howe was the Minister for Housing and Regional
Development (1994–96), we had strict instructions not to copy our advice
to him to the parliamentary secretary, Mary Crawford. Howe’s advisers
were particularly keen to exclude her entirely from involvement in the
regional economic development program despite her nominal
responsibility for local government, which was critical to the program.
When Michael Wooldridge was Minister for Health and Family Services
(1996–98), relations between the ministers seemed generally positive,
but I always felt sympathy for Judi Moylan, who had to carry
responsibility for the 1996 cuts to aged care and child care with little
public support from the senior minister and his ERC colleagues who were
the decision makers. (I remain of the view that the measures were
generally worthwhile not only because they addressed the immediate
budget pressures but because of their longer-term benefits.) Moylan was
replaced by Warwick Smith before the 1998 election (when he lost his
seat).
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Later, when Wooldridge was Minister for Health and Aged Care and
Bronwyn Bishop was the Minister for Aged Care (1998–2001), the
relationship could be more difficult. For example, early in the 1999
budget process, there was a joint meeting with Bishop and the then
Parliamentary Secretary, Senator Grant Tambling, to discuss portfolio
priorities. This did not go well and subsequently the interaction on
budget matters was between each minister and the department, with the
department relaying to each the views and directions of the others (no
doubt complemented by interaction between the respective ministerial
offices).
My practice in the Health department was to identify a particular deputy to
provide most of the secretary-equivalent support to each junior minister, while
making it clear any minister had the right to deal with me directly if they needed
(or preferred) to. I retained the central role with the portfolio minister. For the
most part, this worked well, each minister feeling he or she received the attention
required and the department being in a good position to coordinate and to ensure
the portfolio minister could be kept informed across the full range of
responsibilities. The arrangement also allowed the deputies to learn more about
the role of a secretary in serving a minister.
On one or two occasions, Bishop expressed the view that I was not providing
sufficient personal support to her as I was too occupied with supporting the
portfolio minister, but she was certainly always complimentary about the
dedicated support she received from the deputy secretary, Mary Murnane.
Parliamentary secretaries such as Trish Worth and Grant Tambling also always
told me they were very satisfied with the support they received from deputies
Ian Lindenmayer and David Borthwick, respectively.
Current issues and challenges
Some issues surrounding the support of ministers by secretaries never change:
getting the balance right between responsiveness to the elected government and
its minister and apolitical professionalism in the public interest has always been
a challenge and a matter for judgment. Both are essential, but pursuing one to
the extent of compromising the other is not appropriate.
Some secretaries in the late 1990s referred to their ministers as their departments’
‘primary customers’ in their strategic plans and other exhortations to staff. I
always firmly rejected that view, not only because it misrepresented the
accountability framework in government, but because it promoted excessive
responsiveness and even obsequiousness to ministers. If private sector analogies
must be used, a minister is more like the chairman of the board and the secretary
more like the CEO. The CEO is responsible to the board, which agrees on the
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strategic direction of the organisation, including who is the primary customer
and how the organisation is to serve them. For government departments, the
‘primary customer’ was the Australian public, and I used our strategic planning
to ensure ministerial endorsement of the way we intended to serve the public.
In my experience, there is rarely much controversy in providing policy advice
to ministers. Most ministers are keen to be presented with options and do not
object to advice advocating an option they do not support (though inexperienced
ministerial advisers do sometimes try to constrain such advice). The challenge
is more acute when the advice concerns an issue of due process: a
freedom-of-information (FOI) request, information to be included in an annual
report, the need for a competitive tender process or other constraint about a
grant or contract. In this situation, a secretary might consider there is no room
for offering options: there is only due process. The minister may still reject the
advice (if it is lawful to do so) because of immediate political embarrassment,
but most know that in doing so their future political risks might be heightened.
The advice on due process is itself sometimes regarded as the problem and the
provision of such ‘frank and fearless’ advice requires the most courage, in my
experience.
Table 3.6 Whose annual report?
Annual reports set out departmental performance against the targets set
out in the portfolio budget statements for that year.
In the draft 2000–01 annual report, we included data on the number of
occupied aged-care places compared with the targets set out in the
portfolio budget statements: there was a small shortfall. This was of
considerable concern to Minister Bishop, who had been responding to
sustained criticism of insufficient places by announcing new funding
for more places. Her statements, including approved places not yet
occupied, demonstrated a commitment to considerable expansion, but
the annual report would show that we had not yet met the government’s
own target in terms of occupied places.
Following usual practice, I had provided copies of the draft report to
ministers well in advance to allow time for comment. After some initial
response, I agreed to include in the report figures on approved places
showing that new investments were being made, but insisted that the
data and comparisons based on occupied places remain.
As the deadline approached for publishing to meet parliamentary
obligations, I advised Minister Bishop’s office that I needed to proceed
that weekend. Bishop rang me, directing very forcefully that nothing
was to go to the printer until she had approved the wording, which was
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not possible for another week as she was travelling to Central Australia.
It was her report, she said, and it would not include data that were not
in her public statements. I gently reminded her that it was in fact my
report, that I was obliged to report against the published portfolio budget
statements targets and that Parliament had set the deadlines.
Nonetheless, we held back the printing to the last possible minute.
Deputy Secretary Mary Murnane spent several hours with the minister
in Alice Springs going through the draft in minute detail and I agreed
to a few minor amendments while retaining the key data. The report was
eventually tabled (after further resistance from the minister when the
2001 election was called).
The challenge to balance responsiveness and impartial professionalism is not
always about resisting excessive pressure for responsiveness. In the early days
of a new government, the challenge is frequently in the reverse direction:
departments can be slow to understand the priorities and styles of the new
minister and government and considerable attention has to be given to providing
ministers with the opportunity to exercise the authority they have earned and
to change policies, procedures, priorities and resource allocation. Wooldridge
has told me he felt some areas of the department continued to pursue their own
agendas and were slow to respond to his decisions when they did not align with
their views (there might have been some truth to this and there were cases where
I intervened to press for quicker and more positive responses, but some of the
concerns of the relevant officers reflected statutory responsibilities not personal
agendas and certainly did warrant testing of the minister’s directions).
Officers can also sometimes move into ‘caretaker mode’ too early, resisting acting
on minister’s political decisions before an election has been called. I always took
the view that three-year terms were already very short and the public interest
would not be served at all if the Public Service effectively shortened these terms.
There are clear rules as to when the caretaker period begins and until that time
ministers have every right to expect their lawful instructions to be obeyed. Of
course, the nearer governments get to elections, the more often poor decisions
tend to be made, and the more important good and frank advice can be.
More recent issues include working with substantial ministerial offices and
handling the closer control of government communications.
Ministerial staffers are a critical part of the political landscape in Australia,
reflecting an international trend in government. They not only provide important
politically oriented support to the minister, in doing so, they can take pressure
off ‘politicising’ the Public Service through partisan appointments or activities.
These advantages can be jeopardised if the advisers overstep the mark in their
relations with public servants.
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Table 3.7 Building trust with ministerial staff
Good relations with the minister’s staff are important but not always
easy. I learned from my early experience with Brian Howe’s staff that,
as secretary, I needed to invest more of my own time in the relationship.
I had some concerns about his staff relating in particular to the level of
intervention down into my (small) department and the lack of clarity
about responsibilities in the office (indeed, there was frequently
disagreement among his staff and competition to gain his ear). Given the
chief of staff seemed to have limited authority over the other advisers,
I chose to raise my concerns with the minister himself, but only after I
felt confident of our own performance in serving him and addressing
his policy priorities. This proved at least partially successful (see also
Chapter 7), but ran the risk of openly challenging people with a very
longstanding and close personal relationship with the minister.
With Michael Wooldridge’s office, I used a different tack, which I think
is generally the better one. I worked hard on my own relationship with
the chief of staff, Barbara Hayes (and later Ken Smith). We arranged to
meet every month or so over a glass of wine in my office. We would each
draw up an agenda, which, while dominated by issues of policy or
program substance, usually included a few incidents between the
department and office causing one or other (or both) of us concern. The
informality allowed us to talk frankly about the department’s
performance or an adviser’s overstepping the mark, including incidents
involving either of us personally. It did not resolve everything, but it
diffused many situations that might otherwise have escalated into a brawl
requiring ministerial involvement.
Control of communications similarly can present a two-edged sword. Good
control can help build confidence in the relationship between ministers and the
Public Service (nothing so quickly destroys trust as leaks or other failures in
communications management). Excessive control, however, can inhibit the
release or even the preparation of information, such as research and statistics,
which is in the public interest.
Trust, relations and confidence are put under greatest pressure during political
crises. I have experienced my fair share, learning the importance of keeping
open channels of communication with the minister and office while taking
responsibility for project management of the crisis within the department,
ensuring timely collection of information, preparation of useful briefs, and so
on. I was not always successful in this (Table 3.8).
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Table 3.8 Managing political crises: the ‘scan scam’ and kerosene
baths
The years 1999 and 2000 were particularly difficult for me and the
department, as well as for my two ministers, Michael Wooldridge and
Bronwyn Bishop. Administrative weaknesses in the department
contributed to incidents that spiralled into political crises colloquially
known as the ‘scan scam’ and the kerosene baths case. Years later, I might
be able to convince some people that, in both cases, despite the immediate
failures, the underlying programs and initiatives were achieving
substantial improvements in the quality of care, and in a cost-effective
way. At the time, however, we were all in the bunker under continuous
attack by the media, interest groups and the Opposition.
An interesting side to this was the different approaches taken to managing
the two crises—one effective, the other not.
During the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) crisis in 1999, we
established a small team in the department to coordinate support for
Wooldridge. The team met in my office briefly each morning and we
would have a short teleconference with the minister’s chief of staff to
discuss the latest media stories, the information needed to respond, the
likely tactics in Parliament (for example, Question Time, Matter of Public
Importance debate, censure motion). My officers would then seek out
the necessary information and draft some briefs. Late in the morning,
we would meet again in my office, go through the material, send it to
the minister’s office and have a further teleconference to test if we had
covered what was needed and to discuss further the tactics the minister
might prepare for. The minister’s office would then take over control,
turning the briefs into speeches and so on, liaising with the Prime
Minister’s Office and the minister representing in the Senate. Most days,
I spoke to the minister late in the day to review the situation.
For a time, relations between the minister’s office and the department
were understandably fraught, but I rang the chief of staff advising him
that whatever their criticisms of the department, the minister and I (and
he) needed to keep the lines of communication between us open, every
day. This we did, and it helped enormously.
The aged-care crisis in 2000 was inherently more complex (new claims
were being aired about nursing homes around Australia each day), but
it still was not managed nearly as well as it should have been. First,
despite my objections, the head of the Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet, Max Moore-Wilton, instructed me to work from Bishop’s
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office. This confused my role and the office’s role. We set up a team in
the department under the deputy, but control there was made more
difficult by pressure on me to intervene continuously when briefings
were late. Briefings were constantly late, as we attempted to get the facts
on every claim from around Australia by lunchtime, rather than prioritise
and insist on extra time to investigate details. The department was also
struggling to get its state offices to appreciate the importance of the crisis
and their responsibility to respond more quickly and clearly.
The office was not operating smoothly either, with the Prime Minister’s
Office constantly intruding to criticise the department (‘You need a
baseball bat, Andrew, to take to the department’) and insufficient
attention was paid to ensuring the minister representing Bishop in the
Senate (Amanda Vanstone) was properly briefed. Support from the
portfolio minister’s office was offered but not taken up. Everything was
done on the run, with much blame and insufficient cooperation.
The only one I felt could hold their head up for performing well was the
deputy secretary, Mary Murnane, who was calm in the crisis and accepted
the second-best management approach, performing as leader of the team
back in the department and at times providing some of the personal
support for the minister that should have come from the office.
Postscript: some light relief
Twice during the kerosene baths crisis, while in difficult meetings with
Bishop and her advisers, I was called away to answer an urgent phone
call from the portfolio minister, Wooldridge. While each time there was
some point of substance to the call, the main purpose was: ‘I thought
you might need a break, Andrew.’
Lessons for successfully supporting the minister
Among the lessons from my own experience are the following.
• Notwithstanding the benefits of supporting processes and mechanisms, the
secretary must have regular, direct contact with the minister, initiating that
contact as well as responding to requests.
• Where there is more than one minister in the portfolio, it is helpful to assign
a deputy to each junior minister or parliamentary secretary, to provide
dedicated support. This does not entirely replace the need for the portfolio
secretary to be available to support the non-portfolio ministers, but it does
spread the load effectively and meets most requirements for secretary-level
support.
• Ministers rely heavily on secretaries for advice on due process. In the early
days, some diplomatic teaching of a minister by a secretary is required.
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Courage might be needed at times in giving advice on due process, but most
ministers appreciate it in the longer term.
• Secretaries are also almost always expected to be able to add value to policy
advice. This does not require constraining advice from departmental experts,
but guiding that advice and helping to identify alternative options and take
into account wider issues and context.
• Strategic planning, directly involving ministers, can help build the necessary
relationship. Strategic plans focus on ‘why’ and ‘how’, complementing policy
platforms, charter letters and portfolio budget statements that determine
‘what’ achievements are expected and the resources involved. They can be
regarded as high-level agreements between the minister and the department
and should be formally endorsed by the minister. The minister is never,
however, the department’s ‘primary customer’; the minister is the boss.
• Setting a day aside, at least once a year, for high-level discussions with the
minister on longer-term policy issues and directions is enormously helpful
in ensuring policy coherence and understanding of the evidence behind the
department’s policy advice.
• While never replacing direct meetings, emails and phone calls with the
minister, the secretary should arrange regular meetings with the minister’s
chief of staff. Informal discussions covering agendas drawn up by both
parties can help to diffuse misunderstandings, focus attention on matters of
importance to the minister and clarify the basis of ‘frank and fearless’ advice
that might be causing unease.
• Such contacts are even more important in times of political crisis when there
might be tension between the minister and the department.
• Encouraging the chief of staff to clarify the division of responsibilities among
ministerial staff can serve to limit miscommunications between the department
and the office and to enhance the relevance and timeliness of advice.
• Departmental liaison officers should be high-performing officers with a lot
of potential for more senior roles in the future. This demonstrates to the
minister and ministerial staff the calibre of public servants in the department,
reduces the risk of an ‘us and them’ mentality developing and provides
excellent training opportunities for future public service executives.
Photo acknowledgments
Michael Wooldridge when Minister for Health and Family Services (photo by kind permission of the
Parliamentary Library)
Brian Howe when Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Housing and Regional Development (photo by
kind permission of the Parliamentary Library)
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4. Know the real boss: support to the
Prime Minister and the whole of
government
Left: Prime Minister Paul Keating who first appointed Podger as Secretary of the Department of
Administrative Services and the Arts in December 1993 (photo with kind permission of the Parliamentary
Library)
Right: Prime Minister John Howard who appointed Podger as Secretary of the Department of Health and
Family Services in March 1996, renewing the appointment as Secretary of the Department of Health and
Aged Care in 2001, and appointing Podger as Public Service Commissioner from 2002 (photo by kind
permission of the Parliamentary Library)
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Elements of the role
The contribution of secretaries to ‘collective responsibility’ involves a number
of activities, which overlap and link with the activities involved in supporting
the minister. These include:
• involvement with cabinet and cabinet committees such as the Expenditure
Review Committee (ERC)
• contributing to cross-portfolio policy development and review
• participating in meetings of secretaries, particularly meetings chaired by the
Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C).
In addition, there has been an increasing role for formal guidance from the Prime
Minister to ministers on political priorities over a term of office. As described
in Chapter 3, charter letters grew in importance, length and formality during
the Howard years; while Prime Minister Rudd has not so far continued that
practice, he is certainly no less interventionist in his style, placing strong
emphasis on whole-of-government management and political control.
It was common practice under the Hawke, Keating and Howard Governments
for officials to attend cabinet committee meetings (though not cabinet itself) and
to be invited to contribute to the discussion. The Rudd Government has
continued the practice. This has proven to be an effective way of ensuring
informed and timely consideration of the issues by ministers. Ministers can
choose not to have officials accompany them or to have the relevant policy
expert, who is not the secretary (this apparently is less common under the Rudd
Government). Unless I felt insufficiently knowledgeable on the matters under
consideration, I usually sought to be the official involved, as I was most often
able to relate the issues concerned to wider policies and experience. I also had
more experience than most of how cabinet committees worked, having sat on
the ERC for many years in the Department of Finance and provided briefings to
the Prime Minister when in PM&C.
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Table 4.1 Doing deals in the ERC
In the 1995 budget process, Brian Howe was having difficulty getting
support from his colleagues for his vision of a continuing role for the
Commonwealth in cities and regions. The Prime Minister, Paul Keating,
was sympathetic, particularly about the Better Cities program: he
suggested the final decision on its funding be deferred until the inner
cabinet could reflect on the revenue available at the end of the budget
process. Howe, however, needed not only to keep his proposal for that
program alive, he needed to avoid the ERC rejecting everything else on
the table in order to offset what some ERC members clearly considered
an indulgence of the Prime Minister and his deputy.
Howe’s budget proposals covered a range of housing programs as well
as cities and regional development. The standard ERC rule was that
genuine, continuing savings must offset new policy. Howe’s proposal
did not meet this requirement and certainly did not provide savings to
offset any post-ERC decision to provide new capital funds for cities.
The ERC gave Howe a hard time and he and his adviser (who attended
with me) were dejected, as it seemed nothing would go the minister’s
way. I was, however, conscious that one of the minister’s proposals was
not really a priority for the portfolio (it was included at the strong
insistence of another adviser) and, indeed, I suspected we would not
spend the allocation we already had for that program. I quietly asked
Howe if I could propose a deal, offering not only to withdraw that
proposal but to offer up some savings. He agreed with reluctance,
assuming there was no hope of a useful decision. I put the idea to the
Finance Minister, Kim Beazley, as a trade for all the other proposals
except for Better Cities, which was to be deferred until later anyway.
Beazley turned to Prime Minister Keating, who was about to close the
meeting on a sour note, to say that perhaps a deal was possible after all.
Howe indicated he would accept my suggestion, which Beazley
recommended to the ERC.
Howe and his adviser were still despondent. They had not appreciated
the significance of the deal, having heard only that no new money was
yet agreed for Better Cities, that another proposed measure had gone
backwards and only criticism of the portfolio and Howe’s vision.
It was not until the ERC cabinet decision was circulated that the minister
and his office realised what we had won. Written cabinet decisions
always reflect the exact words in the minister’s cabinet submission unless
cabinet (or the ERC) specifically decides differently. Thus, every proposal
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was endorsed exactly as recommended with just two exceptions, and
we had been extremely careful with the drafting of the minister’s
submission. On Better Cities, the decision included the minister’s vision
for the program, including that it would be a continuing one, but deferred
the amount of new capital to be provided each year.
Belatedly, there was some celebration, particularly when new funds for
Better Cities were also subsequently agreed.
The celebration was short-lived, as the department and the Better Cities
program were abolished a year later.
For most of my time as a secretary, my minister was a member of the ERC. This
can be an enormous advantage if well managed. The minister may seek
departmental advice on submissions from other portfolios. When this happened,
I usually did my best to provide the advice myself or drew on one or two senior
officers with relevant experience. I provided Howe with advice on
superannuation and tax (finding, to the Treasury’s embarrassment, significant
errors in its 1995 cabinet documents) and Wooldridge with advice on education,
social security, housing and defence in 1996 and 1997, with substantial assistance
from Louise Morauta, another former finance officer. Wooldridge took his broader
ERC responsibilities very seriously and his performance was well regarded,
including by Finance and Treasury department officials. This helped him when
his own portfolio was under review, though more in terms of understanding
the ‘rules of the game’ than in getting any special treatment.
Table 4.2 Clearing officials from the cabinet room
Very early in 1996, Michael Wooldridge asked me how the ERC worked.
I outlined the process, emphasising that it was open to the (new) Prime
Minister to vary it as he wished. The minister asked in particular whether
he could ask for a ministers-only discussion to canvass political aspects
without officials present. I told him that was a matter he could raise with
the chair, usually being the Prime Minister when health was being
discussed, noting nonetheless the advantages of having officials present.
Wooldridge frequently pursued this, seeking an opportunity for
ministers-only discussions after some initial debate on his budget
proposals with officials present. Max Moore-Wilton in particular was
not amused, for the good reasons that the debate might not be as
well-informed if central agency officials were not there to question
arguments presented as facts and that the cabinet decision drafted by
officials subsequently might not fully reflect the subtleties of the
discussion and its conclusions.
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Possibly for these very reasons, Wooldridge felt the idea served him
well, strengthening his capacity to win his arguments. I advised him a
few years later that he was using the tactic too often and was putting at
risk his relationship with the Prime Minister, who was receiving strong
objections from Moore-Wilton. He told me that he accepted my advice
just before another ERC meeting. Nonetheless, about half an hour into
the meeting, he turned to the Prime Minister and asked for a
ministers-only discussion. It was a spur-of-the-moment request and was
agreed to by the Prime Minister. Moore-Wilton glared down the table
at the minister and me as he rose to leave. As I also rose, the minister
said quietly to me: ‘I got that wrong, didn’t I?’
Contributing to the cabinet process also entails substantial prior work with other
agencies and, frequently, post-cabinet work. Interaction with other agencies
often contributed to the design of the minister’s proposals and identified the
key issues for debate in the cabinet room. This is articulated formally in the
coordination comments in the minister’s submission to cabinet and in the
Department of Finance ‘Green’ (the Finance department’s briefing for the ERC
or cabinet ministers on each submission coming forward that has resource
implications). Post-cabinet work can involve bilateral or trilateral deliberation
to resolve differences consistent with cabinet directions or to explore additional
options or to test proposals in more detail. It also involves providing regular
reports to the Cabinet Implementation Unit and responses to questions raised
about implementation.
Secretaries’ personal involvement in such work depends on the significance of
the issues involved. It is not unusual for secretary-to-secretary discussions to
resolve, or at least narrow, differences for ministerial decisions. Most of the
interaction among officials, however, occurs among SES officers, and sometimes
below the SES. Particularly in any post-cabinet work, it is common that the
respective ministerial offices will confer to resolve matters that cannot be settled
by secretaries or other officials, or to identify politically acceptable compromises.
In the pre-cabinet stages, there could also be some liaison between ministerial
offices, parallel to the interaction among officials, exploring the political
dimensions of the different views of the portfolios.
There are many mechanisms for whole-of-government policy development and
management. The advantages and disadvantages of different processes and
structures are canvassed in the 2004 Management Advisory Committee report
Connected Government. Secretaries’ involvement in such cross-portfolio activities
is usually at the initial stages in setting the terms of reference for an exercise
and at the final stages in confirming each department’s position on the emerging
policy options, proposals and conclusions. It is also increasingly common for a
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reference group of secretaries, often chaired by the Secretary of the Department
of PM&C, to oversee the work of a task force or interdepartmental committee,
to ensure it is developing options that address the agenda ministers have set and
that are achievable in the desired time frame. This was the model used effectively
when I chaired the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Health Services Delivery in
2005.
Secretaries (and their officers) are usually required to wear two hats in these
exercises. The first is in line with their statutory duty to work ‘under the
minister’, representing the minister’s views and the department’s program
interests. The second is to collaborate to help achieve a collective solution for
the Prime Minister and the government.
Table 4.3 Task Force on Health Services Delivery
From late 2004 until mid-2005, I chaired a task force on the delivery of
health services in Australia. I had a small team of very able officers,
seconded from the departments of Health and Ageing, Treasury and the
Prime Minister and Cabinet, working for me. We were based in the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
There was also a reference group of the secretaries from these three
departments, ensuring the task force addressed the terms of reference
and met the objectives of the Prime Minister. The reference group
commented on outlines and drafts of the report and took responsibility
for a covering cabinet memorandum to which the final report was
attached. Members of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) attended most
meetings of the reference group.
The report was nonetheless my report and I took very seriously my
professional independence in preparing it (though I was directed not to
consult widely). I resisted the preference of the Department of PM&C
and the PMO to focus on incremental reform, believing that the terms
of reference and the context in which the task force was established
required me to give equal if not more attention to options for longer-term
reform.
I was given the opportunity to brief the Prime Minister directly on the
report and subsequently to brief the cabinet. They endorsed most of my
shorter-term proposals, but baulked at my options for more fundamental
reform.
I believe the structure of the exercise was a very good one and am only
disappointed by the government’s decision not to publish the final report.
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The Secretary of the Department of PM&C chairs a monthly meeting of portfolio
secretaries plus the Public Service Commissioner. These meetings are usually of
one hour’s duration and focus mostly on informing secretaries of the current
policy priorities of the Prime Minister and senior ministers, and processes for
handling these and other high-level matters. Sometimes particular policy issues
are discussed but, in the short time available, such discussion usually focuses
on identifying a suitable process for more considered study and advice to
ministers within the relevant timetable. Public service management issues are
also sometimes identified but, again, mostly with a view to establishing a process
for more considered study.
Once a year, the Secretary of the Department of PM&C hosts a two-day retreat
that allows more substantial discussion of selected emerging policy issues and
of some management issues (I understand, however, there was no retreat in
2008). As a rule, the Prime Minister joins the group for a lengthy discussion of
his priorities and strategies and of any concerns secretaries might wish to raise.
These discussions were usually very useful, Prime Minister Howard being quite
forthcoming and frank in his assessments of future policy directions on such
diverse issues as privatisation, Indigenous welfare and demographic change. On
occasions, however, some secretaries seemed to use the opportunity to promote
themselves rather than informed and frank discussion.
Table 4.4 Bring back the biff
At one portfolio secretaries’ retreat, there was a more robust discussion
than usual among secretaries and other invited agency heads of the
government’s policy on information technology (IT) outsourcing. Several
people argued against the mandating of such outsourcing—the
Statistician, Bill McLennan, being perhaps the most outspoken. While
not constraining the discussion on this occasion, Max Moore-Wilton
questioned McLennan’s insistence on his statutory independence and
hence his ability to ignore the government’s policy.
McLennan, a former ACT rugby front rower, finally had enough. ‘If you
say that again, Max, I’ll biff you one.’
It was a most effective way of getting his argument listened to seriously
by Moore-Wilton—better than my tendency to be quietly persistent or
some others’ tendency just to go quiet.
Apart from these formal and regular gatherings (and those focused specifically
on APS management—see Chapter 10), secretaries often meet in smaller forums,
often informally, to confer on issues of shared interest. When Secretary of the
Health department, I continued the practice (mentioned in Chapter 2) of Tony
Blunn, former Secretary of the Department of Social Security, of hosting monthly
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lunches of the secretaries of the social policy departments. The heads of other
related agencies such as Centrelink also became involved and the value of the
gatherings proved so great to those participating that secretaries refused to drop
off the invitation list when they moved away from the social policy area. As a
result, the attendance at times was counterproductive to the private discussions
intended.
As well as such informal forums, there is often the need for selected secretaries
to meet to discuss a matter of shared interest to their ministers and to establish
processes through which officials can explore the issue in more detail. Examples
in the Housing department included work with the departments of Social Security
and PM&C (and later The Treasury and the Finance department) on housing
reform and rental assistance and with the departments of Employment and
Transport on regional development and cities; examples in the Department of
Health included work with the Industry department on pharmaceutical pricing
and regulation, with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs on medical and
pharmaceutical benefits, aged care and patient health records, with the
Department of Family and Community Services on rehabilitation and health
assessment services for social security clients, and with Customs, the
Attorney-General’s Department and others on illicit drug strategies.
Variations on these roles and activities
The extent of whole-of-government activity depends critically on the function
of the department. Some departments are inevitably involved constantly in
whole-of-government activities: the central agencies themselves and other
agencies with specific coordinating roles (for example, the Attorney-General’s
and Foreign Affairs departments). Departments with wide responsibilities, such
as the Health department, also find themselves with substantial overlapping
interests with other agencies.
The extent also varies with the style and interests of the Prime Minister and the
Secretary of the Department of PM&C. Prime Minister Howard made considerable
use of task forces chaired by his department, often involving external players.
He also engaged people to direct task forces overseen or supported by a reference
group of secretaries chaired by his department.
Some secretaries of the Department of PM&C, such as Peter Shergold, have a
naturally collaborative style that encourages more frequent and free discussions
among secretaries. Others, such as Moore-Wilton or Mike Keating, took a more
directive approach to address the government’s agenda and their own perspective
on it. Whatever the personal style of the Secretary of PM&C, forums of secretaries
frequently play a critical role in setting the future policy agenda of the
government, and for redirecting policy. Constructive examples in my time that
I was involved in as secretary included discussions on housing reforms and the
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Council of Australian Governments (COAG) microeconomic reform agenda in
the mid-1990s (under Mike Keating), discussions on population ageing and the
importance of workforce participation and productivity rather than just outlays
on health and welfare (under Moore-Wilton, influenced by Ken Henry from the
Treasury) and discussions on Indigenous programs (under Shergold). Less positive
examples include policies on asylum seekers and illicit drugs in Moore-Wilton’s
time, though I must concede that the Howard Government felt well served by
the advice received.
As Table 4.5 illustrates, not all of the cases I was personally involved in proved
successful in the end—but not for want of extensive involvement by secretaries
and other officials.
Table 4.5 The never completed 1995 housing reform agenda
In 1994, I was encouraged by Mike Keating to explore possible reforms
to housing assistance programs as part of the then COAG agenda on
microeconomic reform and the wider use of competition in the provision
of government services.
I initially opened discussions among Housing department CEOs suggesting
a new approach to the Commonwealth–State Housing Agreement. I was
keen to see the imposition of market rents and the introduction of
transparent income-tested rental subsidies to replace the existing formulae
for rents (based on income but with open-ended subsidies). I also wanted
to explore the possibility of narrowing the differential between social
security rental assistance for those not in public housing and the effective
subsidies for those in public housing, as an alternative approach to
addressing the never-reducing queues for public housing.
The state housing CEOs were mostly sceptical, favouring their traditional
approach of publicly owned housing stock with rents set at no more
than 25 per cent of household income. The minister, Brian Howe, had
also originally supported this approach but recognised the Commonwealth
could never afford to provide the capital needed to meet outstanding
need, and realised the subsidies for public housing in some locations
were unsustainably high, encouraging tenants to stay longer than they
needed to and limiting access to others.
Keating and the senior COAG officials supported the use of market rents
and more commercial management of the housing stock, but were keen
to go further to clarify federal responsibilities for housing. With some
support from Victoria and South Australia, we developed more radical
options under which the Commonwealth would take full responsibility
for rental assistance, including subsidies to public housing tenants, and
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the states would take full responsibility for managing the stock and
policies to promote lower rental housing in the private housing sector.
Howe supported this approach as long as it could maintain and extend
current subsidies to social security recipients in rental housing in either
the public or private sectors.
The benefits were not only greater efficiency in the management of public
housing but wider access to low-rent housing, greater equity in housing
assistance, more choice and the potential to break-up public housing
estates, which in many places had become centres of crime and social
disadvantage, limiting opportunities for escaping poverty. There would
also be better accountability through clearer division of federal
responsibilities.
Keating engaged the Treasury and Finance departments in the process,
encouraging them to help address the necessary transfers in funds
between the Commonwealth and the states arising from the states
receiving market rents and the Commonwealth taking full responsibility
for rental assistance.
Housing ministers accepted the proposals in principle and cabinet also
agreed. COAG endorsed the proposals in November 1995 and Prime
Minister Keating announced the reforms in December 1995 in the
‘Community and Nation’ policy statement.
Sadly, for political reasons I do not understand, the Howard Government
dropped the proposals in mid-1996. The problems of public housing
estates, queues for public housing and inadequate rental assistance for
many social security recipients remain.
Changes in the role over time
Associated with the Public Service and financial management reforms of the
1980s and 1990s there was some shift in emphasis towards secretaries’
responsibilities to their own ministers and to managing their departments. In
part, this was a conscious move to reduce cabinet’s workload and to rely more
heavily on portfolio ministers to prioritise within broader budgetary allocations.
This shift has been limited, however, for several reasons. As argued in the MAC
report Connected Government, there is increasing demand for cross-agency
responses to social and economic concerns, for the government to marshal all
the resources at its disposal to find the most effective solutions and for the
community to have access to seamless services. As mentioned earlier, the
pervasiveness of media coverage has also led to the political requirement for
closer control of the policy agenda and of communications.
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With the introduction of performance pay and increased use of short-term
‘contracts’, the balance also shifted during the past decade back towards the
collective responsibility of secretaries. The collective responsibility of secretaries
is made most clear by the Prime Minister’s role in their appointments and their
performance assessment. The fact that the Secretary of the Department of PM&C
is the key adviser in both these respects adds considerable weight to secretaries’
understanding that their legal responsibility to their ministers is balanced by
real responsibilities to the Prime Minister and the secretary of his department.
Under successive Australian governments, cabinet and its committees have
continued to provide the main processes for coordination, informed decision
making and priority setting. The Prime Minister’s Office has been strengthened
progressively, but unlike in the United Kingdom and Canada, it has mostly
complemented rather than offset the role of cabinet. The Expenditure Review
Committee (ERC) in particular is the engine room for most of the detailed reviews
of policy and resource allocation and for almost all, if not all, secretaries it is the
most important mechanism for their interaction with the centre of government.
There have been some changes in the way ministers are collectively advised on
cross-portfolio matters. The traditional interdepartmental committee, with each
department represented by a senior officer forcefully presenting his or her
agency’s views based on its functional responsibilities, is now in abeyance and
there is more emphasis on time-limited task forces and reviews charged with
identifying preferred solutions to particular problems. The task force might
involve officers from different agencies but they are not there as representatives
but rather as experts helping to find a common solution. Such task forces might
involve outside players and might even be chaired by them (for example, the
former Prime Minister’s task forces on welfare reform and on drugs). They might
have a reference group of secretaries whose role includes directing the work of
the task force and/or testing its proposals from the perspectives of the different
portfolios. Where there is no reference group, secretaries will look to other
avenues to influence the task force and to advise on its proposals. Task force
reports might go to cabinet or a ministerial committee via joint cabinet
submissions from relevant ministers, via cabinet memorandums prepared by the
reference groups of secretaries or directly without a formal filtering process.
Another more recent development is to focus on implementation as well as policy
development. This began after I moved to the APS Commission so I had little
direct experience with the new arrangements. These include the Implementation
Unit in the Department of PM&C, aimed primarily at ensuring implementation
issues are addressed up front in cabinet submissions with a careful assessment
of risks and their management. The unit also oversees a ‘traffic-light’ monitoring
of implementation, drawing to ministers’ attention where implementation is not
in line with plans and objectives.
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Issues
Balancing collective and individual responsibilities is not always easy. Where
a minister has firm views that conflict with the views of the senior ministers
and/or the central agencies, the secretary can be in a difficult position. The role
in these circumstances is still to give the minister all the necessary support and
advice, but also to facilitate informed debate in the appropriate ministerial forum.
That might involve informing the secretaries of the other agencies of the
minister’s views and ensuring there is an opportunity for political debate. In
doing this, care needs to be taken to ensure the minister does not feel the
secretary is undermining the minister’s position (particularly when the secretary
has advised against the minister’s position).
Table 4.6 Michael Wooldridge and control of the health agenda
Michael Wooldridge completed a thesis on the Fraser Government’s
initiatives on health financing as part of a master’s degree. It convinced
him of the need for the health minister and department to have control
of the health policy agenda and not to allow the central agencies, with
only a theoretical approach and limited practical understanding of the
sector, to take the initiative.
While at times this led to some tensions, with the departments of PM&C
and Finance in particular, for the most part it served the government
well. Wooldridge as a member of the ERC felt obliged to ensure his
proposals were financially and economically responsible, and we
developed a series of budget packages that, while not always publicly
popular, were effective, reduced outlays growth and addressed
longer-term concerns. These included changes to aged care, the Medicare
Benefits Schedule (MBS), primary care, the Pharmaceutical Benefits
Scheme (PBS) and the introduction of lifetime community rating for
private health insurance.
Wooldridge had Prime Minister Howard’s full confidence in these issues
for most of the time and in working with the sometimes difficult medical
profession. Where he and the department were less successful in retaining
the confidence of the central ministers and departments (particularly
PM&C) was in public health policy (for example, drugs), Indigenous
health (where the minister and department felt strongly that sustained
increases in funding were required) and in the relationship between
private health insurance and Medicare (it was widely known within the
government that the department had not supported the 30 per cent rebate
initiative at the time, despite the minister’s involvement).
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There were also sharp tensions at times over the negotiation of the 1998
Australian Health Care Agreements, particularly with the Department
of PM&C and the PMO (see Chapter 8).
As mentioned, the Prime Minister appoints secretaries after a report from the
Secretary of the Department of PM&C. They are acutely aware of the Prime
Minister’s priorities and expectations even while they are formally responsible
to their own ministers. I have written previously of the challenge in balancing
these pressures; Brian Howe more than once complaining that he felt I was more
concerned about the views of the then PM&C Secretary, Michael Keating, than
I was about his (Howe’s) views. Mostly, however, Howe was conscious that I,
as well as he, had Prime Minister Keating’s confidence (from my earlier time in
the Finance department and advising the ERC), and that this was helpful to him.
For the most part, I think I also had Prime Minister Howard’s confidence, but
my more rocky relationship with Max Moore-Wilton presented challenges.
A more subtle issue is how secretaries handle the demand for collaboration when
there are serious differences of perspective that should be addressed. There is
a risk of ‘group think’ in collaborative processes, just as there is a risk of
obstruction and delay in the traditional Interdepartmental Committee (IDC)
process. For this reason, I have always favoured the task force approach combined
with a reference group of relevant secretaries (or their representatives). Secretaries
can find it difficult to ensure different perspectives are fully appreciated where
there is no such reference group. It might be too late to advise a minister of
concerns about a task force’s recommendations after it has reported, particularly
if the task force has officials and external people involved. By then, the
recommendations might have a political momentum that, if halted, would cause
significant damage.
Table 4.7 Collective responsibility or centralisation of power
One of Brian Howe’s comments when we discussed a draft of this
monograph was whether the increasing power of the Department of
PM&C was not so much an emphasis on ‘collective responsibility’ as the
centralisation of political and public service power. He cited the instance,
when he was Deputy Prime Minister, of Robert Tickner (the then Minister
for Aboriginal Affairs) being excluded from the then government’s
deliberations of the Mabo High Court case on Indigenous land rights; he
felt that the Prime Minister and his department took over the issue
completely, rather than just ensuring collective responsibility.
There certainly is a risk that ‘whole-of-government’ processes do not
simply facilitate constructive collaboration and coordination, but involve
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coopting public servants to serve the interests of the Prime Minister (or
other central ministers) at the expense of the interests of line ministers
and the groups and communities their policies and programs are designed
to support.
For these reasons, it is essential for secretaries to keep their ministers
closely informed about cross-portfolio activities and deliberations. There
were occasions in my experience when central agencies, at the apparent
behest of their ministers, attempted to constrain ministerial discussion
of significant policy matters on the pretext of overriding financial
imperatives. The Department of Finance at one stage even promoted a
culture among its staff of ‘winning’ debates over resources and policies,
rather than ensuring informed discussion among ministers to allow them
to exercise collective responsibility properly.
My own approach in such circumstances was not just to keep the minister
informed as best I could, but never to accept arguments that our concerns
were not relevant because some more important issue was at stake that
I was not authorised to debate.
The problem is not a new one, though it has almost certainly become
more acute in recent decades. I learned my approach from very early
days in my career not to be bullied by the Treasury in the 1970s over
family allowances and tax expenditures, or in the 1980s over
superannuation and tax reform, nor by all three central agencies in the
1990s and 2000s over Better Cities funding, Indigenous health and
hospitals funding.
A related issue is the appropriate role for ministerial staff (for example, from the
Prime Minister’s Office) in task forces and reference groups. Their involvement
can certainly facilitate clear understanding of the Prime Minister’s wishes and
concerns and help to give focus to the work of the task force. On the other hand,
they can inhibit discussion of sensitive issues by secretaries (or the task force)
that could be interpreted by ministerial staff as obstructing the work the
government has requested. I felt this was the case in the Prime Minister’s task
force on drugs and, to a lesser extent (as I could personally resist the pressure),
in the reference group of secretaries for the task force I chaired on health services
delivery in 2005.
Lessons in supporting the Prime Minister and whole of
government
The following points are among the lessons from my own experience in working
across portfolios and with the Prime Minister and cabinet:
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• To avoid misunderstandings about lines of responsibility, do not initiate
direct contact with another minister or minister’s office (including the PMO),
but work through your own minister’s office or through the other minister’s
department. If the Prime Minister or another minister, or his or her office,
contacts you directly, quickly inform your own minister or his/her office.
• Informed discussion in cabinet or the ERC is enhanced when secretaries
discuss important coordination comments in submissions before they are
finalised, and consult on finance ‘Greens’ (the briefs the Finance department
provides to all ERC members on every proposal put to the ERC). Secretary
attendance at the ERC is also most often an aid to informed discussion, but
ministers should be discouraged from taking in multiple officials or advisers
(this only causes other ministers to have less confidence in the minister’s
capacity).
• Secretary discussion with the cabinet note-taker rarely goes astray after a
complex discussion. It can help to avoid a decision being circulated that fails
to reflect the subtlety of the issues involved and the difficulty of having
such a decision corrected.
• Time-limited task forces are a particularly effective mechanism for
whole-of-government action, particularly if there is also a reference group
to facilitate discussion of portfolio views as well as (independent) task force
views.
• It is usually better if reference groups and task forces do not include
ministerial staff, but ministerial staff are invited to attend discussions at
particular stages of the task.
• If there is a significant difference of view emerging between the minister
and the Prime Minister or other senior ministers and/or the central agencies,
ensure the Secretary of the Department of PM&C understands the issues,
and keep the minister and his/her office informed of the advice going to the
Prime Minister and senior ministers.
• Informal meetings among secretaries are important for cutting through the
issues and clarifying remaining differences for ministers to settle. They also
help understanding of political factors that are not always reflected in the
papers.
• Improved implementation of whole-of-government measures is enhanced
not so much by more reporting, but by better assessment of implementation
risks when policy decisions are being made and closer consideration of the
management of the risks. Light-touch monitoring can then allow selective
review and intervention and avoid more widespread second-guessing.
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5. The lion’s den: respecting and
working with the Parliament
The formidable Senators John Faulkner and Robert Ray who led Senate Estimates interrogations during
the Howard government years from 1996 (photo by kind permission of the Australian Society for the Study
of Labour History)
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Elements of the role
Secretaries are responsible through their ministers to the Parliament. They
interact directly through:
• appearances before Parliamentary Committees
• occasional constituency activities involving departmental program
management
• meetings of government committees
• official functions.
Senate Committee hearings are the main occasions when secretaries interact
directly with Parliament and its members. Departments appear before their
respective Senate Legislation Committees (still commonly referred to as Senate
Estimates Committees) at least twice and usually three times a year: directly after
the budget, when the committees are focusing on the Appropriation Bills 1 and
2 for the year ahead; in November, when they have annual reports for the year
behind to examine; and often again for the ‘Additional Estimates’, Appropriation
Bills 3 and 4, about February.
Despite the ostensible focus of each of these hearings, by convention, committee
members may inquire about any matter relevant to the department’s policy and
program management responsibilities. I always took the view that, as secretary,
I should lead the department’s officers in these hearings, unless I was genuinely
and unavoidably unavailable, such as overseas for meetings that could not be
rescheduled. This reflected my view of my statutory responsibilities and the
respect the APS must give to the Parliament. That has not been everyone’s
practice in the past, though the Rudd Government has now stated its expectation
that secretaries appear.
In most cases, a minister formally represents the executive arm of government,
but committees are always conscious of the right of Parliament to call witnesses
and most questions are directed to officials, ministers intervening when issues
of policy (and politics) are raised. For most agencies most of the time, the minister
sitting at the table is not the minister directly responsible, but a minister in the
Senate representing the minister concerned. This adds to the pressure on the
officials to answer questions.
While non-departmental agencies (including the Australian Public Service
Commission) might not face lengthy hearings (or might not be called at all),
departments are more frequently there for the long haul. In the Department of
Health, it was usually two full days each time, from 9am until 11pm.
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Table 5.1 Lessons for new players
I remember a conversation with a new Chief Medical Officer as I drove
her to her first Senate Estimates meeting when she asked to confirm the
meeting was from nine until 11, as she had another appointment at
lunchtime. I carefully explained, to her horror, that it was from nine in
the morning until 11 at night, for two days, with the possibility of further
hearings after that.
It was not uncommon for the Senate, in addition, to establish inquiries into
aspects of departmental management or relevant government policies and to
require officers to attend. Depending on the nature of the inquiry, I would
usually attend these in person also. Examples included inquiries into magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) and aged care, which were particularly sensitive
politically, and where major questions of departmental management were being
raised. My attendance was not only because of the sensitivities involved and
my respect for the Parliament, but to demonstrate to my staff that I accepted
responsibility for the administration of the department.
More technical reviews of new legislation, such as on gene technology, would
be handled by the appropriate experts and managers. Similarly, I left to the
relevant experts advice provided to ministers when new legislation was being
debated in the House or Senate.
The House of Representatives has fewer committees than the Senate and they
are usually not on highly partisan issues, the government being in control of
their establishment and terms of reference. Accordingly, any departmental
support required is usually of a technical nature not requiring a secretary to
attend.
As a consequence, secretaries are generally more familiar with senators than
members of the House, other than members who are or were ministers—and
vice versa: thus many new ministers who are not senators have had little if any
contact with the Public Service and secretaries.
Members of Parliament also interact with officials in their day-to-day work on
behalf of their constituents. Such interaction is usually codified through rules
developed with the minister and the minister’s office. These usually require, at
the very least, that the minister’s office is kept informed of any such interactions.
I usually took close interest in the development of such rules, but rarely in the
real interactions that took place.
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Table 5.2 Working with politicians: conflicts of interest for
politically active public servants
I have an old-fashioned view that the Public Service values of political
neutrality and impartiality have precedence over a public servant’s right
to participate in politics and that this means that senior public servants
should not be members of political parties. Others have different views,
and there is no prohibition.
The potential for conflict of interest, however, can arise even at levels
below the SES.
In the Health department, the regional director in North Queensland was
a prominent member of the Labor Party and occasionally the subject of
press speculation that she might be a candidate for the Senate. Her official
duties required her to interact frequently with local Members of
Parliament, all of whom were from Coalition parties. Some complained
to the minister, questioning the director’s capacity to act in a non-partisan
way.
I had no evidence that the director acted other than professionally at all
times. I also felt the option of compulsory transfer to Brisbane or Canberra
(where she could be placed so as not to be in regular contact with
politicians) was a pretty tough option and could be challenged, quite
probably successfully.
There was, however, a perception of conflict of interest held sincerely
by a number of politicians. I remained uncertain about the right answer
here, but chose to pass on through my deputy a clear message to the
director to behave with utmost professionalism at all times and to advise
the minister’s office that any specific complaints be forwarded to me and
that the MPs could make contact with more senior staff in the department
if they preferred. I did not receive any specific complaints.
On occasion, I met with government backbench MPs personally to discuss
important policy or management issues (not constituent matters). This was more
common under Labor, which had active caucus committees that ministers wished
to have onside. Mostly, a ministerial staffer would accompany me at such
meetings. Under the Coalition, I sometimes (though rarely) met influential
backbenchers such as Brendan Nelson on a one-to-one basis with the approval
of the minister.
Secretaries also come into contact with Members of Parliament at official functions
such as state dinners for visiting heads of state and public meetings and seminars.
These provide useful opportunities to meet and recognise respective roles;
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sometimes they also provide insights (for both parties) about capabilities, interests
and attitudes.
Table 5.3 Surprising insights from future ministers
At one state dinner, my wife and I were seated at a table with a prominent
shadow minister, who proceeded to lead the conversation in berating
the Public Service. I tried to respond diplomatically. It was to no avail.
Moreover, I felt we were being treated as ‘servants’ rather than as fellow
guests (and fellow hosts) at the dinner.
This became particularly clear at the end of the evening when the MP
asked my wife and me to arrange more red wine; when I explained that
the wine service had stopped, she readily accepted my wife’s offer of
her full glass! It was a useful tip for when the MP later became a senior
minister.
Differences
Dealing with House of Representatives committees is generally different from
Senate counterparts. The former are not only rare, they are generally far less
combative. The atmosphere of Senate Committees also varies somewhat according
to whether the government has a majority in the Senate or not. Even when the
government is in control, however, opposition members of committees are still
allowed considerable latitude in their questioning of officials. In any case, it is
not unusual for government members to take an independent stance on issues
of departmental management in particular.
The extent and style of interaction also vary with the nature of the agency and
its functions. Departments are closer to ministers and weaknesses in departmental
management are more easily sheeted home to the minister and government than
are weaknesses in management of other agencies. Statutory authorities most
commonly (but not always) escape partisan inquiry and both sides of politics
treat independent statutory officers either as professional experts able to offer
constructive advice or as (objectionable) decision makers who need to explain
themselves. For me, it was far easier as Public Service Commissioner than as
departmental secretary (see Chapter 12).
On the other hand, many statutory officers and their staff are less experienced
in the political environment and opposition senators do at times exploit this to
try to embarrass the government. ‘Fishing’ can prove very effective and one of
the roles of the portfolio secretary in Senate Estimates is to intervene subtly in
such situations (see further below).
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It was also easier in the Department of Housing and Regional Development than
in the Department of Health, with the narrower range of responsibilities, fewer
portfolio agencies and less involvement in direct service delivery.
Changes over time
The extent of direct interaction with the Parliament has increased over the years
as the level of scrutiny of government administration has increased. More open
government, increased Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) activity, the
role of the Ombudsman and the increasing effectiveness of interest groups have
all added to the legislature’s capacity to scrutinise and, since the 1970s, much
of that scrutiny is via direct interaction with the Public Service, not indirectly
through ministers. (In an ironical reversal of normal Westminster practice, in
Australia, it more often falls to officials to explain and even defend the minister,
than for the minister to defend officials.)
Corresponding with this change has been the increasing investment by the
executive arm of government in measures to manage communications and
maintain control of the political agenda. Accordingly, the scale of activity to
prepare for Senate Estimates has not only increased steadily, there is now more
close involvement of ministerial staff on politically sensitive matters. Public
servants are keenly aware that their ministers’ staff (and at times the ministers
themselves and even the Prime Minister) are watching the TV monitors during
Senate Estimates hearings, if not sitting at the back of the room.
Technology is also affecting the process. Committee members these days sit with
PCs in front of them, allowing their own advisers to prompt and to draw attention
to information that might be used to dispute or follow-up answers given in the
hearing.
Table 5.4 Responding to new technology in Senate Estimates
When committee members first started to bring laptops to hearings, we
had a discussion in the Health department about whether we too should
bring our laptops to allow us to refer immediately to data and documents
beyond what we held in briefing folders. I decided we should not, as
there is sometimes advantage in taking questions on notice in order to
allow more careful reflection not only of the facts but of the context. We
did, however, have a computer in the officials’ room behind the
committee room.
What has not changed much, despite all the efforts surrounding program
budgeting and outcomes/outputs frameworks, is the focus of Senate Committee
scrutiny. It continues to be strongly partisan, with opposition (and minor party)
members seeking ammunition to attack ministers and the government, and
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government members (and ministers at the table) looking to defend their policies
and distance the government from any failures of administration. Questions
might sometimes relate to the documents the committee is ostensibly reviewing
(appropriation bills, portfolio budget statements, annual reports), but more often
they concern issues running in the media already or populist matters that can
grab media attention. One can be despairing of this, but it is important to
recognise that, as a colleague once told me, ‘the plural of anecdote is data’. That
is, petty failures that embarrass and grab attention might indeed reflect poor
management or complacency or arrogance. Of course, they might not.
Part of the problem is the opaqueness of official documents these days. The rules
governing portfolio budget papers and annual reports seem to have left most of
them almost impossible to read, and the financial tables under the arcane accrual
accounting that is now used do not highlight key issues and trends even for
specialists, let alone lay readers. I suspect, however, clearer, more readable
documents will still not shift committee members’ attention from possible scandals
to overall performance and program effectiveness.
Issues of accountability
The most demanding issue for secretaries and other senior officials is balancing
responsibilities to the minister and the elected government and obligations to
the Parliament, to whom ministers are accountable (secretaries are statutorily
required to assist ministers to meet their accountability obligations, as mentioned
in Chapter 1). There are formal rules for public servants appearing before
committees and supporting guidance from the APS Commission, which
coordinates some excellent training courses for senior public servants assisted
by the parliamentary departments and the Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet.
The rules relate to being honest and not misleading, while not answering
questions relating to policy or policy advice. The issue of balance comes most
often in whether to elaborate a strictly accurate answer in order not to mislead,
with the risk of revealing through subsequent questions matters embarrassing
to the government. For the secretary, this turns on whether and how to intervene
to take a question or to cut off an answer, including where the questions are to
officers of a portfolio agency that is not strictly within the secretary’s
responsibilities.
Table 5.5 Rule 1: keeping answers short
To the occasional chagrin of the minister sitting beside me, I did not
always stick to the rule of answering only the question asked, even if
that rule is generally a good one. At times, I felt respect for the Senate
demanded some explanation of the context of an answer, but I usually
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preferred to give that myself rather than allow a less experienced person
to do so.
I can recall on one occasion a minister doodling rather ostentatiously
and constantly on a pad beside me as my officers and Health Insurance
Commission officers answered questions on Medicare, the doodling being
in the form of a schoolchild’s 50 lines, each stating something like ‘Why
don’t they just answer the question. Why don’t they just answer the
question’.
Sometimes getting the balance right is best managed by applying the ‘no
surprises’ rule, warning ministers of the answers that must be given if discussion
moves in a particular direction, despite the possible political embarrassment
involved.
Table 5.6 Landing them in it: handling unavoidable questions
When Minister Wooldridge was under attack for not correcting a
statutory declaration he had tabled in the House of Representatives to
defend himself against accusations of leaking confidential budget
information on MRI benefits, I was acutely aware we would be questioned
on the matter when we appeared before the Senate Estimates Committee.
I therefore spoke beforehand to the minister’s chief of staff clarifying
what I would say in answer to the questions I expected. He was decidedly
unhappy about my intentions, but at least he was forewarned and could
consider how best to handle the inevitable political fallout. I warned
that, while I would refuse to answer any question about the real advice
I had given, I would have to answer questions as to whether I had given
advice and, if so, when.
Senator John Faulkner was cleverer than even I had anticipated. He
tested me about my understanding of the need to correct, at the earliest
possible opportunity, any misleading — deliberate or otherwise —
information provided by a minister to the Parliament. I could not avoid
giving an answer and I acknowledged that we were aware of the
guidelines in this area. He then asked the questions I had foreshadowed:
had I given advice, when, whether orally or in writing. I answered each
question, as indeed I had to, while knowing everyone in the minister’s
office was watching on their TV monitors. While he also unsuccessfully
sought a copy of my advice, he did not really need to. (The full picture
was not all bad for the minister, as he had eventually agreed to correct
the record, but I was hardly popular at the time.)
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An issue I found particularly difficult was the right of Parliament to access
market research collected by a department. Such information is inherently
politically sensitive, providing guidance to the government about how to manage
an issue, while simultaneously revealing the public relations risks that need to
be addressed. My approach was to try to apply the FOI principles, but this was
not easy to do.
Table 5.7 Parliamentary access to market research
Senate Estimates were continually interested in the market research
conducted by the Howard Government into private health insurance.
The market research helped us in particular to develop strategies for
introducing the complex Lifetime Cover initiative, including the language
to use and the stakeholders to involve (those to whom people most often
turned for advice).
I felt there were entirely legitimate reasons for Parliament’s interest,
given the risk that the research might be used for partisan purposes
and/or that it might be exploited to run advertising campaigns of a
partisan nature (because of content or scale). Release of the information
could, however, equally undermine the program of government support
for private health insurance membership and the implementation of the
Lifetime Cover initiative, by informing opponents how they might most
effectively damage public understanding and support. Accordingly,
release would not be in the public interest.
I prepared some guidance for the department on appropriate investment
in market research and consulted the minister’s office. The guidance
focused on the legitimate role of market research if it was focused on
program effectiveness or successful implementation of a new initiative
and was non-partisan. It also suggested that the research should be made
public in due course, but not while this could undermine the program’s
objectives or the initiative’s successful implementation. This clarified
the public interest case and could also put a brake on attempts by
ministers or their advisers to use market research for partisan purposes.
I tabled the guidance at a Senate Estimates hearing and gained some
temporary support. The support fell away during the next few years,
however, as the research was still not made public and we continued to
argue the risk of undermining the private health insurance program
objectives (the minister and his office had ruled out tabling the research
at the time anyway).
I was conscious that this understandably left the committee uneasy about
the legitimacy of the research. As a result, we prepared summaries of
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the research omitting details that could be used to undermine the program
but demonstrating that it was being used for legitimate purposes.
Getting the balance right also involves deciding when to be proactive and how.
On a few occasions, I decided to make an initial statement to put on the record
the context of a matter under investigation and our approach towards dealing
with the issue. While this was intended to put the matter in the best light for
the government in the circumstances, and to dampen enthusiasm to go for the
jugular, it was also intended to acknowledge the concerns of senators and our
respect for the point they had raised. I did this during the MRI inquiry in 1999
(the ‘scan scam’) and the hearings on aged care in 2000 (the ‘kerosene baths’
case); I also did it when accrual accounting first came in, admitting openly that
the financial accounts in our annual report, while fully audited, were very
difficult to follow, and stating that all of us were on a learning curve on accrual
accounting.
Table 5.8 Treading the line between ministerial and departmental
performance
A perennial concern of Senate Estimates Committees is the slowness of
responding to committee Questions on Notice. The health portfolio was
frequently singled out, with little sympathy for the much higher number
of questions we received compared with other portfolios. The problem
was not just slowness in the department: it was gaining clearance from
ministers. The bulk of the outstanding questions related to aged care.
After a series of hearings in which the department’s performance was
heavily criticised, I was asked sharply to explain the worsening record
and our failure to take the committee’s concerns seriously. I decided it
was time to defend my staff. I provided data on the numbers of answers
to questions that had been drafted by the department and sent to the
minister’s office, as well as the (much smaller) number of answers cleared
and sent to the committee. Committee members’ eyes lit up. My relations
with the minister hit a low point.
At the next hearing, I was asked for an update of the data and revealed
that hold-ups in the minister’s office had worsened and that the
department itself had provided draft answers to the majority of questions
asked. The committee went on strike. It refused to proceed with oral
questioning of the department until more answers to the Questions on
Notice had been received. During the next hour or two, I was asked for
regular updates on the situation. We had more answers cleared more
quickly that morning than ever before, or since.
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I have seen public servants go too far, advocating rather than basically explaining
government policies and being disrespectful or even dishonest in avoiding
answers or giving answers that are just too smart. As a secretary, I was always
mindful of the influence my own behaviour would have on my staff and portfolio
colleagues. In hindsight, I did not always call it right, but just having the issue
of balance always in the front of mind is no bad thing.
Lessons
In parliamentary committees, secretaries are on the stage, along with their senior
officers. Members can and do grill you, in large part for the sport of catching
out a minister. You are in the witness box and everything you say is in Hansard,
on the record. Parliamentary privilege represents real power.
The main lesson I drew from my experience therefore was the need always to
be wary and to be seen to show respect for the Parliament and its members and
senators. Apart from anything else, it is salutary to keep in mind that any one
of those interrogating you today could be your minister tomorrow. Most show
great respect for the Public Service, but even those who do not deserve respect
from public servants nevertheless.
Most ministers most of the time are also very respectful of parliamentary processes
and, while frustrated at times with public servants giving away more information
than they would prefer, or recommending that embarrassing documents be
tabled, they do not usually appreciate public servants being cavalier or too
clever. Advisers are not always as appreciative of these issues.
At times, it is not possible to avoid embarrassing a minister. Alerting ministers
beforehand to this risk is always good practice.
A minor but useful lesson I learned is that Hansard does not reveal silences:
taking a few moments to check papers or to consult officers behind you might
seem at the time to reveal uncertainty or lack of responsiveness, but getting the
record right in Hansard is of far greater importance. Do not be pressured to
answer off the cuff: no-one sees the delay when reading Hansard.
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6. It’s lonely at the top: management
of the agency
Elements
This role of a secretary is closest to that of a chief executive in the private sector,
but is still quite different given the accountability structures involved. It
involves:
• setting the strategic direction of the organisation in line with the minister’s
policies
• having a top management structure that facilitates effective overall
administration with appropriate lines of accountability
• using this structure to monitor program performance and implementation
of government decisions, and to help manage risks
• having staffing arrangements (including industrial arrangements) to ensure
efficient and effective program delivery and quality policy advice
• fostering a productive culture throughout the organisation that delivers
more than the sum of its parts
• ensuring the systems that underpin most of the operations of the department
are robust and seamless.
In policy departments in the Commonwealth, secretaries are also the ministers’
top policy advisers and have the associated management responsibility of:
• marshalling as well as adding value to policy analysis and advice.
Strategic planning
I always put great store in strategic planning, consciously trying to avoid the
dangers of rhetorical and meaningless vision and mission statements by processes
of extensive consultation and engagement supported by real evidence and
analysis. Good plans require frank discussion of strengths and weaknesses and
of the changing environment. I recall, for example, that the most critical issue
in 1994 for the new Department of Housing and Regional Development was
acknowledgment that the Whitlam Government’s Department of Urban and
Regional Development (DURD) was widely seen to have been a failure, and we
needed to understand the reasons and how we could avoid the mistakes made
by DURD.
I would substantially revisit plans after elections or after changes of portfolio
minister, with annual reviews of the plans in between. The plans represented
an agreement between the minister and me as to how we planned to deliver what
the minister and the government required (as set out in portfolio budget
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statements and Prime Minister’s charter letters, for example). They typically
outlined strategies covering structures, systems, staffing, communications and
external relationships, all linked to a small number of unifying themes reflecting
the government’s broad policies.
The plans were not one-off exercises that simply ended up on the shelf, but were
reflected in the business plans across the department and in performance
agreements, and were reported against including in the annual reports of the
department.
The strategic plans were also complemented by more detailed plans on particular
critical strategies such as staffing, communications, IT and financial management.
We also undertook risk assessments and developed risk-management plans,
though these were not as sophisticated as is now common practice in Australian
government departments.
Table 6.1 Strategic plan for the Department of Health and Family
Services, 1996
Just over two months after the change of government, I initiated an
extensive planning process centred on a two and a half day management
retreat. The department had had a strategic plan, but it had little
influence on corporate behaviour or priorities and just sat on the shelf.
I was determined to have one that made a difference.
The main participants in the retreat were the executive and division
heads, but the heads of all portfolio agencies were also invited, as were
the ministers’ chiefs of staff.
The two ministers and the parliamentary secretary spoke on the first
evening and the next morning, responding to questions about their
priorities and concerns after their initial experience in their positions.
A series of stakeholder presentations followed with open discussion after
each group of presentations. The four groups of stakeholders were
portfolio agencies, other government stakeholders (including central
agencies and a state CEO), consumer organisations (Australian Council
of Social Service, Australian Council on the Ageing, Australian Council
for Rehabilitation of the Disabled, Consumer Health Forum) and
professional providers (for example, Australian Medical Association,
Australian Private Health Insurance Association (APHIA), aged care,
child care). The presenters were asked to identify significant changes in
the environment and key issues and concerns for the national department
to address.
I also made a presentation based on my first two months in the job,
identifying some major options for addressing the new government’s
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priorities, including in particular the choice between a loose federation
of programs in a large department with essentially independent portfolio
agencies (a ‘holding company’ model) and a smaller but more integrated
policy department with purchaser/provider or other semi-contractual
relations with a wider range of portfolio agencies, many operating on a
more commercial basis. I focused on not only the new government’s
commitments to Medicare and so on, but its stated philosophies of more
choice, more use of markets and reduced government spending (including
big cuts in departmental expenses).
This all provoked substantial and constructive debates during the next
day and a half, leading to a draft plan that contained more substantial
analysis of the context than was usual, in order to convince the
departmental sceptics that this was not just a rhetorical exercise. It also
identified some critical success factors and key result areas, with a
number of strategies under each and some initial ‘targets’. We emphasised
information and communication as priorities if we were to support a
more patient-oriented health system and we also emphasised the
Commonwealth’s leadership role and the importance of our relationships
with the many bodies and groups involved in health and family services.
Despite some resistance, we pressed for the more integrated policy
department option and some restructuring of portfolio arrangements.
The draft for comment was circulated within the department and portfolio
and was the subject of a follow-up planning day for the whole SES before
being finalised.
The approach was unashamedly top-down, designed to ensure ministerial
endorsement, but allowing for bottom-up reality checking.
The final document was cleared through the department’s senior
management committee, endorsed by the two ministers and issued by
me as secretary. It had a major impact on portfolio and departmental
structures, governance arrangements, IT planning, staffing and culture.
One of many initiatives was a major investment in leadership throughout
the department and practical support for a learning organisation.
Management structures
Under the Public Service Act and the Financial Management and Accountability
Act, the secretary has direct responsibility for the management of the department.
Staff are accountable to the secretary. Management committees were formally
only advisory, but I always placed considerable emphasis on them, particularly
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in larger departments. They help with the management workload, ensure wider
ownership of decisions and foster a shared commitment to strategic directions.
The Health Department Executive team in 2002 – Andrew Podger (seated) with David Borthwick, Mary
Murnane and Professor Richard Smallwood (photo by kind permission of the Department of Health and
Ageing)
Table 6.2 Top management structures
The basic model that I used was a modification of the one Tony Ayers
used in the Department of Defence when I was there. It involved the
following.
• A small executive of the secretary and deputy secretaries (or
equivalent), which handled most senior staffing matters, discussed
sensitive issues relating to ministers and external stakeholders and
caucused on sensitive management issues coming before the
management committee. It would meet informally (with only a brief
record of decisions taken) each week over a glass of wine.
• A management committee that endorsed the strategic plan and any
associated planning documents, decided on resource allocations across
the department, monitored program expenditure and performance
and implementation of budget and other initiatives, and reviewed
selected policies and programs in detail from time to time. It would
meet monthly, with a formal agenda, papers and minutes.
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• Subcommittees of the management committee, usually an Information
Management Committee and a separate but associated IT Committee,
a Human Resources Committee, Finance Committee and Performance
Committee. These were chaired by a deputy or a division head,
meeting as required, usually monthly or bimonthly, with formal
agendas, papers and minutes.
• Monday morning ‘prayer meetings’ of division heads and deputies
for no more than an hour to identify key issues for the coming week.
Each division head circulated on the Friday before a short email with
dot points listing the issues, allowing the meeting simply to highlight
key areas. These emails were copied to state managers to keep them
in the loop and were usually passed to the ministers offices also.
• I also had a regular policy forum of the division heads, plus relevant
policy staff, to discuss selected policy issues, usually of medium-term
rather than immediate interest to the minister. I often attended these,
but they were usually chaired by a deputy.
I reviewed the Chief Executive Instructions which underpin the high level
management structure every few years, not only clarifying financial rules,
delegations and so on for departmental staff (as required by the Financial
Management and Accountability Act), but ensuring they reflected the APS Values
and Code of Conduct and promoted the culture we wished to foster in the
department.
The composition of the executive team is critical to making the top structure
work. I always looked to a balance of expertise and personal styles.
Subject-matter expertise is essential within the executive to ensure credibility
with stakeholders, not least the minister. The team must also include strong
management skills. Having at least one person with central agency experience
also helps. Corporate knowledge and some continuity are also important,
particularly in large departments, and I generally chose not to displace
incumbents too quickly (if at all). As explained in Chapter 10, I felt it was also
important for the service to have a least one deputy who was a strong candidate
to be a future secretary.
As a rule, division heads were responsible for big programs and exercised very
substantial delegations, and they had broad management responsibility regarding
staffing and administrative resources. The management structure above them
was intended to ensure cohesion rather than to interfere. Division heads generally
reported to deputies, but I encouraged the deputies to act not as super-division
heads but as quasi-secretaries (as mentioned earlier, where there were junior
ministers, I allocated prime responsibility for supporting them to a deputy). I
always preferred fewer rather than more deputies in organisational structures.
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Division heads’ authority for staffing was subject to the budgets they held for
administrative purposes and centrally determined pay and classification
arrangements. The latter has become an important element of a secretary’s
management responsibilities.
Organisational performance management
While I held each division head responsible for the management of their business
units and programs, the departmental management committee also regularly
reviewed program performance. In the Health department, we put extra effort
into this through the department’s Performance Management Committee. This
committee would meet regularly to discuss particular programs, focusing on the
performance indicators and targets for each program in the portfolio budget
statement and reviewing the management of risks against risk plans. The
committee might also suggest more formal evaluations from time to time.
This built a corporate ownership of the programs we were managing, allowing
the interactions between programs to be regularly reviewed and some
cross-program learning to be applied.
The committee also monitored the implementation of key initiatives including
major budget measures. This required a project management approach and I
frequently established a formal project team to manage some of the more complex
initiatives (such as the reforms to private health insurance). The committee also
used Gantt charts to monitor progress of all the key initiatives, ensuring I was
kept informed of significant problems and could advise the minister accordingly.
This was the beginning of what has since become a more sophisticated
whole-of-government approach to improving and monitoring the implementation
of government decisions.
I encouraged the use of quantitative measures of program and project
performance but was always mindful of their limitations and the need for a
broader appreciation of how well a program or project was running.
Staffing
Making senior appointments is perhaps the most important element of a
secretary’s management responsibilities and one that takes considerable time
and effort. Selection of SES officers is subject to certification by the Public Service
Commissioner, but agency heads take the decisions and run the process. I always
chaired selection committees for deputy-level appointments and took close
interest in all SES appointments and movements, which were always discussed
by the executive. I also monitored appointments and movements at EL2 level,
regularly updating information about high flyers and pursuing strategies for
their training and development, including through transfers and placements on
project teams to broaden their experience.
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Having credibility with key stakeholders is also essential to the department’s
effectiveness, requiring careful balancing of generalist and specialist skills at
even the most senior levels. Seconding Professor Judith Whitworth, a
world-renowned medical researcher, as Chief Medical Officer in 1997 literally
transformed the Health department’s relationship with the medical profession,
complementing our already strong capacity in public health. When she left, I
appointed in her place Professor Richard Smallwood, former President of the
Royal Australian College of Physicians and Chair of the National Health and
Medical Research Council (NHMRC). In the Housing department, having a small
number of city planners, a top team of housing policy analysts and a senior
officer with a strong industry background ensured credibility with the states
and the housing industry.
I put a lot of effort into the performance assessment system in each agency I
managed. The broader process of performance management described earlier
closely guided individual performance. Individual performance agreements were
linked to program (and project) performance as well as to the strategic plan
priorities concerning management of staff, building team capabilities, fostering
external relationships and upholding values through personal behaviour.
Assessment against these agreements was also subject to a strict quality-assurance
system to make performance assessment obligatory and to try to maintain
consistency. The system involved regular direct feedback during the year and
the provision of draft ratings by supervisors to their supervisors at the end of
the year before final decisions were taken. The supervisors’ supervisor would
then meet with the supervisors together to gain endorsement that the proposed
assessments were consistent.
Table 6.3 The ‘manager-once-removed’
The role of supervisors’ supervisors, or ‘managers-once-removed’, is
essential not only for quality assurance and consistency of performance
appraisal by supervisors, but for mentoring, career planning and
succession management.
Supervisors are in the best position to answer staff questions on ‘what’s
my job’ and ‘how am I going’.
The manager-once-removed is far better able to advise staff on ‘what’s
my future’, taking into account past experience as well as current
performance, and identifying potential roles and appropriate longer-term
development opportunities.
Despite much criticism, I also used a very broad template to guide the
performance-appraisal process, allowing departures from the template where a
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branch or division had clearly performed exceptionally (or badly). I also
experimented with upward appraisal, which worked successfully if not linked
to the end-of-year assessment but focused on personal development and
improvements in team performance.
Performance appraisal formed just one of the elements aimed at enhancing the
organisation’s capability (Table 6.4).
Table 6.4 Strengthening organisational capability




• individual development plans
• statements of required skills and knowledge for each business or
team
• training and development plans
• succession management plans
• recruitment and retention strategies.
It was not possible in practice to adopt this framework all in one go: it
took several years to introduce.
As each process was introduced and then matured, it would influence
the other processes and build an integrated framework helping senior
managers (and me) to focus on and improve the capability of our business.
This integrated framework had some important impacts, including a firm
shift in training and development to include ‘technical’ skills related to
the administration of programs and the relevant legislation (as well as
generic administrative skills such as writing, supervision and leadership),
a closer study of turnover and mobility and a more structured approach
to recruitment at base levels and laterally.
I could not, as secretary, devote sufficient personal time and energy to
drive this agenda myself. I relied heavily on having a head of corporate
services and head of personnel who understood my agenda and had the
enthusiasm to follow it through. In the Health department, Neville
Tomkins and Andrew Wood played these roles successfully for several
years.
Every two or three years, the department would enter into negotiations for a
new enterprise agreement encompassing some pay increase and/or conditions
enhancements combined with productivity measures. I generally negotiated
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directly with staff as well as with unions, preferring the final agreement to be
signed off by the staff (rather than just the unions). The process could be time
consuming for me as well as for the senior managers most responsible for human
resources as I always attempted to link the agreements not only to our budgetary
position but to our strategic directions, which sometimes included industrially
sensitive measures such as more robust performance management.
In line with the Howard Government’s industrial relations policies, secretaries
introduced individual Australian workplace agreements (AWAs) for their SES
and most EL staff. Later, there was strong encouragement to widen the use of
AWAs to all staff. My approach was to limit AWAs to senior staff only (with a
small number of exceptions) and then to use a standard format within which
the staff concerned could negotiate personal provisions such as the real pay
(within the publicly known bands) and conditions. The standard format was
part of an explicit remuneration strategy we developed and circulated, to ensure
all staff could be confident of the integrity of our approach and that we were
abiding strictly by the APS value of merit-based employment. As secretary, I
was always involved directly in negotiations with my most senior staff.
Culture
Fostering a productive culture involves more than setting strategic directions
and establishing an effective management structure—essential as these are.
Leadership and values are important, even if they have become somewhat
‘faddish’ terms. A key instrument I used was a common program of leadership
development across all middle and senior managers tied to our particular business
(health or housing or administrative services). I inherited the customer-focused
training program used so effectively by Noel Tanzer in the Department of
Administrative Services in the early 1990s to help turn corporate government
services into efficient and effective commercial businesses. I used Peter Senge’s
‘learning organisation’ as the core theme in the departments of Housing and
Health, those two organisations relying heavily on research and expertise for
‘evidence-based’ policy and management, and also on external stakeholders with
very different cultures to bridge. I was also looking to build a more flexible and
agile organisation, better able to manage change and handle uncertainty.
I personally attended at least one session of each of these many courses—Tony
Ayers used to call such sessions ‘fireside chats’—to clarify to staff my own views
on the organisation’s strategic direction and to demonstrate my commitment to
a more open culture that promoted initiative as well as collaboration. These also
reinforced my approach towards public service professionalism and offered
opportunities for participants to examine my personal style and objectives. (The
almost universal question in 1996 and 1997 concerned my tenure in the Health
department: I could assure them only that my own desire was to stay for at least
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five years but that proved a sufficient commitment for most to give their full
support for the directions I was pursuing.)
The purpose of the leadership development program, and related activities, was
to gain alignment across a large organisation based on genuine commitment and
enthusiasm rather than mere compliance. The key to this was to gain the support
of the middle managers—those whom most staff considered to be their team
leaders and who more senior managers relied on to get things done. I had become
increasingly aware over my career of the importance of teamwork, particularly
by middle managers, and the role of team leaders in setting the example for their
staff. I was fortunate to participate in a series of remarkable teams—the Income
Security Review in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the
Development Division in the Department of Social Security, the Finance
department—and learned that their success was only partly due to the calibre
of the individual team members. As important, if not more so, was the example
set by the team leaders and the environment that allowed them to take the
initiative and to accept personal responsibility.
Complementing the leadership development program in the Health department
was an ethics awareness program for all staff, which continued for all new staff
(see Chapter 10 and Table 10.1).
Another important tool in fostering a productive culture is the celebration of
success and showing pride in history. I was pleasantly surprised by the level of
interest and support in the Housing department’s celebration of 50 years of the
Commonwealth–State Housing Agreements and in the Health department’s
celebrations of its eightieth birthday in the centenary year of the Commonwealth.
The book we commissioned that year from author Francesca Beddie, ‘Putting
Life into Years’: The Commonwealth’s role in Australia’s health since 1901, in
which I took very close interest, was widely commended within and beyond
the department.
Awards are simultaneously perceived cynically by staff from a distance and
hugely appreciated by those getting them and those near to those getting
them—as long as the peers believe they are deserved. I put considerable effort
into having some awards for successful teams and individuals, recognising the
risks if our judgments were astray.
Enhancing and sustaining capability involve each of the elements mentioned
previously but also investments in staff recruitment and training, management
and IT systems, and external relationships. As outlined in Table 6.4, I called for
statements of required skills and knowledge from each area of the department
as a key building block for identifying gaps or potential gaps and strategies for
filling them via recruitment or staff development, including staff rotations. These
statements provided a more balanced perspective on what was required than
74
The Role of Departmental Secretaries
had previously come from human resource areas on their own and strengthened
the professional culture we were aiming to build.
Systems
We invested heavily in IT, particularly in the Health department. Our longer-term
vision was a nationwide system of electronic health records to support integrated
health care, but most of our investments were in systems for internal
administration and management of programs. Our success was mixed. I believe
health managed better than nearly any other agency the government’s policy
on IT outsourcing, employing a carefully designed project management approach
that focused on the business requirements of the department and the then Health
Insurance Commission. Less successful was the introduction of a new
administrative system in 1998, where our ambitions for improved records
management and electronic administration of personnel decision making such
as leave went beyond our investment in consultation and staff training. I learned
the sad lesson that if management gets the basics such as IT support wrong, it
loses credibility among staff for everything it does (this was revealed in our first
comprehensive staff survey shortly after this IT failure).
Managing policy advice
Policy advising is part and parcel of supporting the minister (Chapter 3) and
occupied a great deal of my time. Management of the policy advising process
is, however, a key management task as well. The management structure I
generally had in place entailed a central or strategic policy unit and policy
capacity within each of the program divisions. The balance was always an issue.
Quality assurance was provided first through the hierarchy, with minutes to
the minister required to be signed by SES officers and copied up the line, and
deputy secretaries (if not the secretary) always engaged in more substantial
policy discussions; the originating author, usually a non-SES expert, was
identified as the contact officer. Second, we used cross-departmental processes
such as the policy forum and the role of the central policy unit (which, for
example, coordinated budget proposals) to ensure wider coordination and to
foster internal debate. Failure to consult across affected areas of the department
was treated firmly. Policy advising capacity was also enhanced by longer-term
analysis, particularly within the central unit, but also through external linkages
such as with the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) and the
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) (in the Health portfolio)
or the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute (AHURI) (in the Housing
portfolio).
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Differences
The main difference between the agencies I led related to their size. Smaller
agencies such as the APS Commission and the Department of Housing did not
require elaborate structures for control or to ensure collaboration as did larger
agencies. The fundamentals of management, however, were the same and the
issues very similar. The people-management issues were somewhat more
complicated in agencies with different internal cultures to manage (which was
true of housing as well as health), but in any organisation they require
considerable effort by the agency head personally.
Agencies also have different cultures and it is sometimes important to shift the
culture (Table 6.5).
Table 6.5 Enthusiasm, scepticism and cynicism
Balancing enthusiasm, scepticism and cynicism was a common challenge
in each agency I led; however, the starting point differed each time.
I found the Department of Health in 1996 to be a rather cynical
organisation, too quick to find fault elsewhere and to question motives.
The uncertainty created by the change of government certainly added
to unease, but did not explain the lack of trust within the organisation
and with many external stakeholders. One of the themes of the leadership
development strategy was to counter this cynicism through better
understanding of the roles and perspectives of different groups within
the department and across the health and family services system, while
confirming the importance of scepticism (as fundamental to professional
advising and to scientific discovery). I also encouraged enthusiasm for
departmental policies and processes where these had been carefully
developed and well considered within the organisation.
On the other hand, I found the Australian Public Service Commission in
2002 to be an enthusiastic little organisation, eager to embrace new ideas,
particularly on management. It had pockets of cynicism, but its main
weakness was its lack of scepticism about the latest management fads
and fashions. One of the themes I pursued as Public Service Commissioner
was to ‘hardwire’ the commission’s initiatives in leadership development
and values-based management into the realities of public service
administration (see Chapter 12).
Different personal styles clearly affect the approaches of agency heads to
management. My own style was probably somewhere between a Tony Ayers
(keenly interested in management) and an Ian Castles (keenly interested in policy
analysis and relying on others to help manage the organisation): recognising
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from Ayers the vital importance of people management but knowing that I,
perhaps not as much as Castles, needed support on the management side to
complement my strength in policy analysis. I primarily used the executive and
the management committee to support me, rather than delegating management
responsibilities to a deputy, which Castles tended to do. My style was, I like to
think, more collaborative than some of the more famous mandarins of the past
(recent and decades ago), but my personality required some solitude to analyse
and reflect on important issues, and then to take personal responsibility for my
decisions. I was sometimes criticised for not having enough ‘mongrel’ in dealing
with under-performing staff, but I would prefer to err on that side than the
opposite: in any case, positive reinforcement is usually more effective than
negative feedback.
Changes over the years
The importance of an agency head’s management responsibilities increased
substantially during the 1980s and 1990s with the new public management
reforms. These included the devolution of many financial and human resources
controls to agencies combined with increased accountability of agencies and
their heads for results. The changes were reflected in the new legislation of the
late 1990s governing agency responsibilities for financial and human resource
management (the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and Public
Service Act 1999). Associated with these changes were sharply increased emphases
on strategic and business planning, performance management and performance
reporting and a tougher financial environment through efficiency dividends
and other pressures for productivity improvement.
The primary focus of these reforms was initially on financial management, but
in the 1990s, people management became an increasingly important part of the
agenda with agencies responsible not only for all aspects of staffing numbers
and profiles, organisational structures and recruitment, but increasingly for pay
and conditions under enterprise bargaining and then under the Workplace
Relations Act (to which the Public Service Act 1999 specifically referred). That
act reinforced the Howard Government’s policy of industrial relations flexibility,
including through individual AWAs. While the Rudd Government has since
barred AWAs for the Public Service, there remain considerable variations from
agency to agency regarding pay and classification (and conditions) and, within
agencies, regarding individual levels of remuneration within pay classifications.
Managing industrial relations issues became a significant responsibility for
agencies and their heads from the early 1990s, whereas previously these were
mostly handled centrally.
Apart from these industrial relations responsibilities, the increased focus on
people management encompassed such initiatives as performance management,
leadership development, values-based management and workforce planning.
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The APS Commission and the Management Advisory Committee fostered many
of these throughout the APS, but the detailed work was left to agencies and
their heads.
Another important shift in the past two decades has been towards greater use
of project management rather than (continuing) program management. The move
to more rapid change and to working across boundaries has required managers
to be more agile and flexible, relying less on continuing structures and more on
time-limited project teams and so on to manage new initiatives or particular
challenges and crises.
Not independent of this has been the need for more expert management of
communications. This management shift rivals the financial management reforms
of the 1980s as the biggest shift in my time. It covers managing communications
with internal and external audiences and is now an essential part of managing
agencies, implementing initiatives and managing programs (see Chapter 9).
Devolution and other issues
There have been many benefits from devolution, particularly in allowing more
emphasis on achieving each agency’s business objectives. They were, however,
somewhat oversold, in my view, particularly in industrial relations.
Devolution at its height: Andrew Podger launching the Department of Health and Aged Care logo in 1998
(photo by kind permission of the Department of Health and Ageing)
At the time, I accepted the responsibilities and invested heavily in exploiting
the flexibility I had to promote the business objectives of the agencies I managed.
This included using performance pay to reward individual performance, to allow
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some pay flexibility for attraction and retention and to engage directly with
staff on business improvement and so on. This was all well intentioned, but I
now question the value of the overall investment in industrial relations, which
was not only of senior management’s time but, in the Health department, meant
considerable disruption throughout the organisation. I now note that some
colleagues gave mainly lip-service to the then government’s policies and
continued to use essentially traditional industrial relations processes of
negotiation exclusively with the unions, and their outcomes were essentially
the same as those the rest of us achieved. Some others very enthusiastically
adopted the government’s policies, sometimes with disastrous effects on their
agencies’ performance and staff morale.
That said, some flexibility in pay had significant advantages, including the
attraction and retention of specialist staff. I signed the first AWA in the APS in
1997 with a new chief medical officer; I could not have recruited her or anyone
else of her calibre under the old system.
A broader issue is whether the increased management responsibilities have
contributed to a weakening of policy advising. As discussed in Chapter 3, I
suspect it has to some extent. I sadly doubt, for example, that the current system
would ever appoint an Ian Castles to be a secretary. And I know the time I
devoted to management did reduce my capacity to contribute personally to
policy development. I do not advocate, however, relieving agency heads of these
management responsibilities, which, if handled well, should support strong
policy advising capacity within the organisation.
One aspect of this issue is how best to balance the size and role of a central policy
unit in a department with the policy responsibilities of the program areas. Linking
policy and administration is essential for realistic policy advising. The program
areas, however, are inevitably drawn into immediate management problems and
shorter-term policy fixes. I tried to address this weakness through policy forums
and through strengthening the central policy unit (particularly in the Health
department) with some capacity for longer-term policy research. The program
areas generally did not welcome the latter moves but, with hindsight, I feel I
should have invested even more in the central policy unit. Certainly, one of the
key lessons from my experience in the Development Division in the Department
of Social Security in the 1970s was the value of a strong, central policy unit with
its own research and statistical capacity.
One of the strengths of the reforms of the Hawke/Keating Governments was the
more systematic gathering of performance information and evaluation of
programs. Cabinet submissions were required to identify research and evaluation
evidence in support of policy proposals and to set out how the proposed new
policy would be evaluated. In a short-sighted attempt to reduce the size of
submissions, the requirement was dropped in the late 1990s, and evaluation was
79
It’s lonely at the top: management of the agency
no longer a mandated requirement. While performance reporting continues to
contribute to ‘evidence-based’ policy advising, the loss of internal capacity and
systematic evaluation, and the increasing reliance on chosen external consultants,
has affected the capacity of departments to offer high-quality policy advice.
Strategic planning, like many other modern management initiatives, can be
formulaic, adding little, if any, value. Plans that end up sitting on shelves without
influencing resource allocation, priorities and behaviours reinforce cynicism.
Critical to making the planning process work are the quality of the information
and analysis used in the process, the openness of the discussions involved and
the willingness to engage widely within and beyond the organisation. All of
these present risks.
Table 6.6 Tea cosies
The retreat to develop the first strategic plan for the Department of Health
and Family Services in 1996 (Table 6.1) was one of the most difficult
management meetings I ever led.
There was unease about the new government, particularly after the
dismissal of a number of secretaries (including the husband of one of my
division heads), the culture among senior executives was more akin to
that of robber barons than united leadership and there was unease about
me as the new secretary.
I engaged one of the best facilitators in Canberra, Lynette Glendinning,
to assist me. She has told me often in the years since that it was the
toughest assignment she ever faced.
One division head sat in the centre, arms folded and legs outstretched,
making it abundantly clear he was there under sufferance. An enormously
talented and knowledgeable officer, he was nonetheless closed to new
management ideas and determined to protect his particular empire. Our
state offices, for example, were merely creatures of history in his strongly
stated view and should be strictly limited to working on community
services programs and have no role under any circumstances in health
programs.
Two other division heads sat to one side, crocheting a tea cosy. The
completed cosy, presented to me a week or so later, remains one of my
prized memorabilia. I like to think, perhaps fancifully, that its
presentation to me was a sign of reconciliation: that its two creators
accepted in the end the value of the exercise, recognising my genuine
determination for open discussion and wide engagement, leading to a
plan that would indeed help to shape the future direction of the
organisation.
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Performance management is well entrenched in the Australian system of
budgeting and reporting, with considerable benefits in the past 25 years in terms
of improved focus on effectiveness and efficiency. It is, however, easy to be
sucked into unrealistic ‘outcomes’ approaches with meaningless outcomes
statements and limited connections between the program activities and the
claimed outcomes. A degree of scepticism is required along with a practical
outlook, using a mixture of input controls and output measures, with regular
evaluations of impacts; and a broad appreciation of the usefulness of the program
or project taking into account the multiple objectives often involved.
Individual performance management remains one of the most vexed issues for
any CEO. The most common complaint from staff about their senior managers
is the failure to address under-performance; yet, ensuring robust staff appraisal
and introducing rewards for performance always face opposition from staff.
Allan Hawke, Secretary of the Defence department (1999–2002), always opposed
any formal process of calibration to ensure consistency, suggesting instead the
system should focus purely on individuals and how they were improving (or
not) each year. My unease about this approach is that it can lead to ignoring
poor performance and focusing entirely on pats on the head (or, as Tony Ayers
used to complain about such systems, that ‘everyone walks on water’). On the
other hand, it is also true that most people respond better to acknowledgment
of achievements than to the highlighting of their weaknesses.
The other aspect of this issue is the role of performance pay. Despite years of
hard work to get a system to work, I now accept that it is just not worth the
effort. My support for it was never based on potential incentives to improve
performance, but on the discipline it imposed on the process, requiring
supervisors to establish performance agreements with all the staff concerned in
line with our strategic directions and to provide feedback at least once a year.
I have seen too many appraisal systems disappear into the sand as staff and
supervisors put off preparing agreements or giving feedback because they think
there is more important work to do; I have also seen too many supervisors
unwilling to give any critical feedback, particularly when the system does not
demand some differentiation in assessments. Despite these risks, I now look back
and accept that the disadvantages of performance pay outweighed the advantages.
I might have imposed a robust appraisal and feedback system successfully
without the pain of the continuing controversy and staff unhappiness with the
performance bonuses.
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Table 6.7 Making performance assessment work
When I first came into the Health department in 1996, the department
had a performance-pay system for the SES (which at that time was
mandatory in all agencies). The system was a complete mess and had no
credibility with staff. How bad it was became clear to me when I insisted,
in the first round under my secretaryship, that division heads advise me
of the proposed performance ratings of their branch heads before telling
them. Very quickly, I could see there was no consistency from division
to division.
I therefore called a meeting of all division heads and, armed with a
whiteboard, I asked each in turn to name each of their branch heads and
the performance rating they proposed. As each division head finished,
I asked the others for any comments. There were none. The lack of any
corporate management structure at the time had led the division heads
to behave independently, jealously guarding their own territory and
not commenting on another’s decisions for fear of, in time, losing their
own authority to the centre.
As the names and proposed ratings appeared on my whiteboard, however,
it was becoming increasingly clear that the standards being applied were
hugely different. This could not be ignored when one division head
listed his five branch heads and said he proposed that every one be given
an ‘A’ (outstanding) rating. Again, I asked for comment from the others
and, initially, there was silence. Then a few said that, while they could
not comment on the branch heads from another division, they now
wanted to revisit the ratings they had proposed for their own staff.
Finally, one said that, while he did not have as much knowledge of the
individuals as the relevant division head, he did think from his (quite
close) dealings with them, two were not as strong performers as the other
three. There were nods around the table. At last, we had the beginnings
of a process to get more consistency in the system.
I chose not to press the matter too hard in this first round, but did ask
the division head claiming his five branch heads were all outstanding
to review his proposed ratings in light of the discussion and come back
to me. He did, proposing three ‘As’ and two ‘Bs’. I decided to concur.
Next, I had two angry branch heads contacting me demanding to know
how I could have downgraded the rating by the supervisor with whom
they worked most closely when I did not personally know of their
performance. I met with each of the branch heads, telling them frankly
of my determination to get consistency of standards in the appraisal
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process throughout the department and reassuring them that a ‘B’ rating
was indeed very high against the overall distribution across branch
heads.
In time, we established clearer performance agreements that covered
program and management responsibilities and targets, with personal
development action also identified; and we systematised the processes
involving supervisors’ supervisors to ensure consistency of standards.
Even then, however, I could not say the system was universally
supported.
Most importantly, I became increasingly aware in the APS Commission of the
research evidence that organisational performance was enhanced, not by
performance pay no matter how well designed and managed, but by timely,
positive and fair feedback together with clear alignment of individual work
requirements with organisational goals and by management effectively removing
obstacles to good performance (including getting rid of under-performers). I
hasten to add for those critics who have always opposed performance pay,
performance assessment and feedback is never an easy or uncontroversial
management issue and in some ways removing it from pay decisions makes it
harder, not easier.
Another difficult issue in management is building a winning team, moving on
the people who do not fit while winning the loyalty and enthusiasm of the others.
The division heads I inherited in the Health department were, individually,
highly talented and hard working. They knew their areas of responsibility and
were generally very good policy advisers. Together, however, they operated as
robber barons and it was my job to change that, to build a cohesive team. Sadly,
that required encouraging one of the very best to leave. As a colleague told me
at the time, you can have a really top rower in your crew, but if he insists on
sitting backwards, at some time you have to tip him out. It was not an easy time
and I lost some other excellent officers who preferred not to stay and support
the changes I was instituting (management change was not the only concern —
there was also apprehension about the government's policies towards the public
service). A conclusion for me was that good performance required far more than
technical expertise, or even good management of a division or branch: it also
required collegiality and good corporate behaviour. My own personal
behaviour—being as open and honest as possible and listening carefully to
everyone before deciding—has also always been essential to building team spirit.
Another issue is the minister’s involvement in senior appointments. Secretaries
are responsible for all employment decisions in the department and ministers
are prohibited under the Public Service Act from giving directions on such
decisions, which must be based on merit. I took the view, nonetheless, that I
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should inform the minister before making senior appointments (that is, deputy
secretary and, sometimes, division heads), while emphasising the decisions were
mine and that the Public Service Commissioner had to certify that the process
was properly managed. In the case of deputies, who from time to time act as
secretary, I believe there must be a level of ‘comfort’ about the people appointed.
Table 6.8 Selecting deputies: there’s more than one way (for the
minister) to skin a cat
In 1994, I was establishing the new Department of Housing and Regional
Development and filling the deputy position. In those days, the Public
Service Commissioner had final responsibility for SES appointments
(subsequently, the role was reduced to certifying the process of
appointment). The selection process identified the preferred candidate
on merit and I advised the minister that I would be recommending him
to the commissioner. The minister, Brian Howe, favoured another
candidate and pressed his case with me on a number of occasions. I stood
my ground, emphasising the importance of the merit principle and why
the preferred candidate was superior, noting nonetheless that his
favoured candidate was second on the merit list. I also noted that the
final decision was not his, or even mine, but the commissioner’s.
At that time, the Minister for Finance determined SES numbers and levels
and I had been negotiating with the Secretary of the Finance department,
Steve Sedgwick, the SES establishment for the new small department.
We were nearing settlement when I told Sedgwick that my minister
might be proposing to Beazley something different: a second deputy
secretary.
To Sedgwick’s displeasure and my bemusement, that is what happened.
Beazley understandably deferred to the Deputy Prime Minister, I gained
an extra deputy and two people were appointed entirely on merit. And
the team worked extremely well together.
Lessons
Michael Keating warned me when I was first appointed a secretary that the old
adage, ‘it’s lonely at the top’, was absolutely true. He was right. That is
particularly relevant to the secretary’s overall management responsibilities.
There are aspects of these that cannot be discussed internally at all, including
the appointment and performance of deputies. Other aspects can be discussed
to a limited extent, but in the end it is your call, including in particular matters
going to management style and organisational culture.
Key lessons for me include the following:
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• Strategic planning is a vital tool for top management but must be done well.
It allows ministers to have confidence that their agenda is being pursued
and to influence the way the department does so. The process can also engage
middle-level (and even junior) staff as well as senior management, building
wider ownership of the strategic directions finally determined. The process
can also engage stakeholders, strengthening relationships and mutual
understanding and respect.
• Organisational performance management is an essential part of top
management and increasingly requires a project management approach to
monitor implementation of key initiatives. Some scepticism is needed,
however, rather than blind acceptance of the current enthusiasm for
outcomes-based management.
• Individual performance management remains a difficult challenge and there
is no easy answer. My main lesson is not to run away from it. I no longer
advocate performance pay but, in the absence of that, it is important not to
drop the ball and let regular and robust performance appraisal slide.
• Structured performance management can enhance personal development
and career planning: involving supervisors’ supervisors not only helps
consistency of appraisal, it opens up dialogue about a person’s future (which
immediate supervisors might have little interest in) as well as their current
job and performance.
• While it is right and proper to inform ministers about proposed senior
appointments, particularly deputies, the secretary must not allow the minister
to think he or she can decide, and the secretary’s decision must be made on
merit.
• The personal behaviour of a secretary is critical not only to developing a
strong and enthusiastic management team, but to setting the style of the
whole department.
• ‘Soft’ skills of leadership among all managers, most particularly the middle
managers, need to be enhanced and encouraged. Having section heads onside
is the tipping point of organisational success: they are the ones whom most
staff down the line look to as their team leaders and they are the ones senior
managers rely on to get things done.
• This needs to be done in a ‘hard-nosed’ way, avoiding content-free rhetoric.
Leadership also needs to be complemented by specific management and
technical skills.
• In promoting teamwork, I also appreciated the risk of ‘group think’, where
the pressure for consensus and desire to please peers and more senior staff
could discourage real debate.
• Considerable effort needs to be given these days to the design and efficient
operation of information and communications systems. These are central to
the delivery of programs and the smooth management of the department.
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When they go wrong, everything goes wrong, including staff confidence in
senior management and staff morale (see also Chapter 9 on communications
management).
• The other main lesson I draw from my experience is the importance of
allocating time and resources for policy research and development. Pressures
from ministers and pressures of program delivery can squeeze capacity for
longer-term research and development. Some suggestions for personal
approaches to preserve a longer-term perspective and a depth of analysis
are set out in Chapter 2. Management options for addressing this danger
include retaining a capable central strategy unit, promoting systematic
program evaluation measurement, setting aside time for policy forums in the
department and drawing on external expertise through close partnerships,
including with specialist research or statistical agencies.
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7. The art of persuasion: management
of the portfolio
Elements of the role
The term ‘portfolio secretary’ had no legal status and, unlike ‘portfolio ministers’,
departmental secretaries did not in my time have any formal responsibilities
over the other agencies in the portfolio. The term is not, however, without clear
meaning: the portfolio secretariy is the most senior official in each portfolio and
is expected to coordinate various activities across agencies for the portfolio
minister and for the government as a whole.
The core elements of this role are:
• to ensure good lines of communication across the portfolio, with the
minister(s) and with central agencies
• to participate on relevant boards and committees of agencies
• to advise the minister on structures and appointments and, sometimes, on
performance
• to manage formal agreements between the department and particular agencies
• to coordinate portfolio budgets and appearances before parliamentary
committees.
Usually, I found the portfolio minister expected a more proactive role than
simply acting as a postbox, and also that the agency heads were keen to get
better understanding of the broader policy context of their work than a basic
information exchange would reveal. Accordingly, I chaired a portfolio agency
heads’ meeting, usually every quarter, with a formal business agenda but also
time for informal discussion. We also generally included on the agenda each
time a short presentation by one agency head about that agency’s plans and
issues. The formal agenda would usually include budget arrangements, industrial
relations issues and areas for possible management cooperation; it would also
include discussion of current policy issues affecting more than the department,
though mostly these would be managed down the line outside these quarterly
meetings. The meetings were always strongly supported by the agency heads
whose access to ministers was often limited.
I also involved the portfolio agencies directly in the department’s strategic
planning process, participating in the senior management’s retreat and
commenting on drafts (see Chapter 6). Agencies usually did the same, involving
me or one of my deputies in their own strategic planning processes.
As secretary, I was also often a member of the board of a portfolio agency, such
as the AIHW and the Health Insurance Commission (HIC). This entailed attending
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monthly meetings, although, by mutual agreement, some boards arranged their
agendas to allow me to reduce my time at those meetings with another
departmental representative acting as an observer for the rest of the meeting.
The department also had responsibility for advising the minister on structural
matters affecting portfolio agencies and, in the Health department, this became
a major policy issue for several years. The structural agenda included splitting
Medibank Private from the rest of the Health Insurance Commission (which
continued to have responsibility for Medicare); corporatising Health Services
Australia; restructuring the Australia New Zealand Food Authority; and
establishing new agencies such as the Aged Care Standards and Accreditation
Authority, the General Practice Education and Training Agency and the
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA), or new
statutory offices such as the Gene Technology Regulator. I established a corporate
strategy team in the department to oversee these projects, but many required
significant personal involvement to resolve differences and to confirm ministerial
views.
Table 7.1 Splitting the Health Insurance Commission
The Health Insurance Commission (HIC) had responsibility for Medibank
Private, a private health insurance fund competing with others, and key
elements of Medicare, the universal government health insurance scheme.
I was acutely aware of the conflicts of interest in this dual role and the
lack of transparency in the operations of Medibank Private, which made
it impossible to deny criticisms of unfair competition. I advised in 1996
that the HIC should be split.
The then CEO opposed my view strongly and there was debate among
the board of commissioners, but the minister accepted my advice.
I established a small team in the department to work with a small team
in the HIC to plan and execute the split. For the most part, this project
management process worked smoothly and a major reform was achieved
quietly and efficiently. The support of the then board chairman was a
critical factor.
Drawing from the Social Security department’s experience in separating
Centrelink from the department, I recommended the early appointment
of (at least acting) heads of each agency to facilitate a transparent process
for dividing resources and staff, with a clear champion for each new
agency. The CEO disagreed, highlighting his statutory responsibilities
for both proposed agencies until the new legislation was in place and
deferring his own decision on which of the new agencies he wished to
head.
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My preference could not be enforced, so there was no point pressing the
matter, but the CEO’s very late announcement that he would go with
Medibank Private left a legacy of minor problems (relating to the
suspicion or reality that resources were not split fairly) that were not
resolved for more than a year after the split.
Looking back now, I have no doubt the split helped both sides. Those
responsible for Medicare came into their own, gaining much more
attention from senior management, working more closely with the
department and addressing a range of enhancements to services and
improved administration. Those responsible for Medibank Private gained
greater flexibility to operate commercially, as they had always wanted
to do.
With the establishment of a separate Medibank Private and the commercialisation
of Health Services Australia, the department became responsible also for advising
the minister on aspects of those businesses’ strategic plans and performance.
The ministers also drew on the department for advice on appointments to all the
portfolio bodies, which I usually provided personally after the relevant search
processes. That advice was by no means always accepted but I put considerable
effort into ensuring a merit-based process for our own short-listing. For the HIC
and Medibank Private boards, we employed a search company to identify possible
directors, including the chairs, but our short lists were generally supplemented
by names (often, but not always, good ones) supplied through the political
process.
On one occasion, I was asked to ‘sort out’ a problem concerning an agency head
in whom ministers had lost confidence. Legally, I had no authority, but I was
able to counsel her, help her to identify her own options and assist her with a
dignified departure when she agreed it was in her own best interests to move
on.
In some cases, the department had formal relationships with agencies. In the
case of the AIHW, we developed a partnership agreement under which the
department set out the research and data requirements it had for the next few
years, in addition to the AIHW’s core collections and publications, and the funds
it intended to provide to supplement the AIHW’s core budget. That agreement
followed discussions between me and the AIHW director on the benefits of
moving away from ad hoc requests and payments from different areas of the
department, to a planned approach that allowed the AIHW to invest in ‘ongoing’
staff and additional collections. The new approach also gave the AIHW
responsibility for some collections previously managed by the department.
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In the case of the HIC (now Medicare Australia), we had in my time a
purchaser–provider agreement under which we negotiated the funds required
by the HIC to deliver MBS and PBS payments and so on. This required careful
management of my own conflicts of interest given I was both secretary and an
HIC board member. We also developed a memorandum of understanding between
the HIC and the department to promote closer cooperation and better information
exchange on new policy proposals and program administration and
implementation of new measures.
The budget process always involved close interaction between the department
and portfolio agencies, as agencies developed proposals for ministerial
consideration, the department worked with the minister on priorities within the
parameters set by the ERC or senior ministers and the department developed its
own policy proposals that often affected portfolio agencies (particularly the HIC),
which would have some implementation responsibilities. At several points in
this process, as secretary, I would liaise directly with the agency heads concerned.
They would all have opportunities to talk directly with ministers, but these
were inevitably limited and they relied quite heavily on me and the department
appreciating their perspectives and concerns. In my time, they never attended
the ERC.
All portfolio agencies were usually on the agenda for Senate Estimates hearings,
though some escaped scrutiny frequently as the committee focused on agencies
handling more juicy issues. Agencies such as the HIC and ARPANSA were
frequently interrogated. As a rule, I would continue to sit with the minister
when they appeared and occasionally intervened in the answers to explain
background or to try to contain the potential debate.
Differences among agencies and across portfolios
Portfolio arrangements vary considerably with the nature of the portfolio
agencies’ responsibilities. Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) generally
value their independence from the bureaucracy and the portfolio department,
often working closely with the Finance department, is involved only in advising
the shareholder ministers on ownership issues.
Medibank Private rarely attended my portfolio agency heads’ meetings, though
the CEO of Health Services Australia (HSA) almost always came.
The more budget-dependent agencies tend to have closer relationships with
departments, but that relationship can depend on the personalities of the agency
heads and their personal relationship with the minister. Small agencies most
often have problems with access to ministers and appreciate a close, constructive
relationship with the department.
It was interesting as Public Service Commissioner to see the weak arrangements
in the PM&C portfolio for informing or coordinating its agencies. The APS
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Commission was in a privileged situation given my attendance at portfolio
secretaries’ meetings and involvement in the MAC, but many other agencies
(such as the Ombudsman and the Official Secretary to the Governor-General)
felt very much on the outer. I think there was just one meeting of the agency
heads in my three years as the Commissioner. This experience confirmed for me
the importance to agencies of portfolio secretaries actively engaging with them,
though I can understand that this presents a greater challenge for a secretary of
a less-integrated portfolio such as PM&C.
Changes in arrangements
The portfolio approach was very much an outcome of the 1987 changes in
departmental organisation, which first involved having several ministers in the
one portfolio with the one department. Each department had a portfolio minister
in the cabinet, some with junior ministers outside the cabinet. An explicit purpose
behind this new arrangement was to streamline cabinet business and to give
more responsibility to portfolio ministers and their departments.
In line with this approach, the budget process was aligned more formally with
portfolios and ministers were expected to prioritise across their wider
responsibilities including across portfolio agencies. Some such processes had
always operated, but it became firmer after 1987 and has remained so.
The Uhrig Report in 2004 on statutory authorities and statutory office-holders
raised the question of the role of portfolio secretaries, at long last leading to
formal recognition of their role in such matters as advising on appointments and
reviewing performance, while not detracting from the statutory independence
of such agencies.
A subsequent change to establish the Human Services portfolio including
Centrelink and Medicare Australia does present new challenges for portfolio
secretaries while offering opportunities for closer attention to service delivery
matters. The challenges go to the relationship between such service providers
and their respective policy departments and the relationships in turn with the
Human Services department. I am not convinced that such separation of policy
from administration will prove sustainable.
Portfolio management issues
The main issue to be managed in these portfolio arrangements is acknowledging
the independence of each agency and the legal responsibilities of each agency
head, while addressing the need of the minister for assistance with coordination,
coherence and oversight. Some agencies have considerable statutory or
commercial independence, while others are less independent of the minister to
whom they are responsible.
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The authority of the portfolio secretary is determined largely by the attitude of
the minister: the extent to which the minister turns to the secretary for assistance
and advice. Most ministers I have worked with do not consciously deny agency
heads access to them, but find it necessary in the management of their time and
priorities to limit such meetings. For the most part, the agency heads can just
get on with their jobs, happy not to have the minister breathing down their
necks, but the limited direct interaction with ministers can lead to the minister
and the agency head relying on the department and the departmental secretary
as intermediary from time to time.
A related issue concerns when functions should be performed outside the
department and the appropriate governance arrangements for agencies
performing such functions. New Zealanders appositely call this issue ‘signposting
the zoo’. Notwithstanding its limitations, the Uhrig Report has helped, in my
view, to clarify some of the key issues and options. Before that report, and despite
the efforts of my team advising on corporate strategies, there was limited
coherence among the array of portfolio agencies in Health. These included
statutory bodies, executive agencies and companies, some under the Financial
Management and Accountability Act, others under the Commonwealth Authorities
and Companies Act, some under the Public Service Act and others with their own
employment powers.
Another important issue relates to appointments. For most of my time as secretary,
under Labor and Liberal governments, I was not confident of the integrity of
the appointments processes. Despite efforts to use formal selection advisory
processes and search arrangements, political favouritism was often a dominant
factor. Most such appointees were competent, but not the best for the job, and
the process left the likelihood of some political trade. Fortunately, the Rudd
Government has strengthened the role of portfolio secretaries and the Public
Service Commissioner in advising on these appointments and ensuring a more
merit-based approach.
Table 7.2 Shareholder value or gift of the government: the
appointment of the chair of Health Services Australia
When the chair of the Health Services Australia (HSA) board, Rae Taylor,
came up for reappointment, I strongly supported him given the
company’s successful transition to that point from a bureaucratic
business. There was still considerable risk about the company’s
continuing financial viability and I was concerned that if Taylor left we
could also lose the CEO, Vanessa Fanning, who was performing extremely
well, and shareholder value could collapse.
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While I eventually convinced the two ministers concerned, it was clear
that they viewed the chairman’s position not so much as a key to the
company’s success, but as a prize—a potential gift to a friend of the
government. They were certainly not seized with the possible impact
on shareholder value if the appointment process was not handled well.
For my part, I felt the portfolio—and the public—had been most
fortunate in obtaining the services of Taylor, a former secretary and
former CEO of Australia Post, whose remuneration was a fraction of what
his time was worth; I also knew he did not regard the HSA responsibility
as a prize, but as a burden he was willing to continue to bear.
Another issue involved in portfolio management is the handling of conflicts of
interest. The Uhrig Report recommended that secretaries not be on executive
boards of agencies. I am not convinced this is always the best approach, though
it might be in most cases.
Table 7.3 Should secretaries be on agency boards?
When the HIC had a board, I was initially not a member and then became
one. The chairman was of the view that my membership represented a
conflict of interest, though most of the others felt my involvement assisted
greatly in ensuring the strategic direction of the HIC was consistent with
the government’s policies on Medicare. The chairman, with his private
sector orientation, was looking to ‘increase the return on the HIC’s assets’
(in systems and staff) by widening the HIC’s (essentially government)
business; I saw this as merely another set of new policy proposals to
extend Medicare benefits that would need ministerial and cabinet
agreement. I firmly believed this difference of view was best settled
within the board rather than escalated into a damaging conflict requiring
the minister (to whom both the board and I were responsible) to
intervene. Conflict of interest? Perhaps, but where was it best managed?
A clearer conflict of interest arose when the purchaser–provider
arrangement with the department was being negotiated. I absented
myself from the relevant board discussions and delegated to a deputy
the negotiation responsibilities of the department. Was this adequate
management of the conflict? I think so, but the case here is less clear
(subsequently, based on Uhrig, the purchaser–provider arrangement
itself was dropped—a mistake in my view).
In the Defence department, where I was a deputy secretary, I also
observed the different approaches of two companies being privatised:
Australian Defence Industries (ADI) and Aerospace Technologies of
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Australia (ASTA). ADI had a very able board with no departmental
members or observers and was extremely anxious to keep the department
at arm’s length and, as it saw it, to avoid conflict of interest. ASTA’s
board was probably not as strong and it included a senior departmental
officer. ASTA’s sale went smoothly with close cooperation, independent
assessment contracted by the department, careful coordination with the
Department of Finance before cabinet took its final decisions and transfer
of the sale itself to the Asset Sales Task Force. ADI’s process could not
have been more different. Arguments over conflicts of interest continually
delayed and escalated issues, forcing the conflicts up into the cabinet
room, where it was clear that it was the board along with its CEO, not
the Defence Minister (the main buyer of products) or the Finance Minister
(the other ‘owner’ of the company), that was the odd man out.
Sometimes conflicts of interest, such as in the sale of ADI mentioned in Table
7.3, cannot be totally avoided but must be balanced. What is always essential
is that they are openly identified.
Lessons
Portfolio management is still a growing responsibility and the arrangements are
still evolving.
The portfolio secretary should never have direct powers over the agencies and
will always rely heavily on persuasion, reinforced by having the confidence of
the minister. Whatever arrangements emerge, it is important to establish processes
for regular and open communications.
It is also very helpful to involve portfolio agencies in the department’s strategic
planning processes. This can clarify relationships and reinforce shared objectives
as well as harmonise strategies throughout the portfolio while recognising distinct
roles and responsibilities.
For bigger portfolios with many agencies, it is almost certainly worthwhile
investing in a unit in the corporate strategy area to have primary responsibility
for managing the relationships and undertaking any work on restructuring,
reviewing performance and advising on appointments. The unit needs to be led
by someone who commands the respect of the agencies and who has expertise
in public and private sector governance.
Secretaries and agency heads (and chairs of agency boards) can also usefully
cooperate to ensure the processes for appointments to boards and agency head
positions are more robust. Together, they can ensure more emphasis on merit
in appointments, even if they might not fully constrain political choices.
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There will from time to time be conflicts of interest. These need to be
acknowledged and processes for managing them agreed. Avoiding such conflicts
might usually be the preferred approach, but frequently they just have to be
managed: balancing interests is part and parcel of the political process.
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8. Juggling the players: working with
external stakeholders
Elements
The main groups I worked with directly as a secretary that were external to the
Commonwealth were:
• the states and territories
• advisory bodies and interest groups
• academics and international groups (including governments, multinational
bodies and networks of experts)
• the media.
The work included formal negotiations and discussions, consultations, shared
learning and information exchange. Working with the media is a particularly
complex and sensitive matter, which is therefore addressed separately in
Chapter 9.
States and territories
Most portfolios these days must engage with the states. For those with continuing
financial dealings, such as the departments of Housing and Health, there are
periods of intense negotiations as multi-year financial agreements are developed
and settled. There is also elaborate machinery for continuing discussion and
day-to-day decision making within and beyond the formal agreements, including
advisory councils of senior officials (usually heads of departments), which support
ministerial councils. Depending on the workload, the advisory councils may
have supporting committees and associated forums with wider participation
from interest groups and experts.
In the health portfolio, the main funding agreements are the five-year Australian
Health Care Agreements (AHCAs) through which the Commonwealth funds
about half of the costs of public hospitals on condition that care provided to
public patients is free. There is a range of other agreements including on health
and community care and population health (Population Health Partnerships).
When the Department of Health included family services, we also had the
Commonwealth State Disability Agreements and Supported Accommodation
Assistance funding through the states.
The Australian Health Ministers Council usually met at least twice a year for a
day with the relevant secretaries attending with their ministers, but more
frequently when the AHCAs were being developed and negotiated. The
Australian Health Ministers Advisory Committee (AHMAC) of heads of
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departments met more frequently, usually for two days, with an extensive
business agenda that might typically cover public health campaigns, safety and
quality, the health workforce, new health technology, Indigenous health, health
records and information technology as well as financial arrangements. AHMAC
has a small full-time secretariat. Occasionally, AHMAC would meet without
other officials present to allow the secretaries to discuss more frankly issues and
options for reform. Committees under or related to AHMAC worked on workforce
issues, quality and safety and population health.
Negotiating the biggest financial agreements with the states requires delicate
handling by the departmental secretary. Such large amounts of money end up
being major items for Commonwealth and state budgets, engaging the Prime
Minister and premiers and the treasurers. They are also potential vehicles for
delivering substantial improvements in services to the community, requiring
careful consideration of the details by the officials in the line departments. Within
each jurisdiction, there is a tension between the line department and the central
agencies, the latter suspicious that the line agencies will collaborate across
jurisdictions to lock in future funding for their interests at the expense of each
jurisdiction’s budget flexibility, and the line agencies concerned that they will
lose control of the subject matter agenda (for example, health or housing) and
see funds diverted to other purposes.
Table 8.1 The 1998–2003 Australian Health Care Agreements
During 1997, health ministers supported by AHMAC met on several
occasions to consider the content of the next five-year agreements,
particularly the opportunity to progress reform in service delivery (such
as coordinated care) as well as the need to address the weaknesses of the
then agreements such as the scope for cost shifting, the failure to address
declining private health insurance membership and poor reporting
arrangements on outputs. The ministers consciously deferred
consideration of the money for some time, knowing that as soon as this
was on the table the discussion would be quickly taken over by the
central ministers and their departments and moved away from health
service delivery issues.
The approach developed during 1997 was to move to outputs-based
agreements setting firm targets for increasing acute-care episodes in
public hospitals. The proposed agreements were also to provide
opportunities to review boundary problems such as support for patients
being discharged, GP-type services in hospital emergency departments
and care of nursing home-type patients, in part to limit cost shifting.
This reform agenda was developed through the Australian Health
Ministers’ Council, with secretaries playing the lead role. Late in 1997,
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however, it was clear that these constructive discussions could not
continue further as it was time to address the money.
Minister Wooldridge put his proposal for the new agreements to cabinet
in late 1997. The department, with my close involvement, developed the
proposal. We had just had two of the toughest budgets ever in the
portfolio and knew we could not expect generous treatment, but it was
also evident to the minister and the department that the Commonwealth
had to put forward a financial proposal that would encourage the states
to pursue the reform agenda we had been developing. The proposal
involved an outputs-based agreement with increasing numbers of outputs
reflecting not only population and ageing but increasing demand and
improving health technology. A hospitals outputs price index was also
proposed. Cabinet agreed to Wooldridge’s proposed offer after
considerable debate and opposition from key central agencies. Looking
back now, I am pleased to say that the offer was more generous, and
more consistent with a genuine health reform agenda, than either the
1993 or the 2003 agreements. Given the context of the tough budgets
we had, we were pleasantly surprised by the minister’s success.
The states’ reaction did not reflect our optimism, even though privately
several of the most senior state directors-general told me they were
surprised by the generosity of the offer. The Premier of Victoria, Jeff
Kennett, led the charge, claiming a $1.5 billion shortfall a year—a figure
that no-one could explain. Wooldridge attempted to split the states by
offering any state or territory that signed up by a particular date extra
one-off funding plus access to their fair share of any additional money
should the Commonwealth later vary its offer. The Liberal Government
of the Australian Capital Territory (under Kate Carnell, the former Health
Minister) quickly took this up, to the great advantage of the territory,
followed much later by Queensland. I handled some of these negotiations
personally, but the Queensland one was effectively signed off by the
head of the Premier’s department and the head of the Department of
PM&C, the two health secretaries sitting in to ensure the details were
correct and understood.
In the first half of 1998 there were several premiers’ conferences at which
the healthcare agreements were top of the agenda. Kennett led walkouts
on two occasions. In this period, I had many conversations with my state
and territory counterparts to gauge the real gap between the offer and
what might be acceptable to their governments. My assessment from
these was that the gap was less than $300 million a year and probably
about $200 million a year, though no specific suggestion was put to me.
99
Juggling the players: working with external stakeholders
After telling the minister, I spoke to Ted Evans, Secretary to the Treasury,
before one of the premiers’ conferences and he indicated that, in the
general context of the revenue-sharing agreements, such an extra amount
should be within the bounds of acceptability, and he undertook to raise
the possibility. There was another walkout when the Treasurer refused
to vary the Commonwealth offer.
I was then contacted again by my Victorian counterpart, Warren McCann,
who told me he was acting with the Premier’s knowledge: could we meet
to test a compromise option. We met over lunch at a restaurant in Manuka
and hammered out a position each of us would take back to our
principals. We narrowed the difference to between $100 and $200 million
a year, after taking into account the generosity of the Commonwealth’s
Gold Card initiative for veterans. I passed this on to Wooldridge, who
was liaising with the Prime Minister and his office, and to the Treasury.
The reaction was positive. McCann rang to say the Premier was on side.
Nothing happened for two months other than continued public
haranguing. Then the Prime Minister announced an enhanced offer that
Kennett and the other premiers accepted. Perhaps it was mere
coincidence, as no doubt there had been parallel private political
discussions, but the final agreement was in line with the deal brokered
by myself and my Victorian counterpart.
I then arranged an urgent meeting of AHMAC at Melbourne Airport to
finalise the agreements, pulling together the content developed in 1997
and the financial aspects now settled. I rang Wooldridge before the
meeting to say that aspects of the output agreements and reform measures
were not yet tied down and asked how tough an approach I should take.
He made it clear that no-one would welcome another public spat:
politically, the deal was now done. I led the discussion, proposing to the
surprise of my colleagues agreements that reflected the basic structure
and wording the states had suggested previously, which emphasised
cooperation and shared aspirations, but then worked into it all our
requirements for output targets and reporting, and an agenda for
examining boundary issues that were disrupting good patient care (we
called this ‘measure and share’). The wording was agreed and the
agreements were subsequently signed.
The potential for conflict with central agencies, and misunderstanding between
the political and administrative arms, as well as between the Commonwealth
and the states, became clear again when the states demanded a review of the
indexation factor in 2000. The situation also reminded me of several earlier
occasions in my career when Tony Ayers would say: ‘You’re being logical again,
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Andrew.’ It was not meant as a compliment, but as a warning that I was being
naive about political factors even if I was right about long-term policy directions.
Table 8.2 AHCA indexation: intellectual logic versus the immediate
bottom line
The AHCAs provided for a review process in the event a new hospital
outputs price index was not developed in time and the states did not
accept the Commonwealth’s default position. This situation emerged by
2000.
I suggested some names for the independent reviewer, two of them being
put to the states by the Commonwealth: the states agreed to Ian Castles,
the former Statistician and previously Secretary of Finance. Castles
conducted a typically intellectually robust study, noting in the absence
of a hospitals output price index that there was nonetheless an
economy-wide output index, the consumer price index (CPI). The CPI
is in essence an average output price index and, because hospitals like
other service industries are likely to have lower productivity than
capital-intensive industries, a suitable output price index for hospitals
might be CPI plus a small factor, say 0.5 per cent.
This was way higher than the Commonwealth’s default figure built into
the forward estimates at the time (the case for a lower figure was the
evident variation in productivity across jurisdictions and the room for
a concerted improvement in efficiency). I was in strife, particularly with
the PMO: I had put the review mechanism in the agreements (albeit
consistently with the cabinet decision taken in late 1997) and I had
advised the appointment of Castles, and he had come up with a figure
that would cost the Commonwealth hundreds of millions of dollars.
Frankly, I thought Castles’ basic analysis was impeccable even if he had
ignored the opportunity for a one-off efficiency gain.
I spoke to the Treasury and the Finance department, Treasury agreeing
on the intrinsic merit of Castles’ argument though questioning the case
for the extra 0.5 per cent (the Finance department then, and even now,
seems willing to ignore such analysis if it does not suit). I suggested to
the minister and the central agencies a way of offsetting the costs by
reducing the output targets in recognition of the huge increase in private
health insurance membership during the previous year. Apparently,
that was not politically acceptable despite the logic and the fact that it
would still have the desired financial impact.
Cabinet decided to reject Castles’ recommendation and to keep the
existing default index, an index that had no logic and was demonstrably
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inadequate; this decision caused a much bigger problem for the states
and the whole health system eight years later. The PMO held me to blame
for the dispute for the rest of my time in health, while I forever struggled
to gain full cooperation among CEOs.
I remain firmly of the view that, for Commonwealth–state relations to
work well, there must be clear policy coherence in any financial
agreement so as to foster trust and cooperation. Heavy-handedness leaves
a legacy of mistrust and blame that CEOs can never overcome.
The role of senior officials vis-a-vis that of ministers and their staff in these sorts
of processes is critical. Officials work to ministers’ agendas and politicians will
always make the decisions. In my experience, however, officials need some space
to do the analysis, to identify the benefits and the costs and to provide an
evidence-based framework against which political considerations can be taken
into account. Not giving them this space, including through forums of CEOs or
other Commonwealth–state officials, runs the risk of constraining the analysis
and the options and is generally not in the public interest or, indeed, longer-term
political interests. Bureaucrats who play politics can cause just as much harm as
politicians and their advisers intervening inappropriately, and I saw evidence
of that in housing and health, with NSW bureaucrats more often offending than
others.
Table 8.3 Looking over my shoulder: the role of ministerial staff
in CEO meetings
In 1994, the minister, Brian Howe, insisted for some time that his senior
adviser on housing accompany me to the meetings of CEOs as we
developed options for the next Commonwealth–state housing agreement
and considered more radical reform of housing assistance for low-income
Australians (see Chapter 4). It was a mistake. The other CEOs all felt
uneasy, wondering if they too should invite their ministers’ advisers.
They felt inhibited, as the discussions were not removed from direct
political involvement.
As I explained to the minister after the arrangement had operated for
several months, the inclusion of his adviser raised questions of his trust
in me (‘looking over my shoulder’) and, more importantly, constrained
discussions to the potential disadvantage of himself as well as the other
ministers.
He finally accepted my advice, perhaps in part because his adviser had
witnessed that I was indeed developing a reform agenda that he might
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value and ensuring officials across jurisdictions undertook the analysis
necessary to allow ministers to take informed decisions.
Advisory bodies and interest groups
I spent considerable time with advisory bodies and interest groups. Building
and maintaining such external relationships is a significant responsibility of top
management in any organisation and a large part falls on the agency head as a
rule.
In the Housing department, we had an advisory board of business and community
representatives, which the minister frequently attended, and the Indicative
Council, which gave independent technical advice on investment trends in the
housing industry; we also had less formal consultative arrangements with welfare
organisations providing supported accommodation services and we were in the
business of establishing Regional Economic Development (RED) committees
throughout the country. As a rule, I attended meetings of the advisory board,
chairing them whenever the minister was not present. I also went to early
meetings of some of the new RED committees, particularly where there had been
sensitivities over representation.
In the Health department, I moved swiftly to engage with a wide range of
stakeholders, as explained in Chapter 3, by inviting them to give a series of
presentations to senior management when we were developing our first strategic
plan. When we set our vision to be ‘the leader’ of Australia’s health system, we
were highly conscious that that required gaining strong standing with the many
players involved in the system including, in addition to the states, the medical
profession, the industries and charitable groups providing services and products
and the various consumer groups and organisations. The scale of health is such
that it is impossible for ministers and their advisers to manage these relationships
on their own: the department requires close, continuing links and the secretary
has to take the lead.
A particular priority for me, and the minister, was Indigenous health. In 1995,
under the previous government, the department had taken over responsibility
for health services in Indigenous communities from the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). It was a controversial decision and it was
incumbent on us to demonstrate that the change would enhance service levels
and effectiveness. I chaired the advisory committee established by the minister,
a trade-off between the committee being seen to be independent and
representative, and being closely plugged into the decision-making process. The
committee was one of my hardest jobs.
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Table 8.4 Indigenous consultations
The first two-day meeting of the Aboriginal and Torres Trait Islander
Health Advisory Committee was a struggle. We spent the first day in a
frustrating (for me) discussion of protocols and processes. At about five
o’clock, I said that we had now got to know each other and settled our
processes, but perhaps we could be more ‘businesslike’ and return to
the substantial agenda on the second day.
My comment caused a furore. I was accused of racism and of ignoring
‘blackfellas’’ way of doing business. Debate on my comment continued
for more than an hour the next morning, before we turned to matters
directly relevant to health services for Indigenous people.
I accepted I might have spoken presumptuously, but I also knew this
was a try-on, a game to test my nerve and patience. It was by no means
the last time discussions with the National Aboriginal Community
Controlled Health Organisation (NACCHO) and other Indigenous
organisations got testy (leading to occasional cessation of grants and
withdrawal of agreements), but over subsequent years, I and the
department gained considerable respect from most Indigenous
organisations for the mix of empathy, patience, toughness and
professionalism we tried hard to demonstrate.
There was no doubt in my mind that my direct and continuing
involvement was essential and I followed up formal meetings with many
visits and informal discussions with community leaders. It was hard
work, but inherently satisfying because it was the most important
responsibility we had. We made some progress, aware of the evidence
that community involvement was critical to improved health, but were
frequently overwhelmed by the complexity of the problems and
despairing about how to engage and to understand the cultural diversity
involved.
The late Puggy Hunter was a key character in those years. A Kimberley man,
Hunter had many parts. He was a pragmatist, willing to negotiate across the
political divide to get better resources for Indigenous health services, but he
had his own battles in the arcane world of Aboriginal politics. Despite being
chair of NACCHO, he could not always deliver his side of the bargain with his
network, nor could he always get from government what his network demanded.
The divide between the old school led by Naomi Meyer, the pioneer of the
Redfern Aboriginal Medical Service, who saw the issues primarily through the
lens of rights and struggles and protest, and the new school of pragmatists
looking for practical gains and willing to negotiate, was and remains wide. The
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old school is not without its justification, but Indigenous health needs people
to work together.
My greatest disappointment was Minister Wooldridge not convincing cabinet
to commit to an increasing budget allocation, which I firmly believed was
required and could be well spent. He tried hard, and indeed he delivered real
increases each year, but his attempts to lock in more substantial increases every
year for 10 years received no support from his ministerial colleagues.
Working with external groups often goes beyond consultation. Some interest
groups have the capacity to make or break a government initiative and proposed
measures have to be negotiated with them. This was particularly true in health,
where agreements were continually being negotiated with the AMA and the
various colleges such as the pathologists, radiologists and GPs, and the Pharmacy
Guild. My role in these was usually not in the negotiations themselves but in
some of the early high-level discussions of the possible parameters for
negotiations.
Table 8.5 Learning the limits: negotiating the GPs’ memorandum
of understanding in 1999
The first memorandum of understanding (MOU) with GPs (the Royal
College, the Divisions of General Practice and the AMA) was negotiated
in 1996, with increases in MBS fees agreed in exchange for restrictions
on the growth in numbers of GPs through vocational registration. The
agreement came up for renegotiation in 1999.
The department and I advised the minister that he should press hard for
firmer conditions on MBS fee increases, including a greater shift towards
blended payments (some funds based on patient
numbers—‘capitation’—rather than just fee-for-service) by introducing
more payments for particular purposes such as immunisation, cancer
screening, practice support and chronic illness care planning, providing
greater incentives for group practices and reducing rewards simply for
throughput. I also canvassed the possibility of placing conditions relating
to the co-payments charged. The minister was keen to make some
progress particularly on improving public health outcomes and chronic
illness care, agreeing that this might allow some shift to blended payments
and more sensible incentives (rewarding quality and effort) for GPs, but
he cautioned that my preferred approach was a bridge too far. I did not
agree and told him so. I was wrong.
After cabinet agreement, the minister successfully negotiated his deal
with the then AMA President, David Brand, the Royal Australian College
of General Practitioners and the Divisions of General Practice. Then there
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was an election for the AMA Presidency at which Dr Brand was defeated
by Dr Kerryn Phelps in a major medico-political brawl over the GPs’
MOU. The MOU, which I felt was too soft, was in fact too hard (at least
for the AMA at the time).
Relations with the AMA entered a very rocky period, Wooldridge finally
and famously making concessions to Phelps at a Sydney restaurant in
front of television cameras. I strongly suspect that GPs in fact lost
financially out of the compromise, but progress on reform was also
slowed.
Table 8.6 Consulting with the private health insurance industry
I met the private health insurers in 1997 to discuss possible directions
for reform and put on the table the possibility of changing community
rating to an unfunded lifetime approach, as suggested in the recent report
by the Productivity Commission (on our advice).
They did not reject this suggestion out of hand, but were keener on
increasing the direct support they received from government, arguing
that this was justified in recognition of the savings to government as
their members relied less on public hospitals. My preferred approach
was set aside until after the 1998 election (the minister wisely deciding
it could be derailed in the heat of an election given the complexities
involved). We met again subsequently to discuss specific possibilities.
The details were developed during the next year in close consultation
with the industry; the funds were also engaged in the communications
strategy in 2000 that was essential to explain what was a highly complex
policy initiative.
As it turned out, this initiative was far more effective in reversing the
downward spiral in private health insurance membership than any of
the previous initiatives involving direct subsidies.
Academics and international networks
An element of this role of a secretary that I was personally very keen about was
engaging with academics and international groups and individuals. I always
took seriously the idea of us delivering ‘world-class’ services, requiring us to
know the lessons from the past and to know of international developments.
In the Housing department, Minister Howe was also keen on academic linkages
and he had a history of establishing reviews that, while very closely tied to his
political agenda, drew considerably on academic expertise. When I arrived in
housing, he had in place Jenny Macklin’s review of urban and regional planning
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and the portfolio had close links with the Australian Housing and Urban Research
Institute (AHURI) and the Centre for Urban Research and Action in Melbourne.
In Health, the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) ostensibly
provided the umbrella for linking with the research community, but its emphasis
was on medical research and I struggled for six years to get the council to focus
seriously on public health, health services delivery or health economics (despite
two review reports, endorsed by the government, giving them extra resources
precisely for these purposes). I tended to look elsewhere, attending seminars
and conferences of experts from various universities. Professor Stephen Leeder
at Sydney University was particularly helpful in the early days, hosting a regular
private forum attended mostly by NSW health officials and Sydney University
academics, which I participated in whenever I could. Despite time problems, I
also tried to keep up with the literature on health financing and economics in
particular, and encouraged officers in the department to do likewise.
Our own Occasional Papers series imposed a good discipline on our analysis and
required officers to do the necessary research and maintain academic contacts.
It also provided a further opportunity for subsequent engagement with
academics, who generally responded very favourably to the work. Some of the
papers derived from seminars we hosted with selected academics. They also
posed some political challenges (see Chapter 9).
Ever since my time in the Social Security department in the early 1980s, I have
also drawn on international networks of practitioners and academics. I attended
a major Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
conference in 1980 that led to a seminal report, The Welfare State in Crisis, and
the establishment in 1983 of the OECD’s Working Party Number One on social
welfare. I was made chair of the working party when in the Finance department
and used the opportunity to forge many lasting contacts. In the Health
department, I generally left to the Chief Medical Officer the main responsibility
for our relationship with the World Health Organisation (WHO), while keeping
a personal role in our relationship with the OECD, which offered considerable
opportunities for learning about health systems and looking at our own system
from an external perspective. One senior officer in the department, Dallas Arriotti,
had particularly strong international connections and she helped me on several
occasions to develop itineraries for international trips for the minister and myself.
She was also successful in getting me involved with a fascinating network called
Four Nations (Table 8.7).
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Table 8.7 The Four Nations network
This network, led by a small group of individuals with high standing in
the fields of health and political science, focused on the health systems
of the Netherlands, Germany, Canada and the United States. Participants
included academics and practitioners (public servants, politicians, service
providers) from each of the four nations and other international experts,
including from the OECD, the World Bank and WHO and from the United
Kingdom and Ireland.
Three of the countries have universal health systems, three are federations
and three have significant private financing: for these reasons, they are
relevant to Australia. More importantly, the participants were a veritable
who’s who of international experts in health systems and public
administration.
The format was informal, but supported by documents from the four
nations on a particular issue (for example, primary care, hospitals, aged
care) and a commissioned commentary from an international expert
observer. Because most participants attended regularly, there were
opportunities for much deeper learning than through other forums I
attended and I liked their philosophy of ‘learning about before learning
from’.
While I sometimes took another departmental officer with me, I used
this network personally to reflect on our health system, to consider
whether and how to adapt useful developments elsewhere and to test
some of our own ideas. We hosted one meeting of the group in Sydney
in 2000. In 2005, well after leaving the Health department, when I was
chairing the review of the delivery of health services for the Prime
Minister, I renewed my contacts with this network and received some
helpful advice—not on what we should do in Australia but more on
what questions I should pursue in the review.
These days, departments are increasingly involved in working with developing
nations and more widely on trade issues. In the Housing department, Minister
Howe was particularly interested in China, Japan and Indonesia and their efforts
in urban infrastructure. I followed up his initiatives in Japan, in particular
negotiating access for Australian firms to Japanese building markets. In the
Health department, I was again involved with China, and the department with
Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia.
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Four Nations Conference in Germany in 1997 – Andrew Podger with Dr Zipperer, head of the German
Health Department (personal photo collection of Andrew Podger)
Table 8.8 Overseas visits have their moments
My trip in 1994 to China, Japan and Indonesia with Brian Howe was
memorable for many reasons.
At my instigation, the minister agreed that a prominent businessman,
Brian Martin, would accompany us. We were all impressed with the
huge housing and urban development under way in China, but the
minister seemed surprised when I said I was decidedly unenthusiastic
about the prospects for much trade in this area. Martin reinforced my
views, noting the huge risks to any private investment in the absence
of international contract law and political certainty. There were certainly
potential benefits in government-to-government cooperation and helping
China learn about such matters as urban planning in a market economy,
renewal of historic buildings and precincts and asset management, but
Australian private sector involvement in the industry in China was
unlikely to go much beyond simple fee-for-service consultancies for
some time.
In Beijing, we met with Zhu Rhonggi, one of China’s most remarkable
leaders at the time and formerly the very progressive Mayor of Shanghai.
He discussed frankly the challenges facing China socially and
economically, including the expected shift of population from having
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80 per cent in rural areas to 60 per cent in the cities within 20 years—that
is, a movement of about 500 million people. He spoke about opening up
markets, reforming collectives, addressing growing inequity by
transferring taxation powers from the provinces to the centre to allow
redistribution to poorer provinces and privatisation of roads and utilities.
His agenda was like a concertina of our past reforms over 50 years or
more and our current reforms.
We also met the Mayor of Beijing, who greeted us wearing a Sydney
Olympics tie. When we asked why he thought Beijing had lost to Sydney
in the very recent competition, he answered frankly, ‘Blue skies, blue
sea’.
Among the most memorable of many fascinating experiences was our
visit to Tianjin on a Sunday. We met with the Australian Studies Centre
at the university before having lunch with city officials at the
Buckingham Palace Restaurant in the Astor Hotel in the old ‘treaty port’
with its colonial architecture. It was an amazing event.
We were welcomed by a small chamber group dressed up in Mozart
costumes complete with wigs and powdered faces. For our banquet, we
sat at a long table with high-backed chairs and golden goblets. Our host,
the deputy mayor, a female engineer, quickly became decidedly drunk.
The minister, sitting in an even higher-backed chair than the rest of us
(almost a throne), turned to me to ask what he might say. I suggested he
take this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to raise a toast to the Australian
republic in Buckingham Palace. He did so with great enthusiasm, and
much mirth among the Australian contingent.
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Dinner with Chinese Vice President, Zhu Ronggii, in 1994: Renata Howe on his right, and on his left the
interpreter, Andrew Podger, Jenny Macklin and Professor David Wilmot (personal photo collection of
Andrew Podger)
Table 8.9 Overseas visits also have their downsides
My first trip overseas with Michael Wooldridge was just after the 1996
budget. It was a tough budget with cuts everywhere. The only new
spending was an increase in the subsidy for private health insurance
premiums. We went to the United Kingdom and North America, having
agreed clear lines for those staying behind to respond to all the criticism
we anticipated over the cuts.
To limit jetlag, I stayed up for as long as I could on the day we arrived
and we then had a full day of meetings and a dinner the next evening.
At one o’clock the next morning, I received my first call from Canberra:
private health insurance premiums were increasing and the media and
opposition were highlighting that this premium increase would fully
offset the subsidy increase. What should we say? The government’s only
good news in the budget had gone sour.
I did my best to discourage the knee-jerk reaction to involve politicians
in the setting of premiums, noting the department’s statutory role (which
I did not much like either) and the benefits of an arm’s-length process.
An hour or so later, there was another call. There was now a suggestion
of a public inquiry. I advised firmly against that, warning that inquiries
should not be established without some clear strategy in mind and the
new government could come under attack if there was any public
uncertainty about its support for Medicare.
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A few hours and several calls later, I decided I had better wake up the
minister’s adviser, Ken Smith. We went through the issues and he agreed
with my advice, and that we should not wake the minister until the
morning.
By this time, however, it was evening in Canberra and the press needed
answers. The Prime Minister and Treasurer were involved and wanted
to speak to Wooldridge. We set a time (about 8am, I think) and woke
the minister just after 6am. He agreed with the position we proposed:
do not have ministers buy into the premium setting and do not have an
inquiry. The telephone call was made and the minister presented his
views.
Decisions were then taken in Australia: premiums were to be subject to
agreement by a committee of the Prime Minister, the Treasurer and the
Health Minister and the Productivity Commission was to conduct an
inquiry into private health insurance.
The lesson? Advice from overseas has no authority or influence.
Differences across government
The extent of external engagement activity varies considerably across
Commonwealth departments according to their functional responsibilities. For
me, it was greatest in the Health department, which Sidney Sax famously
described as ‘a strife of interests’. Commonwealth–state issues are also most
complicated in health, though they also play an important role in many other
portfolios these days. Similarly, international connections vary across
departments—the Department of Health possibly having more than most.
There are also personal factors involved, with some secretaries preferring to
limit their own involvement, and exposure, relying more on ministers and their
staff to manage external relationships or, at least, requiring that their engagement
with stakeholders is always confidential rather than public. I generally enjoyed
this role, believing it made me better aware of the issues and different
perspectives and hence better able to advise, and accepting such engagement
could not be expected to be off the record (indeed, there were benefits from the
discipline and wider interaction that flowed from public engagement). I also
placed emphasis on the credibility of my agencies among the stakeholders and
saw public interest in the information I was able to provide via public speeches
and private consultations. I also enjoyed interacting with academics, finding
this personally stimulating. Other secretaries are more reserved and rely more
heavily on private and informal interactions rather than public forums. The days
of isolation and anonymity, however, are long since gone.
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Ministers’ preferences also have an impact, some encouraging wider interaction
and others being less keen. Brian Howe was particularly keen for his small
department to have strong connections in Australia and internationally, including
with the academic community. Michael Wooldridge also promoted widening
and deepening the department’s work with external stakeholders, particularly
among health professionals.
Recent changes in the interaction
Curiously, while the management of external relationships has grown steadily
in importance across all government agencies, the sensitivities involved have
also grown, leading to increasing attempts to manage the process centrally
through ministers’ offices and the PMO.
The Management Advisory Committee report Connected Government sets out
some of the reasons for more interaction across and beyond government,
including the technological capacity to do so, increasing community expectations
and our increasingly informed and educated public. Looking simply at
Commonwealth–state relations, there continues to be an almost inexorable
increase in the national government’s involvement in public policy, whether in
service delivery or economic and environmental regulation. So far, the states
have not vacated these fields, so the extent of joint involvement has widened.
More generally, the increasing number of players on the field, and their
increasing professional capacity, requires secretaries to keep up to meet their
basic responsibilities of offering disinterested but highly informed advice.
The international agenda is also inexorably increasing, so that almost every
department now has its own networks among similar developed nations and
very different, developing nations, and relies less heavily on the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade. Most secretaries travel overseas several times a year,
with and without their ministers.
Engagement with academics has moved in both directions. The Hawke/Keating
Governments encouraged close connections with academia. Howe reflected this
attitude when I was secretary of his department, encouraging us to engage with
external centres and academics. The Howard Government seemed less enthusiastic
on the whole, though Wooldridge was keen for us to consult public health and
medical researchers in particular. The government’s unease, not often shared
by Wooldridge, was more with consulting health economists known to be critical
of private health financing and promoting closer control of doctors (indeed, I
was instructed not to consult certain external experts when conducting the
review of health services delivery for the Prime Minister in 2005). Nonetheless,
a number of departments have strengthened their relationships with universities
in recent years, including through contracted research, as they struggle to
maintain research capability internally.
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Issues arising
An issue in all areas of working with stakeholders is the respective roles of
secretaries (and their departments) and ministers (and their offices). The modern
world demands that secretaries and their departments engage more widely, but
as they do so, political risks arise that need to be managed carefully.
In working with the states, forums of officials are essential for marshalling the
information and analysis and clarifying the key issues for political settlement.
Not allowing the officials some space to work without direct political involvement
(or having political bureaucrats) can undermine the ability for dispassionate
analysis and information sharing. Secretaries play a key role in overseeing these
processes and in maintaining the confidence of ministers that the process is
working in their interests, giving them the opportunity to consider relevant
policy options and make well-informed decisions.
Likewise, in dealing with interest groups, ministers understandably need to be
confident that departmental contacts are constructive and supportive of the
government’s agenda and are not likely to exacerbate political difficulties. A
risk, if that confidence is lacking, is that ministers see secretaries and their
departments as just one source of advice competing with others, where the
competition for ideas is managed directly in the office. Vital to informed debate
and good decision making is the availability of disinterested public service advice
that is well informed of different views and able to provide analysis of them.
Smart interest groups will liaise with departmental officers as well as ministerial
staff; wise ministers will encourage this and refer proposals from interest groups
to departments for analysis and advice. Secretaries are key to getting these
processes right.
There can also be a risk in ministers expecting their secretaries to maintain close
relationships with stakeholders, particularly those they themselves draw on
regularly. Secretaries must also demonstrate to their staff and to the wider public
that such relationships do not reflect any partiality. Accordingly, it is important
to ensure relations with organisations that are not known supporters of the
government are also maintained, notwithstanding the occasional displeasure of
ministerial staff. It is also important to resist undue pressure to offer consultancies
to those close to the minister without proper process.
Maintaining international connections also raises the issue of containing costs
to taxpayers and ensuring value for money. International travel is always seen
as a perk by the media, and such criticism is often unfair. I do not know if I
always got the balance right, but I generally went overseas with the minister
once a year, letting another senior officer accompany him if there were other
visits, and I might have had a separate visit each year focusing on my own
contacts while attending to some specific business. Sometimes there were other
brief visits for specific business purposes.
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Lessons
Secretaries these days do have to spend more of their time managing external
relationships. Even when they are not directly engaging with external
organisations, they must oversee the relationships and ensure there is comfort
at the ministerial level about the processes involved, that they support the
government’s agenda and that the people involved can be trusted.
Managing the relationships requires effort to appreciate different cultures as
well as different views and to help staff understand that in complex fields such
as health it is not possible simply to direct. Often, success is reliant on influencing
key players to cooperate even if they do not fully agree. In this context, the idea
of ‘leadership’ encouraged by the APS Commission does indeed have real meaning
and value.
In a similar vein, I learned to take a pragmatic approach to working with the
states. Notwithstanding the benefits of clearly defined roles and responsibilities
(which I still strongly advocate), there will always be many areas where one
level of government wishes to influence another and these areas change from
time to time. For these reasons, I thought in terms of ‘control, influence,
appreciate’: try to clarify who controls what, identify and negotiate areas where
one jurisdiction wishes to influence another and always appreciate the remaining
areas under the others’ control, as some understanding of the issues and
challenges can be important into the future.
I believe strongly that secretaries benefit from personal involvement in external
networks, whether they are networks of academics or international experts or
of experienced non-government players. These networks provide rare
opportunities to look at the department, or the wider system in which it operates,
from an external perspective. Such perspectives quite often lead to significant
reassessment of strengths and weaknesses, and where effort needs to be placed
in the medium to longer term.
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9. Fourth estate or fifth column?
Working with the media
Perhaps the most sensitive external group a secretary interacts with is the media.
Particularly in the Howard Government years, any direct interaction had to be
handled with great care. The relationship between politics and the media has
always been critical and, also, essentially symbiotic. The Public Service and
particularly departmental secretaries are inevitably affected by this relationship
whether or not they have direct, personal contact with journalists. In my
experience, one of the greatest changes in public administration during the past
30 years has been the increased importance and sophistication (and sensitivity)
of communications management.
Elements of the relationship
The main ways in which departments and secretaries are involved directly or
indirectly with the media are:
• the daily routine of monitoring stories, preparing briefs and liaising with
the minister’s office
• planning for communications to support program management and
implementation of new initiatives
• presenting public speeches and publishing papers and reports
• responding to freedom-of-information (FOI) requests
• speaking directly to journalists and commentators.
Aspects of some of these elements have been discussed in Chapter 3 (‘Working
with ministers’) and Chapter 6 (‘Managing the department’), but they are of such
significance as to warrant attention in their own right.
The daily routine
The daily routine starts with the circulation early each morning of Media
Monitors—in my day, via stapled photocopies of all that day’s newspaper stories
relevant to the portfolio and a listing of other relevant media stories from radio,
television and magazines (now the material is circulated online). Media Monitors
are circulated to almost all SES officers as well as the minister and all advisers.
The public affairs unit or ministerial support unit in the department organises
this and ensures someone has scanned the stories at a very early hour in case of
a big, breaking story possibly requiring response for early morning radio. I
would normally scan Monitors when I arrived in the office about 8.30am. By
9am at the latest, the stories that seem likely to ‘get a run’ have been identified
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and agreement reached with the minister’s office on whether briefing is required
for the minister.
Most days, I would not participate in this directly, although, by scanning Media
Monitors, I was always ready to do so if I felt it necessary. Our Monday morning
‘prayer meetings’ of division heads and deputies would also have discussed
expected media interest in the portfolio that week when identifying key issues
(see Chapter 6), and helped to clarify our priorities.
The importance and urgency of ministerial briefings increased on parliamentary
sitting days when Question Time Briefs (QTBs) were required. Division heads
normally took responsibility for the quality of these and ensured liaison with
the minister’s office, but when big stories were running I would often intervene
personally, along with the relevant deputy secretary. As mentioned in Chapter
3, in cases such as the ‘Scan scam’ and ‘kerosene baths’, we implemented a major
project management approach.
The public affairs unit would also keep an eye on the media cycle during the
day, as newspaper stories were followed up first by ABC radio and then by
talkback radio, and in the evening by popular and in-depth public affairs TV.
In the Department of Health, this routine was a huge task. Stories on health
appear in every newspaper every day, often with a page-one headline and usually
with a headline on one of the first five pages. Ministers and secretaries must get
used to this, accepting the environment without being panicked, but also
discerning which stories need high-level attention and how best to respond.
The political imperative is to dampen down the bad-news stories and the
department’s briefing certainly aims to help the minister achieve that. I always
felt, however, that it was also important to inform and educate the public on
complex matters of policy or management and encouraged the inclusion of
background information if not in the brief itself then in an attachment. Mostly,
this also reinforced the political objective of dampening down a crisis story.
Proactive communications management
Communications management these days also has a proactive element. Cabinet
submissions usually include, as the first attachment, a draft press release
indicating how the proposed measure might be presented to the public. This
has long been the case, but now there is usually a more sophisticated
communications strategy behind the press release and departments maintain a
considerable continuing investment in capacity for market and other
communications research and communications campaigns.
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Table 9.1 Red and blue umbrellas: explaining lifetime cover
The decision to introduce unfunded lifetime community rating to replace
the previous community rating regulation of private health insurance
presented a considerable challenge for communications: how to explain
a complex reform and how to maximise its effectiveness in meeting the
government’s objectives of increased private health insurance
membership and more stable premiums.
Communications considerations had already influenced the detail of the
reform, including its simple profile of increasing premiums by age (very
broadly reflecting increasing health costs by age). The market research
contributed to the strategies for involving pharmacists and GPs
extensively, as these were the main groups people said they would turn
to for independent advice. The research also contributed to the name
‘lifetime cover’ as an accurate, simple and positive reflection of the
reform.
The communications strategy drew on expert advice from the industry
and elsewhere on the time needed to inform the community and allow
them to make a considered decision, noting the potential negative impact
on those who delayed deciding beyond the deadline set.
It also built on the earlier communications strategy surrounding the
private health insurance tax rebate involving red and white striped
umbrellas signifying ‘cover’. (That strategy included government
advertising and complementary advertising by the industry and
individual funds, all using the umbrellas.) The new strategy introduced
blue and white striped umbrellas.
The scale of government advertising was clearly a political decision,
though the department certainly agreed considerable advertising was
needed. The department was satisfied that the content of the
advertisements and related material was non-partisan and genuinely
informative.
Our strategic plan usually highlighted communications as a ‘key results area’
for effective management of the department. We then had a complementary
communications plan, which identified the broad policy approach and
infrastructure we needed (for example, corporate image and badging, profile,
web site role, ministerial correspondence arrangements, research, information,
public relations skills) and the mandatory processes for specific communications
strategies around, for example, any major government initiative.
During my time, the department did not conduct its own regular market research
on public attitudes to its programs or administration. I can see a case for that
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for agencies in the business of directly delivering services, but am also mindful
that it would be easy to cross the line in providing the governing party with
privileged information that might be used for partisan purposes. We did,
however, use market research extensively in most communications strategies
for specific initiatives.
With the advent of the Internet, departmental web sites have become critical to
the communications effort. Departments have learned that these sites require
more effort than being a dump for their hardcopy publications and have invested
in clever architecture and sometimes more active two-way communications
through online, almost real-time exchanges, complementing ministerial and
departmental correspondence. This has also led to the development of rules to
separate departmental from ministerial sites, to preserve the political neutrality
of departments and careful design to dampen expectations of unrealistic speed,
accuracy and comprehensiveness of responses to individual queries.
Speeches and publications
I always took the view that one of the roles of a secretary was to make public
speeches to explain the background to government policies and to promote
informed discussion of the issues involved, without either directly promoting
the government’s policies or undermining them. I similarly favoured publications
by the department disseminating facts about the programs, presenting
departmental research and canvassing some of the more technical issues
underpinning policies and programs. These served the department as well as
external players and the public, by forcing a discipline on our analysis and
opening our work up to external, expert examination.
Table 9.2 Health Occasional Papers
Between 1997 and 1999, the Health department issued five papers in its
first series of Occasional Papers. These covered:
• national leadership through performance assessment
• family and community services: when is competition the answer
• a healthy start for zero to five year olds
• compression of morbidity workshop papers
• an overview of health status, health care and public health in
Australia.
I was keen to promote more informed discussion of health financing
issues generally and advised the minister on a number of occasions that
some form of public inquiry or review would be helpful, perhaps by the
Productivity Commission (notwithstanding my initial opposition to its
1996 inquiry into private health insurance). He took a more cautious
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view, fearful that this could set hares running and reduce his capacity
to manage the policy agenda. When he again rejected my proposal after
the 1998 election, I decided the department might take some action to
fill the gap, albeit without advocating any policy directions either
generally or specifically.
It was a delicate matter, but it did lead to an excellent special series of
Health Financing Occasional Papers, prepared under the leadership of
one of the deputy secretaries, David Borthwick. The papers published
between 1998 and 2000 included:
• Health financing in Australia: the objectives and players
• International approaches to funding health care
• Health expenditure: its management and sources
• Public and private: in partnership for Australia’s health
• Technology, health and health care
• The quality of Australian health care: current issues and future
directions
• Health financing and population health.
Another occasional paper on health financing, Reforming the Australian
health care system: the role of government, was also issued in 1999, but
was not formally part of this series.
The papers received many plaudits, including from Ross Gittins in the
Sydney Morning Herald, and caused no political damage. Their existence,
however, did require some resilience by me and the department in the
face of some unease among the political staffers.
Freedom of information
The secretary may also become personally involved in managing FOI applications
when they involve politically sensitive information. I delegated authority under
the legislation, but was occasionally drawn in either by a delegate or (more often)
by the minister or minister’s office. I did not ever withdraw a delegation, but I
might have sought clarification from the delegate of his or her assessment of the
case for or against release.
Ministers and their advisers are understandably concerned to minimise political
damage and do not always appreciate public service advice on the requirements
of the legislation or common law understandings of the public interest where
that is a factor (for example, internal working documents may not be released
only if it is not in the public interest not to do so). Sometimes, however, they
do understand that delaying the inevitable often exacerbates the problem.
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Table 9.3 FOI can become very personal
I was accompanying Michael Wooldridge on a visit to the United States
when, on the way to an important meeting one morning, he turned to
me in the car blasting me about the department betraying him and lying
to his office. I had no idea what he was on about until the adviser
explained that it concerned an FOI request. The department overnight
had released information requested about the minister’s personal expenses
in the form of all the various receipts for expenditure. The media back
home was having a field day about such things as champagne with the
AMA president after settling some negotiated agreement.
I contacted my office and sought the background. The minister remained
furious all day, convinced of the department’s disloyalty and unilateral
action. Having finally obtained the full story, I went to the minister’s
hotel room late in the evening, a bottle of red wine (bought with my
own money) under my arm. The staffer was with him.
I accepted responsibility for the department not forewarning the minister
or his office of the precise time the information would be released, but
advised that his office was aware of the request and the information to
be released. I also noted that the FOI request followed the minister’s
continued refusal to answer a related Question on Notice, a reply to
which we had drafted on several occasions.
The minister was not much mollified (given the continuing media fun
and games), but said he appreciated my gesture and accepted it was my
role to defend the department. I bit my tongue, waiting until the staffer
and I had left his room to hand the adviser copies of all the emails I had.
These detailed the extent of communication between the department
and the office over several weeks, including the collation and verification
of documents by the office, consideration of what had to be released
under the law and the deadlines under the law for release. I told the
staffer: ‘You now know what I did not tell the minister: I could have
nailed you and the office on this. There was no lying by the department
or any disloyalty to the minister. You guys clearly did not keep the
minister informed.’
Perhaps I should have been more forceful with the minister, but this
way I won important credit with the office and greater cooperation from
then on. I doubt the minister forgave us, however.
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Direct contact with journalists
The department’s standard rules were that contacts with the media would be
referred to the public affairs area and/or the minister’s office. By agreement with
the office, some matters would be handled by the department, particularly if
they were merely factual or related to a matter of administration or professional
expertise where the general line to be used had been discussed with the office.
For example, the Chief Medical Officer frequently commented publicly on public
health and medical issues and the departmental delegate making a decision under
a law might be the one to announce and explain the decision if there was media
interest. Any policy matters or sensitive administrative matters would be handled
by the minister’s office.
Notwithstanding these rules, which I established in line with ministerial
directions, I occasionally spoke directly to journalists without formal clearance.
Generally, this was with journalists seeking background to current issues rather
than information for an immediate news story. For example, I had conversations
with Ross Gittins on the analysis behind the lifetime cover reform to private
health insurance. Background conversations with journalists occurred up to
once or twice a month, but mostly much less often. (I had many years earlier
developed a good relationship with Gittins, who was keen to understand the
background to policy decisions on social welfare as well as economics; he never
betrayed the trust between us.)
More problematic were the calls from reporters such as Michelle Grattan on a
breaking, high-profile story. These I ducked as a rule, though on occasions,
again, I provided some background, particularly for follow-up commentary
columns. (Grattan also never betrayed my trust, but her focus on politics made
any contacts more risky.)
Differences of approach
Health has a much larger load in dealing with the media than most portfolios.
It receives more headlines that it must respond to, its programs affect every
member of the public and it has responsibilities in health promotion. Other line
agencies might have smaller workloads, but most are involved in each of the
elements I have described. Agencies directly delivering services are these days
very extensively involved in sophisticated communications management,
including through the use of the latest technology.
The central agencies’ role varies. The Department of PM&C has the job of
monitoring the media across all government activities and providing the Prime
Minister with briefings on any of them. They, however, have limited involvement
in broader communications management. Treasury under the Howard
Government was drawn into preparing more briefs for the Treasurer than in the
past, but the load on the Finance department seemed still to be relatively light.
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Some departments are expected to deal directly with the media more often than
others, perhaps related to the operational nature of the work (for example, the
departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs) or to their expert roles, which are
almost statutorily independent (for example, the Treasury Secretary).
More important, however, are the attitude of the minister and the personal style
of the secretary. Ken Henry (Treasury Secretary) evidently has more licence
from his minister under the Rudd Government and is a confident public speaker,
but his public role is still a long way from John Stone’s regular and frank briefing
of the press in the 1970s and early 1980s. In my time, the secretaries who most
often made public speeches were Allan Hawke (Defence), Peter Shergold and I.
Recent changes: the 24/7 news cycle
As mentioned, the power and reach of the media have increased dramatically
during the past 40 years and, in response, the professionalism of the political
process has grown, leading to greater control and increased sophistication of
communications management. The relentless constancy of media attention—the
24/7 news cycle—now demands enormous resources and skills in government,
which secretaries help to marshal and manage.
Technological developments in the communications field have also changed the
way programs are managed.
Politics and the media have always been intertwined, with politicians sensitive
about public servants’ public statements and public servants usually favouring
anonymity. Anonymity is harder to maintain nowadays, while the task of
communications management is too great to be left entirely to the political arm
of government.
Issues arising
The key issue is the respective role of the political and administrative arms.
Ministers are concerned to maintain closer control and that control is increasingly
centralised around the Prime Minister and his office. There is nonetheless a
major role for the administrative arm as part of program management, as well
as lending legitimate support to ministers.
Excessive political control can constrain the capacity of public servants to serve
the public interest in making information available, publishing documents and
giving speeches. The Public Service also needs to take care not to have its
communications resources devoted to partisan purposes. As mentioned, market
research in particular can be used for partisan purposes and secretaries need to
be confident that taxpayer funding for such research is justified and can be
defended in Senate Estimates hearings.
A particular case in point concerns the sensitivities around senior public servants
speaking directly to journalists: few do it nowadays and those who do, do so
124
The Role of Departmental Secretaries
less frequently and less openly. Similarly, secretaries make fewer public speeches
these days than in the past. I think this is unfortunate, while agreeing firmly
that care is needed not to betray the minister’s trust and accepting there is a risk
of misrepresentation by the media in order to create controversy. (I also believe
it is wise for secretaries to try to avoid a high media profile, so that I do not
favour them appearing before the National Press Club.) Seeking permission every
time is also not really sensible: it can lead to unnecessarily cautious responses.
While I have been pretty cautious, I believe secretaries should draw on their
experience and judgment, recognising there is public interest in helping to
explain government policies and to provide impartially some of the underlying
analysis and research. Ministers should also recognise the professional standing
and experience of their departmental secretaries and allow them some latitude
on the understanding there will be discussion between them on handling
politically sensitive matters.
Nonetheless, there is no easy answer here and sometimes even the most carefully
considered comments to the media can blow up into political embarrassments.
That is why some secretaries are just not willing to take any risk. My preferred
approach, which occasionally got me into trouble when the media misused or
exploited my comments or speeches, was just to wear it and move on, learning
from the experience about who to trust and when and how to speak. I suspect
most ministers and their staffers, however, would prefer a more cautious
approach.
Table 9.4 Caught between a rock and a hard place
I accept I made an error of judgment at a late stage of the MRI scandal
and yet I am still unwilling to shoulder all the blame.
Minister Wooldridge had tabled a statutory declaration by a departmental
officer to support his statements that he had not divulged unauthorised
information at a meeting with radiologists shortly before the 1998 budget.
A radiologist subsequently wrote to the officer noting an omission in
the declaration about his own presence at the meeting. I informed the
minister.
Sometime later, a journalist and photographer camped outside my officer’s
home, evidently aware of the problem with the statutory declaration. I
rang the journalist to ask him to back off, that it was unfair to put a
public servant under such media pressure. He agreed to do so if I would
answer his questions: was I aware of the error in the statutory declaration
and had I informed the minister.
I said yes to both questions and then immediately rang the minister’s
office. The front-page story the next day reported my answers and the
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minister’s failure at that point to correct the parliamentary record. The
minister and his office felt I had been more keen to protect my staff than
to support the minister. I can see their point and agree I should have
rung them first, but had I done so the story would have been essentially
the same, and appeared the same day, and with no less prominence, and
the officer would have been under unfair public exposure and criticism
as well.
Table 9.5 Slaps on the wrist
After the government introduced the 30 per cent rebate on private health
insurance premiums, I was invited to speak at a public conference of
private health insurance and private hospital executives in Canberra. I
gave the conference participants some background to the government’s
policies on private health and Medicare, noting how important it was
that the industry also took action to ensure its members got value for
money and used competition among hospitals to do so. If they did not,
and premiums again began to increase, the benefits from the new rebate
would be put at risk.
The speech seemed to be well received and follow-up questions were
sensible. There were no press stories for about a week. The Australian
then decided to give it a beat-up with a headline that I was questioning
the merits of the rebate.
The Prime Minister’s Office called me directly to ask whether the speech
had been cleared by the minister and accusing me of improperly speaking
on behalf of the government. I had not formally cleared the speech, but
had sent a copy to the minister before it was delivered. The minister
later told me it was a good speech, as it was important to put some
responsibility back on the industry. The journalist rang to apologise for
the headline on the story, but I was under no illusion: the view of the
Prime Minister’s Office was that secretaries should not give public
speeches unless formally cleared by ministers beforehand, and even then
they were frowned on.
A related issue concerns how proactive media management should be. I recall a
presentation at one portfolio secretaries’ retreat by a former Fairfax executive,
which included the advice that governments (and departments) should supply
positive news stories to crowd out negative stories. Health was cited as an
example, where the public interest in health led to the allocation of considerable
space and time by media outlets to stories of interest, which, if not filled with
interesting material on medical breakthroughs or heart-warming stories of
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selflessness or courage or success through adversity, would be filled with stories
of crises and hospital errors and so on. Some politicians and their media advisers
might play that sort of game, but most of us were not persuaded that this would
be consistent with the values of the Public Service.
The popular image already is that communications management is more often
about spin than substance. The image might be a caricature, but nonetheless
represents a real issue. Apart from the need for communications management
not to be partisan (for example, through the level or nature of taxpayer-funded
advertising and research), it is important not to allow media management to lead
to excessive focus on short-term populist measures and insufficient consideration
of the longer-term public interest and options that might serve that interest.
It is here that the media can be simplistic and self-interested. There is public
interest in some limits to access to information. Politicians might try to press
this too far, but equally the media often does not acknowledge the public interest
in government having reasonable time and space, without the public constantly
looking over its shoulder, to consider complex issues, canvass options widely,
have frank discussion within the bounds of collective responsibility and receive
frank and fearless advice from officials and political advisers. The press rarely
if ever condemns someone who leaks confidential information, notwithstanding
the breach of trust involved, and seems unable to recognise the irony of its own
insistence on preserving the anonymity of its sources of information.
Secretaries, however, need to be careful to ensure decisions on access to
information are made according to the law. If they or their officers hold the
delegation, they must make their own judgments as delegates weighing up the
public interest where appropriate without direction from ministers. In my time,
I saw too many secretaries spend too much time trying to please their ministers
by exploiting exemptions under the FOI Act or not keeping records, rather than
acting with genuine impartiality and in the public interest.
Ministers are understandably uncomfortable about revelations, through FOI
requests or other processes, of advice they have not accepted, which proves to
have been sound or of events or reports that are embarrassing and hard to
explain. Several warned me on occasions that public access to departmental
advice would lead them to insisting on advice being oral only with no records
that could be subject to FOI requests. I never took this too seriously, though no
doubt I did dampen the forcefulness of some of my written advice and the tenor
of records of some discussions in more recent years. I do not believe the courts
systematically undervalue the public interest in keeping certain deliberations
confidential; more likely is that ministers, and their public service advisers,
undervalue the public interest in openness.
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Table 9.6 Legal options to limit FOI versus legal obligations to create
and maintain records
A meeting of all departmental secretaries in 2004 discussed concerns
about the media campaign, led by The Australian newspaper, to challenge
decisions (including the issuing of ‘final certificates’) to exempt
documents from FOI. Discussion focused first on the definition of
‘documents’ and then, when the meeting was advised by Rob Cornall
(Secretary of the Attorney-General’s department) that the legislation
implied a wide definition, discussion turned to ways of limiting the
number of documents held that were not unequivocally exempt from
public release. Keeping diaries was firmly discouraged, those with ‘day
books’ or similar were advised to destroy them at the end of each week
or fortnight and it was suggested that good practice was to systematically
review document holdings to destroy draft papers that were no longer
essential for future work. Where possible, policy documents were to be
managed as cabinet papers, which were exempt.
One secretary went so far as to boast that he never kept written records
of conversations with the minister, but reported back to his departmental
officers orally on decisions made and action to be taken.
Cornall was asked to provide further legal advice on how to gain
exemptions from FOI coverage.
I expressed concern that the conversation was so one-sided. I noted the
Auditor-General had frequently criticised the lack of adequate record
keeping and asked Cornall to give us legal advice also on the obligations
of public servants to make and to keep records. Cornall agreed that this
was a sensible request. (As I recall, the subsequent advice provided was
that there was no explicit obligation to create records, though the Public
Service Act and the Financial Management and Accountability Act arguably
implied some such obligation—for example, through the value of ‘open
accountability’; the Archives Act certainly constrained the destruction
of records once created.)
I also asked the secretary who claimed he did not keep records how he
expected his staff to carry out the minister’s decisions, which he had
relayed orally. Surely effective management, let alone the obligation of
accountability, meant someone would make a record of the decisions.
A year later, when I was working in the Department of PM&C, I was
intrigued by the systematic trawling of files, official and unofficial, to
destroy ‘surplus’ copies of draft papers and other papers not essential
for recording the decision-making process. There were also systematic
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arrangements to tie as much policy advice to cabinet papers as possible.
The processes did not involve the destruction of any key documents,
but were clearly aimed at limiting the risk of FOI (or parliamentary)
requests for working papers being upheld.
A less significant but fascinating management issue in communications and
media relations is handling the culture of good public affairs staff. The fact is,
the best such staff are not like traditional public servants. They are often
extroverts, do not like rules and processes, abhor authority, cut corners and
speak out of turn. Any attempt to corral them, however, let alone replace them
with classical bureaucrats, runs the risk of losing their creativity and effectiveness
in their jobs. I tried, not always successfully, to give the public affairs unit some
licence under the leadership of an older, more experienced person with media
nous. On a couple of occasions, things went badly and I had to pursue
disciplinary action against individuals who misused resources, but on the one
occasion (in the Housing department) when I intervened more forcefully to
impose much firmer controls, the downside was far worse, with the loss of several
of my most talented and creative people.
Lessons learned
It is important to gain the minister’s confidence in the department’s handling
of communications and this requires having a capable unit in the department
that works closely with the minister’s office. Having rules requiring everything
to be cleared through the minister’s office is not good practice in my view, and
is certainly not a sign of confidence in the department.
Secretaries need a thick skin, particularly in departments such as Health, where
stories of scandals and crises happen every day. They also need, however,
political antennae to judge the stories that are likely to ‘run’ and require
high-level, careful responses and management.
Secretaries also need access to expertise within and outside the department in
communications management, including in the best use of new technology. A
big part of the secretary’s role is to clarify the integrity standards involved,
particularly regarding political neutrality and value for money.
It is important for secretaries to give public speeches from time to time,
particularly in large and complex portfolios where policies and programs need
more public explanation than can ever be delivered by ministers. It is also
important to maintain publications of research and statistics and background
policy analysis. If the minister is not comfortable with this, alternatives need to
be found, such as contracted research (with some independent capacity to
publish) or the use of a statutory honest broker (such as the AIHW). Confidential
discussions with external experts and stakeholders are useful but not sufficient,
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in my view, either to ensure departmental advice is well informed or to ensure
public understanding of the issues.
Secretaries also have a role to play at times in speaking directly to journalists. I
am not sure it is wise to seek permission formally to do so as the official answer
is likely to be unnecessarily restrictive. There is, however, a risk of such
discussions going wrong and hence of undermining the confidence of the
minister.
Looking forward, I suspect this is an area for more careful review and guidance.
The Public Service Commissioner has issued more and very useful guidance in
the area since I left the service, but I am not sure it recognises sufficiently the
public interest in public access to the expertise and experience of public servants
whether through departmental publications or through occasional background
briefing, not managed directly by ministers. Public interest would not be served
if this access led to loss of confidence of ministers in their departments.
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10. Dead poet society duties:
promoting APS values and contributing
to APS capability
Elements of this role
Agency heads have a statutory obligation to promote as well as uphold the APS
Values, many of which can be traced back to the Northcote Trevelyan Report
of 1854, which established the Westminster tradition of a professional,
non-partisan career public service. All portfolio secretaries and heads of some
other large agencies are also members of the Management Advisory Committee,
which is a statutory body under the Public Service Act. This reflects an obligation
on secretaries that goes beyond their management of departments to contribute
to improved management practices throughout the APS and to strengthening
APS capability.
Secretaries meet this obligation in a number of ways:
• by ensuring their own staff are imbued with the APS Values and identify
themselves with a cohesive, highly professional APS
• by participating actively in cross-APS activities such as the MAC and APS
Commission forums
• by supporting APS-wide career management and succession management
for senior public servants
• by participating in external forums such as the Australia New Zealand School
of Government (ANZSOG) and the Institute of Public Administration Australia
(IPAA), which foster public service professionalism.
Promoting the APS Values
I invested quite heavily in a values-based approach to building cohesion in each
of the departments I led, strengthening relationships within and beyond the
organisation and promoting ethical behaviour. It was not until I became Public
Service Commissioner, however, that I fully appreciated the connection between
the values I had been espousing and the APS Values that I had been required
by statute to promote. The connection had always been there: indeed, in health,
we explicitly referred to the APS Values in our strategic plan as well as the values
we were giving particular priority to in pursuing our business objectives, and
I do not doubt that staff understood the priority I personally gave to public
service professionalism.
Perhaps the most successful initiative was the ‘Fork in the Road Café’ ethics
awareness campaign we ran in the Department of Health. It was developed by
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some very innovative staff, including Andrew Wood and Michelle Kinnane
(Table 10.1).
Fork-in-the-Road Cafe hypothetical: Geoffrey Robertson with (visible) Senator Grant Tambling, Professor
Don Chalmers, Louise Dodson, David Graham, Peter Sekuless, Dr Barry Catchlove and Andrew Podger
(photo by kind permission of the Department of Health and Ageing)
Table 10.1 ‘Fork in the Road Café’
This was the title of the ethics awareness campaign we ran in the
Department of Health from 2000. The title reflected the basic lesson:
when facing a dilemma, stop (in the café) and reflect, discussing it with
respected colleagues and checking guidelines and precedents, before
making a decision. All staff attended half-day workshops over about 12
months; subsequently, the program was a compulsory element of
induction training for all new staff.
The purpose was to promote the values of public service professionalism
in the environment of greater devolution and fewer specific rules. The
campaign encouraged discussion of common workplace dilemmas, using
a ‘hypothetical’ video commissioned from Geoffrey Robertson (and
starring Senator Tambling, various departmental officers, a top journalist
and a newspaper editor, an industry lobbyist and a CEO of a private
sector chain of health services).
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Issues canvassed included conflict of interest, ethical research, working
with industry, whistleblowing, post-separation employment, leaking,
gifts and entertainment, and non-partisanship.
The campaign later influenced APS Commission programs promoting
values and ethics awareness.
Participating in cross-APS activities
The Secretary of the Department of PM&C chaired a monthly portfolio secretaries’
meeting and MAC meetings three or four times a year. He also hosted a two-day
retreat each year, held in Sydney since about 1997, at the Reserve Bank facility
opposite the Prime Minister’s residence in Kirribilli. The Secretary of the
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations also chaired a monthly
meeting of agency heads to discuss industrial relations issues. The portfolio
secretaries’ meetings focused mainly on immediate operational issues requiring
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coordination throughout the government, often emanating directly from the
Prime Minister or cabinet. The retreat focused mainly on some major
medium-term policy challenges affecting most portfolios, though the former
occasionally addressed some urgent or sensitive management issues (such as
running costs and secretaries’ pay and conditions) and the latter also always had
one session devoted to management issues (including, in most years, some
discussion of SES career management).
The main formal forums for discussing APS-wide management and capability
issues are the MAC and the Employment Secretary’s meetings of agency heads
(effectively, a workplace relations committee). The MAC projects always
progressed under a reference group of interested secretaries, with a project team
of deputies. The secretaries’ contribution was sometimes quite substantial in
time and intellectual content. The APS Commission also pursues many of its
responsibilities for promoting leadership and improved management through
informal forums of secretaries, and secretaries also frequently make presentations
at APS Commission leadership development programs, particularly those aimed
at new SES officers. The APS Commission’s activities, including through the
MAC, are described in more detail in Chapter 12.
The Employment Secretary’s workplace relations committee meetings provided
an important forum for considering industrial relations issues and also aspects
of capability, including attraction and retention of skilled staff and ideas for
productivity enhancement. They were not always successful. Under the Howard
Government’s industrial relations policies, agency heads ostensibly had far
greater flexibility in managing pay and conditions, but the Employment
department retained authority to approve enterprise bargaining agreements and
also enthusiastically pursued its interpretation of government policy on
individual employment contracts (AWAs). The real risk of devolution pushing
up wages as agencies competed with each other required not only the discipline
of budget constraints but having agency heads exchange information on their
proposed enterprise agreements, including productivity offsets. These meetings
helped to ensure such information exchange but the ideological direction might
have been avoided had the commissioner, or even the Secretary of the Department
of PM&C, chaired the meetings (my view remains that the commission should
have responsibility for overall guidance on public service pay and conditions).
I was an active participant in all these forums whatever my agency head role. I
made a substantial submission to Ron McLeod’s review of the Public Service Act
in 1995 when in the Housing department, participated in several of Helen
Williams’ reference groups when in the Health department, led or contributed
substantially to MAC reviews and APS Commission studies in my role as
commissioner (see Chapter 12) and participated actively in the workplace relations
committee throughout the Howard Government years.
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APS-wide career management
Tony Ayers promoted the view that in every large department at least one of
the deputies should be clearly destined to be a secretary in the future. I accepted
this view and always endeavoured to have in at least one of my deputies someone
who would gain from the experience in order to help them as a future secretary.
They must have won the deputy position on merit, but whenever I had a vacancy
I would canvass with the Public Service Commissioner and some fellow secretaries
possible candidates for transfer as well as promotion who were serious options
as future secretaries and would benefit from experience in my department.
Table 10.2 Grooming secretaries
While some critics have claimed that the frequency of secretary
appointments among those with executive experience in the departments
of PM&C or Finance reflects power battles in the service, or policy
capture by neo-liberals, the truth is that it reflects conscious career
planning by individuals and succession management by senior secretaries.
I had the privilege of working in the departments of PM&C and Finance,
as well as many other agencies, particularly in the social policy field.
Among those I worked with in PM&C in the late 1970s were Ian Castles,
David Charles, Michael Codd, John Enfield, Neville Stephens and Ed
Visbord. Among those I worked with in finance in the 1980s were Pat
Barrett, Tony Blunn, Neil Johnston, Michael Keating, David Rosalky,
Steve Sedgwick and Helen Williams.
Following Tony Ayers’ views on the responsibilities of all secretaries to
help in the development of future secretaries, I negotiated the transfer
of David Borthwick from Treasury to health as one of my deputies with
Ted Evans, ensuring he gained experience in an operational agency (and
I gained his considerable economic expertise). I had previously promoted
Jeff Harmer to join me as a deputy in housing, and later was pleased
when Lynelle Briggs joined me in health as a division head on transfer
from social security: both were regarded by me as potential future
secretaries. (Future secretaries and agency heads Jane Halton and Lisa
Paul also worked with me in health and Jeff Whalan in housing, but,
while I hope I contributed to their development, they were in those
departments when I arrived).
Tony Ayers was also mentor to an extraordinarily wide range of public servants
across the whole service. I never matched his achievements in this respect, but
I did accept responsibility before and after appointment as a secretary to maintain
contact with officers who had worked with me in different agencies. I followed
their careers with interest and provided advice if asked on their options for
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future development and work. These networks also helped me from time to time
to understand broader policy debates and service-wide management issues.
External professional development
Most secretaries also encouraged involvement by their staff in external
professional development that reinforced their broader APS role and contribution.
As a rule, the President of the ACT Division of the Institute of Public
Administration Australia (IPAA) is a current departmental secretary or agency
head. I was president for two years when in the Health department. Secretaries
often speak at IPAA forums such as the national conference and noteworthy
speeches at these or other forums are regularly published in the IPAA’s journals.
In whichever agency I managed, I was a more frequent speaker and author than
most.
Michael Wooldridge presenting Andrew Podger (Health Secretary and IPAA ACT President) with the
Annual Reports Award for 1997 (photo by kind permission of the Department of Health and Ageing)
Other professional associations that I saw contribute substantially to the broad
development of public servants in different agencies included the Economics
Society, the Australian Institute of Management, the Australian Human Resources
Institute, the Australian Project Management Association and the Australian
College of Health Service Executives.
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The establishment of the Australia New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG)
in 2004 has provided a stronger base for developing leaders in Australasian
jurisdictions. I was a member of the inaugural board, but many other secretaries
contributed to the creation of ANZSOG and then to its programs by making
regular appearances.
Differences in approach
Obviously, the Public Service Commissioner and the Secretary of the Department
of PM&C have more direct responsibilities for building the capability of the APS
as a whole than other agency heads, but even their contribution varies with the
personalities of the individuals involved. Max Moore-Wilton was less active,
for example, than Michael Keating as chair of the MAC (or its predecessor, the
Management Advisory Board); Peter Shergold’s appointment led to some
reinvigoration of the MAC.
The contribution of other secretaries and agency heads varies considerably
according to personal interests and styles. The majority in my time were
genuinely interested and committed, but the time they could devote to MAC or
APS Commission activities was often limited. Some invested a great deal of time
and energy. A few were less interested, viewing the commission and even the
MAC as costly overheads that did not add much value to their particular
businesses. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) at times seemed
to see themselves as an elite, even a separate foreign service (reflecting a long
history), demonstrated by the explicit view of the then secretary Ashton Calvert
that, while they had many top candidates for departmental secretary jobs in the
APS, no non-DFAT person could ever be a candidate for head of DFAT (or even
a senior diplomatic post) unless forced on them via ‘political’ appointments (even
Allan Hawke’s appointment as High Commissioner to New Zealand was described
by Calvert as ‘political’ and his capabilities were undervalued). One or two others
simply did not value the institution of the Public Service sufficiently to invest
time or effort in cross-service activities (other than policy work that enhanced
their exposure to ministers and the Prime Minister).
Interestingly, some agency heads outside Public Service Act coverage were
important contributors and allies. These included, for example, Mick Keelty
from the Australian Federal Police and Dennis Richardson from the Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).
Changes over time
Under new public management in the 1980s and 1990s, devolution was
accompanied by substantial networking, through the Management Advisory
Board and its Management Improvement Advisory Committee and other informal
groups, to promote improved financial management and, subsequently, broader
management. Financial management capability within and across agencies
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improved significantly, even if people-management improvements lagged
somewhat. Enthusiasm for this concerted APS-wide learning waned in the late
1990s as devolution was pressed further and the Secretary of the Department of
PM&C showed less interest in the subject. The Finance department, too, withdrew
from its former leadership position and the APS Commission struggled a little
to gain support in the absence of other central agency leadership.
Nonetheless, my strong impression is that, despite some ups and downs, agencies’
investment in training their own staff increased substantially during the 1990s.
More recently, the issue of public service capability has been reinvigorated not
only in the APS but in other Australasian jurisdictions, most obviously through
the establishment of ANZSOG. This began in the Howard Government years,
with Moore-Wilton lending his support to Victoria’s suggestion to establish
ANZSOG and with Shergold and Ian Watt pressing the capability agenda further
as they took up their roles as head of the departments of PM&C and Finance
respectively, supporting the Public Service Commissioner’s advocacy.
This renewed interest was the result not only of recognition that the previous
focus on individual agencies alone was sometimes counterproductive as agencies
competed with each other in a tightening labour market and was also constraining
capacity to deliver whole-of-government initiatives. It also reflected a growing
realisation that greater workforce mobility, an ageing workforce and increasingly
complex demands on managers required a different approach to capability
building than the traditional ‘apprenticeship’-type model in which public
servants learned through osmosis on the job at the feet of their elders. Instead,
public services need to invest more in continuing formal learning covering
technical, management and leadership skills, and cross-agency and
cross-jurisdiction learning and networking are essential.
This new emphasis is not replacing the investment by each agency in its own
capability building; it is complementing and reinforcing that investment. Across
public services, I am sure investment in capability building is now substantially
higher than in the 1980s and early 1990s, within agencies and service-wide.
Values and capability issues
The APS Values are open to interpretation. I am somewhat of a traditionalist,
wedded to Westminster principles of a professional service serving the elected
government loyally but with a measure of independence through obligations to
be apolitical and impartial. As in the film of that name, this enthusiasm for a
‘dead poets’ society’ was not just nostalgia for an arcane past, but a living
philosophy of ‘seizing the day’ to serve the public. This view emphasises the
shared culture and common role of the Public Service as a whole and the
importance of nurturing the service and continually building and diversifying
its overall capability.
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Others have somewhat different views. Some give more weight to the different
businesses of different agencies, focusing their attention more exclusively on
their own agencies and complaining about central agency requirements. Some
see closer similarities with the private sector, where investment in capability
must deliver adequate rates of return, preferably in quantifiable terms such as
the amount or price of agency outputs. Some give more weight to being
responsive to the immediate demands of the government of the day and less to
the requirement for a degree of professional independence or to the capability
of the service as a whole to support future governments.
Perhaps the key shift in the values and culture of the Public Service in the past
30 years is the greater emphasis on performance—in delivering services
(‘management for results’) and in serving the government (‘responsiveness’).
For some secretaries, at least for a while, this reduced the importance of
service-wide approaches to capability building and narrowed their interpretation
of their obligation to promote the APS Values.
The renewed interest in service-wide approaches has also been associated with
a shift towards greater engagement with external groups and organisations and
the importance of enhancing capability to respond to and manage change and
uncertainty.
The main practical issue for secretaries has been in balancing their efforts to
enhance their organisations’ capabilities to meet their business requirements
now and into the future and their contribution to broader APS and public sector
capability. This is not a simple either/or issue, but a question of supporting both
to the extent time and money are available.
My own view is that it should be mandatory for the SES, as the leadership cadre
of the APS, to undertake key APS Commission programs of leadership
development and management improvement. The quid pro quo, however, is
close involvement of agency heads in the design and performance feedback of
the programs.
A related issue is the power or influence of the APS Commission and Department
of PM&C Secretary in SES succession management, including movement of
deputy secretaries to enhance the readiness of people for future agency head
positions. I am inclined to the view that our approach is a little too laissez faire.
Another related issue concerns the extent of joint actions in areas such as
recruitment and induction training. My inclination is for agency heads to
continue to have the freedom to work independently or collaboratively, but for
the APS Commission to facilitate collaboration for those who favour that. I found
in the Health department that there was benefit in a recruitment strategy that
combined targeting those interested specifically in health careers with working
also to gain our fair share of those looking more generally to public service
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employment through the broad, collaborative recruitment process coordinated
by the APS Commission. Health tended not to attract the very best among the
latter when candidates nominated their preferred agency, but the field of those
specifically interested in health omitted many capable generalists with
considerable potential to contribute to the Department of Health and the broader
Public Service.
The IPAA plays an important role as a professional association. It has a degree
of independence in its support of professionalism among those involved in public
administration whatever their level or role, but it also serves jurisdictions and
their public service leadership as a forum for informed debate and study of
current issues, drawing together practitioners and academics. Several IPAA
divisions also provide extensive training opportunities to middle managers in
particular. The support of the IPAA by departmental secretaries is essential, as
is their willingness to tolerate if not encourage open debate and fearless
evaluation of public administration policies and practices. Other associations
also provide valuable professional development services and opportunities and
rely on the support of secretaries and other senior managers.
Lessons learned
Contributing to APS-wide capability, and broader public sector capability, is a
core responsibility of all secretaries. It might not be an explicit responsibility,
but it is implicit through membership of the MAC and through the obligation
to promote as well as uphold the APS Values. A few lost sight of this periodically.
Secretaries contribute in part, simply by the example of their own behaviour,
demonstrating their support of cross-agency cooperation and collaboration.
They can also contribute directly by personal contributions to such
capability-enhancing activities as MAC projects, helping to develop processes
or practices or to promote investments and structures that will improve the
future performance of the service. Cooperating on recruitment and staff
development, and promoting and participating in SES leadership programs and
mentoring staff beyond the secretary’s own department, can make a major impact
on overall capacity and the cohesion of the service.
Each secretary accepting this responsibility is not, however, sufficient. Central
agency heads, particularly the secretaries of the departments of PM&C and
Finance, need to take a leadership role along with the APS Commission in
sponsoring and promoting networks that encourage improvements in leadership
capabilities and management skills, and in capacity in policy analysis and advice.
They are also in key positions to ensure adequate investment in cross-service
processes and systems including interoperable databases, shared recruitment
and development and linked reporting systems.
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Informal approaches to enhancing capability also increasingly need to be
complemented by formal training and development given trends in labour market
supply and complexity of work requirements. Much of this also requires shared
investment—ANZSOG being a model that might be extended into particular
fields such as health, education and industry regulation.
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11. Secretaries’ personal development,
support and performance assessment
Elements
Secretaries and other agency heads are all individuals with their own personal
histories and personal styles and habits. Nonetheless, there are common skills
and capabilities required for these jobs that need to be developed and nurtured,
and their application supported and assessed. This chapter is a little more personal
than the others, reflecting my own background and style, while also attempting
to draw out issues and lessons. It canvasses:
• career planning and development
• continuing professional development
• personal support
• performance assessment.
Career planning and development
Australia does not have a formal, structured approach to grooming people for
top public service positions, unlike practice in some other countries such as the
United Kingdom and Singapore. Our approach is more laissez faire, relying almost
entirely on personal career decisions and merit processes for selection to each
and every position, at least up to the higher bands of the SES. This approach
has been reinforced in recent times in response to increased mobility and
increased lateral recruitment into the APS, including at SES and agency head
levels.
There have, however, been influential schemes, particularly for young graduate
recruits, whose impact on the senior echelons of the APS continues to the present.
When I was a secretary, I was one of several former Australian Bureau of Statistics
(ABS) cadets who were agency heads. Others included Michael Keating and Neil
Johnston. There were many more in the 1980s (for example, Vince FitzGerald,
Chris Higgins and Michael Codd). There are still at least three former
administrative trainees among the current group of secretaries (Helen Williams,
Andrew Metcalfe and Terry Moran); Allan Hawke and Roger Beale were others
in my time. Ian Watt was a Treasury cadet.
These schemes did not so much groom people for future senior roles (though
they did provide participants with excellent training), as recruit some of the
best and brightest, encourage them to commit to a career in the APS and promote
their ambitions for higher achievement. After a year or two of special treatment,
the participants were left to their own devices to pursue their preferred career
paths, and a remarkable number proved successful.
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Most of my cohort of ABS cadets chose to leave the bureau a few years after
coming to Canberra, having gained an interest in some area of policy with which
they had become familiar through ABS statistical work; a few left the Public
Service. In my case, I developed an interest in social policy and alleviation of
poverty, having worked on the Henderson Poverty Inquiry surveys. The ABS
cadetship certainly succeeded in convincing me to commit to an APS career,
even though the bureau had my services for only about four years after my
graduation. Some stayed in the bureau. One, Dennis Trewin, later became the
Statistician, succeeding another former cadet, Bill McLennan.
My commitment to the Public Service strengthened during and directly after
the Whitlam Government, as I studied public administration part-time at The
Australian National University and as I was given remarkable opportunities for
someone my age to advise on income security and welfare matters. I also matured
greatly in my understanding of public service professionalism during this time.
When I joined the Social Welfare Commission in 1974, I accepted the widely
held view in the Whitlam Government of an antagonistic public service, but
this was replaced during 1975 by a growing respect for the quality of the advice
I saw emanating from the more traditional departments, Treasury, Social Security
and the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Individuals such as Colin McAlister (Social
Security), Sir William (then Bill) Cole (Treasury) and Ian Castles (PM&C), revealed
to me a professionalism that served the government and involved rigorous
analysis with frank and open debate among individual public servants and
agencies. The revelation of the ‘Loans affair’ and the courageous advice from
Sir Frederick Wheeler to Prime Minister Whitlam added to my appreciation of
the value of a somewhat independent, professional public service. I was still
keen to see reforms to the Public Service such as through greater public
engagement and more understanding of disadvantaged Australians, and looked
positively towards the report of the Coombs Royal Commission (the Royal
Commission into Australian Government Administration), which reported in
1976.
Working in the Department of Social Security in the late 1970s, when Senator
Margaret Guilfoyle was the minister, capped this stage of my development as
her relationship with the department, and in particular with the Development
Division where I worked, proved to be the most constructive and professional
one that I experienced in my whole career.
My development was therefore primarily experiential, rather than based on
formal training, though my studies at The Australian National University and
reading of the Coombs Commission reports and papers gave me some good
grounding in public administration history.
From time to time, there have been programs for the feeder group into the SES
to help those with potential to build up their capacity through training and/or
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work experience. These schemes, such as the Executive Development Scheme
(EDS), were effective for a while in identifying potential leaders and giving them
broader experience, but they were never really focused on those expected to go
to the top. They were more successful in helping those trapped in the system to
find better career paths and maximise their potential. The Senior Women in
Management (SWIM) scheme was particularly effective in this regard.
For the most part, serious consideration of people for top positions begins only
when they are well entrenched in the SES with a proven record at that level. As
I have described elsewhere, this is still managed in a light-touch way, with
agency heads encouraged to consider succession management, and appropriate
development of those with potential.
I was promoted early to the SES, in 1978, while only twenty-nine years old. This
was not entirely unusual at that time given the then age structure of the service,
with many post-World War II recruits nearing retirement, an explosion of
recruitment in the late 1960s and early 1970s and enormous growth in
Commonwealth programs and employment in the Whitlam era. Nonetheless, I
had virtually no management experience and no management training, though
I had established a reputation for policy analysis in income security in particular.
Moreover, I was extremely sceptical of the advantages of management training
of any sort and derided colleagues who employed such nerdy techniques as
diaries; I believed I could manage anything on my ear.
I was terribly wrong, though I avoided being found out through any major
disaster, partly because I had the continued good fortune of being among teams
of very able individuals who did not need much managing, and who taught me
subtly some basics such as supervision, research management and budget cycle
planning, as well as applied policy skills such as drafting cabinet submissions
and briefings (McAlister, my division head in the Department of Social Security,
was particularly helpful as a coach). I also found I could draw on my policy
skills not only to analyse issues but to reshape small teams to address what I saw
as emerging priorities. In the Social Security department in the late 1970s, these
included a stronger focus on tax and social security linkages and occupational
superannuation, and moving away from the previous Whitlam Government’s
focus on national compensation and national superannuation.
When I moved to the Finance department in 1982, I was still cynical about
management training, but began to learn much more on the job about financial
management and managing a branch. On promotion to division head in the
Finance department in 1986, I first started consciously to think about my
management responsibilities. I had about 70 staff and responsibility for financial
oversight of about six portfolios as well as public sector employment matters
(for the Defence Force and the Public Service). I even engaged a consultant, Bill
Godfrey, to help with some strategic planning for the division, which led us to
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focus on being in essence a consultancy business, with the capacity and flexibility
to provide high-quality advice and scrutiny, responding quickly to emerging
government priorities. We focused on such issues as our structure, our skills
requirements and our relationships with agencies in our patch, as well as our
budget and staff resources, which had been the main focus of earlier business
planning. I suspect this was a first within the Finance department, although by
then Finance was promoting financial management improvement throughout
the APS.
Shortly afterwards, I attended my first ever management training. It changed
my attitude to training completely.
Table 11.1 ‘Top management’ training
The 1989 ‘Top Management’ course was sponsored by the Public Service
Commission and attended by Band 2 and 3 officers considered by their
agency heads to have potential for top positions. It was my first ever
management training course. The selection of participants was not bad,
as it included half a dozen future secretaries (including Steve Sedgwick,
Allan Hawke and Jo Hewitt) and a future Chief of the Navy (Rear Admiral
Ian McDougall). The course included substantial material on strategic
planning, with a case study by groups of participants on the future of
Australian construction services and training in communications and
media.
I kept the course material and my notes for the rest of my career, drawing
on them in each new agency I joined. I finally understood that
management skills could be learned through formal training and
on-the-job experience and was not just something you developed with
intelligence and the right personality.
With hindsight, I can now see the hidden guidance and career planning that
was being orchestrated by some APS leaders, particularly the commission and
the head of the Department of PM&C, but also by Tony Ayers and Michael
Keating (then in the Finance department).
I first became very aware of this when I was approached by Ayers to apply to
be a deputy secretary in the Defence department. There was no doubt his
approach came after discussions with Keating and others, and reflected Ayers’
interest in the Public Service as a whole, not just the Defence department.
Table 11.2 Informal career planning: lunch with Tony Ayers
In early 1990, Tony Ayers invited me to lunch to ‘talk about my future’.
I had worked with Ayers in Social Security, but we had separated
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somewhat unhappily in 1982 and had not had much interaction since. I
was intrigued and agreed to meet him at his ‘club’, a Chinese restaurant
in Yarralumla.
There he proposed that I apply for an impending deputy vacancy in the
Department of Defence, in charge of capital procurement and
logistics—perhaps the biggest management job for a deputy in the APS.
I was stunned: I had limited management experience, limited
understanding of defence and no technical expertise in engineering or
project management.
Ayers felt that, with suitable support in the organisation, I could handle
the job. He told me that Michael Keating considered I was the best
manager in the Finance department and could draw on that in this much
larger task. He was also looking for stronger financial discipline and
probity in defence acquisitions.
Importantly, he spoke about my future career in the APS. He said I was
likely to be approached to be a deputy in the Finance department in the
next year or so, but accepting that would be a mistake. I already had
nearly eight years in Finance and, if promoted again there, I might forever
be perceived as a Finance person. His view was that I should be looking
to move back into a line agency where I could make a greater contribution
to public policy.
If I wanted to head a line department, however, I needed to learn a lot
more about management. My management experience to date relied on
knowing personally all my people and knowing personally the matters
they were dealing with. I needed to learn how to manage when it was
not physically possible to know everyone or to know all the subject
matter. This required much greater skills in people management, in
delegation of authority and in selective reporting and oversight.
So it was that later in 1990 I went to the Department of Defence and
learned far more about management while (hopefully) contributing to
defence capability not only during my four years in the department but
for the next decade and more as projects such as over-the-horizon radar
came into operation.
My first appointment as secretary was to the Department of Administrative
Services and the Arts, where my main responsibilities were business and financial
management. While excited by the challenges of the commercialisation agenda
at the time and keen to see through the reforms, I was a little uneasy that I was
destined now to be seen primarily as a manager, whereas I still desired to
contribute to social policy. Such opportunities soon arose, perhaps a little too
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quickly (I was in this department for only four months before being moved to
the Department of Housing and Regional Development).
Continuing professional development
Secretaries, like anyone else, need to maintain their professional capacity. I chose
to remain actively involved in a number of professional associations, such as the
IPAA, the Australian Institute of Management, the Economics Society and the
Australian College of Health Service Executives. I participated regularly in
seminars and conferences, as a speaker and, more importantly and more often,
as a listener and learner.
On occasions, I arranged for the executive team to participate together in a
management conference to consider possible new approaches and to strengthen
our own ties.
I also had wonderful assistance from the agencies’ librarians, particularly Titi
Alexander, who moved to the Health department after the demise of the
Department of Administrative Services, where we had first met. Alexander
regularly checked with me my main interests and ensured I received relevant
journal articles, book summaries and reviews, and so on, aware of my limited
time to read much at length.
I never rose to the heights of Castles in keeping up with research in the
professional fields I specialised in, but I still modelled my investment in
continuing professional development on his approach and that of other secretaries
I worked with who placed emphasis on keeping up with the research, such as
Mike Keating, Neil Johnston, Ted Evans and Steve Sedgwick.
Personal support to the office of the secretary
Secretaries need considerable personal support to play their role effectively.
This includes a personal secretary (or executive assistant). I was fortunate to
have a series of quite excellent secretaries who were extraordinarily hardworking
and dedicated and personally loyal. The role is complex and sensitive. There
are the obvious duties of managing appointments, handling minor correspondence
and preparing notes, managing papers and handling administration such as
travel, all of which require particular competencies. Then there are the mostly
unstated roles of:
• ensuring the secretary has quality time to think and read and write
• controlling access to the secretary without being seen to do so
• reflecting the style that the secretary wants presented to staff and clients.
Each of my secretaries had their own personalities, but all had a good sense of
humour and the ability to present me and the office as open, with their role
being to facilitate access, not limit it. They also knew it was important to convey
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a professional image to staff and to external stakeholders. They all served me
well. My last secretary, Theresa Graham, worked with me in the Health
department and the APS Commission, and subsequently in the Department of
PM&C. Her style was understated, being approachable to all staff and never
threatening, yet able quietly to help me discipline the allocation of my time. She
is a treasure.
In large organisations, I found the need for a ‘staff officer’ or senior executive
assistant, as well as a secretary. I learned this in the Defence department, where
two and three-star officers in particular used staff officers. Their role is primarily
to keep the flow of papers and actions going whether or not the secretary (or
general or admiral or air vice-marshal) has made the requested decision or signed
the requested paper. They need to understand the issues under consideration,
the likely line the secretary will take and the factors involved and know the
likely time line for decisions. They take minutes of the executive meetings and
may sit in on some other meetings to keep a record. They also have easy access
to the secretary and can alert him or her to particular deadlines or concerns.
They can also be a sounding board for the secretary on the mood of the
organisation, or parts of the organisation.
Table 11.3 ‘Staffing’ as a verb
A lesson from the Department of Defence was the use of the word
‘staffing’ as a verb, not a noun.
This use relates to the process before a matter is put to a senior defence
committee or executive for a decision to ensure there has been adequate
consultation and the outstanding differences narrowed sufficiently to
allow efficient and effective use of senior management’s time. The matter
must be ‘staffed’.
Staff officers in particular are expected to manage this process, not to
limit options or force consensus, but to help senior management focus
on the critical issues and options and to ensure managers down the line
take and share responsibility rather than delegate upwards. The process
is not, however, reliant on having staff officers—it can work through
other means of horizontal management across programs and divisions
ahead of senior management decision making.
The staff officer (or senior executive assistant) and the departmental secretary
need to be careful. In the Defence department, I often saw staff officers overplay
their hands and their two or three-star officer bosses found themselves pressed
into a position without sufficient personal attention towards the issues and
implications (sometimes the fault lay with a lazy senior officer). On occasions,
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the staff officers also exaggerated the power and authority of their general or
admiral, distancing him from others rather than ensuring better communications.
Another danger that occurred once or twice in the Housing department was
allowing the senior executive assistant to inhibit the vital relationship among
the department’s executive. I made the mistake of asking my senior executive
assistant to sit in on some sensitive executive discussions and to take minutes,
when those discussions needed to be in private: my deputies made their anger
known to me very sharply afterwards!
As a rule, I was extremely well served by my senior executive assistants. I also
used the position to help develop some promising executive-level staff who
needed some ‘broadening’ before being considered for more senior jobs.
I did not use a staff officer in the APS Commission as the span of control did not
warrant it. Besides, I had an executive assistant then who was more than capable
of playing both roles.
The other element of personal support within the department is the relationship
among the departmental executive. This relationship is essentially professional,
but it is always personal too. This does not mean regular dinner parties at home,
but a genuine empathy that provides support whether through difficult times
in the department or challenges in personal lives. Attending the funeral of a
colleague’s close family member or celebrating a family wedding—these minor
gestures strengthen ties and ensure broader mutual support.
The critical factor in the relationship is trust among all parties, notwithstanding
the authority of the secretary.
Table 11.4 Trust within the executive
Tony Ayers taught me a key principle behind ensuring trust within a
small executive when I joined him in the Department of Defence in 1990.
At our first meeting on the first morning, he told me firmly that if I had
a dispute with any of the other deputies under no circumstances was I
to raise the matter privately with him. I was to sort it out myself directly
or, if that was not possible, to raise the matter openly with the others
present for a confidential but collegiate discussion.
I insisted on exactly the same behaviour in each agency I managed, and
in every case the executive worked well, with trust and mutual personal
support.
It is lonely at the top, and not even the deputies can be enjoined in some issues.
Michael Keating took me out to lunch when I was first appointed secretary to
give me some useful private advice. Perhaps the best element was his advice to
maintain some external networks, particularly among other secretaries I respected
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highly, not only for advice on specific matters I could not discuss within the
department (indeed often I could not discuss any specifics with anyone outside
either), but for more general mutual support.
This I did, not only with some fellow secretaries but with longstanding friends
and former colleagues, ensuring substantial support and also keeping my feet
on the ground through continuing contacts with people with different
perspectives on work and life. I consciously maintained about four or five
networks, mostly in Canberra but also in Sydney and abroad.
Finally, but not least in importance, is the support of family. I never did get the
balance right between work and family, but my weakness was made up by my
family’s tolerance and support. I am not sure that future secretaries can assume
the same.
Performance assessment
As mentioned in Chapter 6, a key contributor to organisational performance is
the timely, positive, comprehensive and fair feedback to individuals on their
performance, along with clear alignment between their work requirements and
the organisation’s objectives. The agency head also needs regular feedback and
confirmation that he or she is focusing on the right things.
The next chapter on the role of the Public Service Commissioner describes the
processes that used to exist for assessing the performance of secretaries. I have
also written elsewhere about the problems of performance pay for secretaries,
particularly the risk of overemphasising political factors and under-emphasising
professional management, leadership and the promotion of APS Values. I am
pleased the Rudd Government has dropped performance pay for secretaries, but
there is now the danger that feedback might also disappear.
Before performance pay, I used the department’s strategic plan as a form of
agreement with the minister going beyond the outputs and outcomes identified
in budget documentation to cover a wide range of management priorities: in
essence, a form of ‘balanced score card’. It went beyond my personal
responsibilities but, in the absence of a formal performance agreement, it
provided a reasonable basis for feedback on my performance. I did not seek such
feedback from the minister or the Secretary of the Department of PM&C (or the
APS Commission) in any formal way, but I did try to speak to the minister a
least once a year about how we were tracking against the plan, and more
generally against his expectations.
With the introduction of performance pay, the process became more formalised.
I generally prepared a short minute to the minister near the beginning of the
year on the priorities I should personally address, drawing on the strategic plan
and the Prime Minister’s charter letter. I sought opportunities about twice a
year for personal feedback and, in line with the formal processes, prepared a
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‘self-evaluation’ each year for the minister’s endorsement before passing it on
to the Secretary of the Department of PM&C and the APS Commission.
Mostly, the feedback discussions with the minister were only tangentially related
to the minute I had originally prepared or the self-evaluation.
Table 11.5 Ministerial feedback
The aide-mémoire I prepared for the minister in 2000 regarding my
performance agreement for the year listed:
• specific policy and program priorities
• specific management priorities
• ministerial support activities
• leadership priorities
• values issues (highlighting accountability, managing conflicts of
interest and promoting public service professionalism).
The discussion I had with Minister Wooldridge in December 2000 in fact
canvassed informally a wider range of related matters, including:
• my personal style, including whether (as Moore-Wilton had
advocated) I should spend more time in the minister’s office (the
minister confirmed his preference for my practice of working mostly
from the department)
• my policy advising, including the priorities for my personal attention
(the minister was particularly keen for me to remain closely involved
in all budget matters)
• a number of management issues, primarily concerning the quality
of the top team and succession management (the minister was mostly
highly complimentary about the team) but also about resource
pressures on the department and my proposal to involve an external
person on the department’s management committee (he supported
Bill Scales’ involvement)
• some leadership issues (the minister was keen for me to maintain and
strengthen links with various health professional organisations and
complimented me on the role I played across the portfolio) and
communications management (the minister wanted me to give this
more attention, particularly the capacity to respond quickly to media
criticisms of the government, which I struggled to do)
• appointments to portfolio boards
• Centenary of Federation celebrations, including the eightieth
anniversary of the first Commonwealth Department of Health.
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Subsequent to this discussion, I provided the minister with notes against
the agreed priorities set out in the original aide-mémoire, taking into
account his comments. My notes highlighted:
• on policy and program priorities, the private health insurance
Lifetime Community Cover success, the progress on rural initiatives
and the progress on health reform initiatives such as health
information, enhanced primary care through the MOU with GPs and
other agreements that also improved financial risk management
• on management, the lessons drawn from the aged care and MRI crises
and the turnaround in both areas in terms of quality and financial
control, the strengthening of the department’s senior team and the
competent management of IT outsourcing
• on ministerial support, the improvement in managing communications
and correspondence while noting there was further to go
• on leadership, the improved governance arrangements in the
department and portfolio and my personal role in strengthening
linkages across the health system and promoting a coherent strategic
direction
• on values, highlighting my standing with the IPAA and our
improvements in managing conflicts of interest since the MRI crisis.
The minister endorsed my notes, which I then copied to Moore-Wilton
and Williams for consideration in their advice to the Prime Minister on
my performance. The performance pay suspended in 2000 was reinstated
in 2001 and I was also reappointed to the Health department on a new
three-year contract.
I also looked for an opportunity each year, before finalising the annual report,
to seek feedback on how well the department had performed in meeting the
minister’s requirements in each program area. From this, we were able to prepare
the assessment in the published report but, as well, the discussion inevitably
provided feedback on my own performance and that of my senior staff from the
point of view of the minister.
The Secretary of the Department of PM&C provided occasional feedback, also
which, while usually negative in Moore-Wilton’s case and not particularly
welcome, was probably better than not getting any at all. I wrote to
Moore-Wilton twice responding to his comments (in addition to providing the
‘self-evaluation’ agreed by the minister), but he did not reply either orally or in
writing.
The Public Service Commissioner, Helen Williams, provided background to the
assessments being made and offered helpful advice from time to time on how
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best to respond to criticisms being made. Like me, however, she was not a
favourite of Moore-Wilton, and she did not share his assessments of me.
During the MRI and ‘kerosene baths’ crises, I was also constantly warned that
my future was under threat.
Table 11.6 Other performance feedback or scapegoating
The ‘kerosene baths’ crisis was the most harrowing of personal
experiences, it being made clear on a number of occasions between March
and June 2000 that my own position was under threat.
Formally, of course, I could expect my performance appraisal for
1999–2000 to include consideration of the MRI and aged-care incidents
in the assessment of how well I had managed the department and
supported ministers. I had no doubt my performance would be rated
poorly if for no other reason than that the political damage would demand
that the department (and I) should carry much of the responsibility. This
was not entirely fair in my view, but an inevitable result of the political
framework governing the performance assessment process. I was prepared
therefore for being denied any performance pay.
More worryingly, however, were the informal assessments and scuttlebutt
among people with no relevant competence but considerable political
influence. I mentioned earlier (Table 3.7) the advice from a key member
of the PMO that ‘you need a baseball bat, Andrew, to take to the
department’. This was clearly an indication that some ministerial staff
wanted to weigh into me too. A senior member of Wooldridge’s staff
warned me directly that my position was being discussed among
ministerial staff, and possibly ministers, and that termination of my
appointment was seriously under consideration. I responded that this
was quite inappropriate and, in any case, action against me would not
relieve pressure on ministers, particularly Minister Bishop. I spoke to
Helen Williams, Public Service Commissioner, and decided firmly I would
not resign. She kindly ensured I had information about superannuation
options should I suddenly be sacked.
I also received advice in March 2000 from a senior officer in the
Department of PM&C that the social policy area of that department was
strongly criticising me and the department, including in communications
with the PMO. This, I was told, reflected a common approach taken by
that area of PM&C at the time, to work directly not only with the PMO
but other ministers’ offices and to infer that it could handle program
management as well as policy advising better than the relevant line
departments (these included education and immigration as well as health
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and aged care). It was an approach others in the Department of PM&C
considered inconsistent with the department’s coordination role and
inappropriate because it encouraged ministerial staff to contribute to
matters outside their competence.
I continued as Secretary of the Health department for nearly two years
after this, with my contract renewed in 2001 after Wooldridge confirmed
his support for my reappointment (see Table 11.5). On his departure after
the 2001 election, however, I was replaced as secretary and became Public
Service Commissioner.
Changes since the 1980s
The processes of career development of secretaries have been changing with
greater mobility particularly at the SES level, and with more external
appointments of agency heads. While the majority of secretaries are still people
with a long career in the APS, there is an increasing proportion with other
lengthy experience, whether in state public services or in private or
non-governmental organisations (mostly with close involvement with
government). This trend is widening the background, perspectives and skill
sets of secretaries.
At the same time, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the trend since the 1980s to require
secretaries to be both managers and policy advisers has perhaps led to some
convergence of styles and skills. There seem to be fewer mavericks or characters
with highly specialist skills or individual styles (whether an Ian Castles or a Pat
Lanigan—the enigmatic Director-General of Social Security in the late 1970s).
Everyone is expected to be a manager today, perhaps at the cost of fewer top
policy analysts among the secretaries’ group.
Issues arising
A perennial issue is the balance between generalists and specialists, or each
secretary’s own balance between generalist and specialist skills and knowledge.
There is a need for a mix among the cadre of secretaries and agency heads, but
also there are risks for a secretary who is either too specialist (and lacking broad
management skills or deep understanding of the processes of government and
political awareness) or too generalist (and lacking essential subject content).
The increase in mobility adds weight to the Australian practice of more laissez
faire approaches to career development. There is, however, a strong case for
strengthening the investment in future leaders given the pressures on secretaries
and the responsibilities they exercise. This requires careful succession
management to identify those who should receive such investments. And it
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suggests that those who come in laterally to secretary or other very senior
positions need to have access to substantial formal and informal support.
The increase in mobility should not, however, be exaggerated. The current
leadership is still dominated by individuals who joined the APS or a state public
service on or shortly after graduation. That might remain the case. If so, it also
remains essential that the Public Service recruits some of the best and brightest
from our universities and convinces them to stay.
Successful development almost always involves on-the-job experience. Formal
training, however, is increasingly important, providing a framework for applying
lessons from experience to new situations and for analysing the causes of success
and failure. There are serious risks, however, in the fads and fashions of
management theories and training, including wasted resources on overheads
and on unnecessary restructuring together with loss of credibility among staff
within the agency and external stakeholders.
I believe performance pay for secretaries shifted the balance of incentives too
far towards rewarding responsiveness and away from rewarding good
management, leadership and the promotion of public service professionalism.
There is a risk, however, in removing performance pay that feedback to
secretaries will also disappear. Secretaries, like other employees, require
constructive, fair, comprehensive and timely feedback on their performance.
There might be an opportunity now to introduce a performance assessment
process that relies more on peer review, as in Canada or New Zealand, with
ministerial feedback included but not dominating. Reports could still go to the
Prime Minister for noting and comments (see Chapter 12).
Lessons learned
I am acutely conscious that my career experience, while personally very
rewarding, should not be seen as the model for others to try to replicate. It is
my personal history, reflecting my choices, my good fortune and my own
strengths and weaknesses.
What capabilities and experiences do secretaries require? I do not suggest there
is a simple formula. Indeed, there is advantage to the Public Service as a whole
to have a diversity of people at the top with different personalities, skill mixes,
expertise and personal and career backgrounds. Nonetheless, those trying to
guide career development rightly look for some balance in the mix of each
secretary’s experience, seeing benefits in:
• some management experience and some formal management training
• policy capacity, which remains critical for most Commonwealth departments
• some central agency experience as well as line agency experience
• some proven expertise, even if the person is now in a more generalist role.
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The last is, in my view, quite important. In some cases, there remains a need for
the relevant secretary to have particular subject matter expertise (for example,
in the Attorney-General’s Department and in Treasury). In others, the secretary
might not require subject matter expertise, but must appreciate its importance
to the success of the department. I was always persuaded by a comment Sir John
Crawford made to a forum at The Australian National University that I attended
in 1970 to the effect that the best generalist was someone who had been an
expert. I also tend to favour some streaming of most top people according to
areas of expertise, despite my own eclectic career. That streaming might reflect
expertise in social policy, or industry, or defence and foreign affairs, or economics
and financial management, or law, or large-scale management.
Whatever our own attributes, secretaries require substantial support in terms
of personal staff, the agency’s executive team and external networks. Cementing
personal commitment and trust is essential and there are some simple rules to
follow that can help.
I have highlighted the importance of retaining some form of performance
feedback, primarily peer based, despite the welcome removal of performance
pay. The five areas identified under the old regime remain apposite: support for
the minister, support for the government as a whole, management, leadership
and the APS Values. In saying this, I should also caution against too much
formality in the process. With this in mind, I encourage readers to examine a
Canadian paper, Distinguishing the real from the surreal in management reform,
by two former deputy ministers (the Canadian equivalent of Australian
departmental secretaries), Ian Clark and Harry Swain (2007), in which they
distinguish between the duties of deputy ministers to manage people and public
monies in a sensible way and duties to comply with centrally imposed
requirements associated with idealised government-wide management
frameworks.
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12. Inside or outside the tent: the role
of the Public Service Commissioner
I was Public Service Commissioner for three years from the beginning of 2002
until the end of 2004. The position is a statutory office under the Public Service
Act 1999 and, once appointed, a commissioner cannot be removed other than
by the Parliament. The commissioner nonetheless has a minister (in fact, two:
the Prime Minister and the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on the Public
Service).
The following summarises the role from my experience, using similar headings
to those of the earlier chapters concerning departmental secretaries, which can
be used to summarise the responsibilities of almost all heads of government
agencies. The differences in the commissioner’s role are reflected in the very
different amounts of time spent on the various responsibilities of an agency
head.
Table 12.1 Time allocation by secretary and commissioner
Public Service Commissioner (%)Departmental secretary (%)Area of activity
<1035–50(a) Supporting the minister
<5<5(b) Supporting the government as
a whole
5–10up to 5+(c) Working with the Parliament
15–2015–30(d) Management of the
department/agency
















50up to 5(g) Contributing to APS capability
Again, a number of activities could be allocated to several headings. Time spent
on APS Commission and MAC reports and on commission events and programs
as commissioner has been allocated here to ‘contributing to APS capability’,
while ‘supporting the government as a whole’ relates mostly to involvement in
portfolio secretaries’ meetings and related activities not initiated by the
commission.
The extra time involved in working with the Parliament was because I was also
the Parliamentary Service Commissioner. Since the latter position was created
in 1999, the presiding officers have asked the Public Service Commissioner to
take the role.
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capability
As these are at the centre of the commissioner’s statutory responsibilities, I will
describe them first rather than last.
The main elements of this work as commissioner are:
• issuing directions and developing and disseminating guidelines on the APS
Values and Code of Conduct
• developing and supporting the leadership cadre of the APS (SES and agency
heads)
• working through the MAC to identify good management practice in areas
of shared interest across the APS
• evaluating and reporting on how agencies are upholding the APS Values
• succession management and agency head performance assessment.
Guidelines
When I was appointed commissioner, my predecessor, Helen Williams, had
issued the directions required under the new legislation on the APS Values and
Code of Conduct. These, appropriately in my view, clarified the responsibilities
of agency heads while leaving them some room to manage how they would
promote the values and ensure the code was upheld. My focus was on developing
guidelines to help agency heads and their employees to apply the values and
Code of Conduct in their practical work situations.
My earlier, practical experience as a departmental secretary made me somewhat
sceptical of some of the rhetoric of the management literature and the fads and
fashions involved in management theory. I therefore put considerable emphasis
on what I called ‘hardwiring’, whether of the APS Values or of the concept of
leadership, both of which were emphasised in the Public Service Act 1999.
So, for example, I grouped the 15 values in the act under four headings, which
identified public servants’ key relationships and behaviours, and clarified how
the values reflected the unique role of the Public Service under the Westminster
system (for example, responsive to the elected government, non-partisan,
impartial, merit based). This grouping of the values guided the structure of the
State of the Service Reports from 2002 and the rewriting of the Guidelines on
Official Conduct in 2003. Using OECD experience, we also identified how agency
heads could go about ‘embedding’ the values in their organisations in practical
ways through ‘commitment’, ‘management’ and ‘assurance’ activities. This led
to the following diagram (Figure 12.1) to illustrate the practical approach we
were advocating and the guidelines we prepared for agency heads on embedding
the values in their organisations.
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Figure 12.1 The APS Values framework
This work recognised the different business responsibilities of agencies and how
these might reflect differences in priorities among the APS Values (for example,
Centrelink might give more weight to values concerning the relationship its staff
have with the public while the Department of PM&C might give more weight
to values concerning the relationship its staff has with the government and the
Parliament), but confirmed the unifying role and relevance of the full set of APS
Values.
Leadership development
Similarly, I was becoming uneasy about the language of ‘leadership’. The SES
Leadership Capability Framework had proven to be very robust, with richness
in its detail and language, but there was a push to apply the framework to
everyone at every level. I felt this ran the danger of making it meaningless. We
therefore did some extensive research into the skills and attributes that were
really required at different levels, recognising that there could be wide disparities
for different jobs in different businesses. I was also concerned not to understate
the importance of technical expertise or the specific skills required of managers
at different levels. The ensuing Integrated Leadership System (ILS), released in
2004, gained considerable credibility throughout the Public Service precisely
because of this practical balance, as illustrated by Figure 12.2, which appeared
near the beginning of the ILS documentation.
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Figure 12.2 The changing mix of skills and capabilities
The ILS led to a substantial refreshment of our suite of APS Commission
development programs, though these continued to focus mostly on the SES and
the feeder groups into the SES.
My personal involvement in these was extensive, both in the design and in their
delivery. I attended all the courses for new SES officers, which were held three
or four times a year, to discuss the statutory obligations of SES officers in
promoting and upholding the APS Values and in working throughout the
APS—not just within their own agencies. Often I would raise common ethical
dilemmas and encourage discussion of how they might be handled. I also attended
many of the other leadership programs managed by the commission or run by
agencies for their own staff.
A particularly useful program was the Career Assessment Centre for staff at EL2
level considered likely to be promoted to the SES in the future. The value of this
program for those participating and their agencies was in its direct assessment,
without pulling punches. An added value for the commission was the capacity
to collate the assessments and to build a picture of common strengths and
weaknesses and trends over time, to help in the design of future development
activities. This analysis showed that most of these high-flying staffers were
skilled in communication and demonstrated personal commitment and integrity,
but many were weak in shaping strategic thinking and maintaining productive
working relations.
The Management Advisory Committee
Our APS Commission guidelines were prepared through an extensive process
of consultation with agencies, mostly using a reference group of secretaries and
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drawing on APS-wide case studies. MAC reports similarly used reference groups
and case studies, but also employed a team of deputy secretaries to pull the
material together. This had the added virtue of allowing secretaries to see close
at hand deputy secretaries from other agencies who might be candidates for
advancement in the future, thus contributing to succession management.
I was always closely involved in the MAC projects as the commissioner was the
‘executive officer’ of the MAC under the Public Service Act. I initiated some
projects, prepared papers for the MAC on the scope of each one and was on
every reference group of secretaries.
Those that I contributed most to were the 2002 report Organisational Renewal,
on the likely demographic impact on the APS and the need for improved
workforce planning, and the 2004 report Connected Government, on the
management of whole-of-government policies and projects. I had previously
contributed substantially to the 2001 report Performance Management in the
APS: A strategic framework.
Table 12.2 Connected Government: improving whole-of-
government capacity
Peter Shergold, Secretary of the Department of PM&C, initiated the 2004
MAC review of whole-of-government management, with strong support
from me as Public Service Commissioner.
Roger Beale (Environment department) chaired the reference group of
secretaries and agency heads and Lisa Paul (later Secretary of Education)
led the deputy secretary project team; Lynne Tacy (Deputy Public Service
Commissioner) provided the most substantial contribution among the
deputies’ group.
The project drew on a wide range of case studies of whole-of-government
exercises, including the response to the Bali bombings, the management
of the Sydney Olympics, the establishment and role of the Australian
Greenhouse Office, the COAG Indigenous trials, the Goodna service
integration project, the National Illicit Drugs Strategy and iconsult (a
proposed electronic information exchange on community consultations).
The final report canvassed:
• the most appropriate structures and processes for managing
whole-of-government matters (Beale contributed most to this chapter)
• cultural aspects that might facilitate cooperation and collaboration
(Tacy and the APS Commission contributed most to this)
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• information management and infrastructure (with particular help
from Helen Williams from the Department of Communications,
Information Technology and the Arts)
• budget and accountability framework (assisted by the Finance
department, with considerable cajoling from line department
secretaries and me)
• engagement beyond the APS (I contributed substantially to this
chapter, along with the heads of several service delivery agencies)
• crisis management (DFAT contributed substantially to this chapter,
along with Paul, who had played a key role in the Bali bombings
response).
I believe the report has had a significant impact on APS practice,
improving capability through shared learning. For example, crisis
management is now a well-drilled process throughout the Commonwealth
and there is more careful consideration of the structures and processes
appropriate for different types of problems than in the past. This body
of work also influenced the subsequent development of the Cabinet
Implementation Unit.
State of the Service Reports
The main avenue for evaluating and reporting on how agencies are upholding
the values is the commissioner’s yearly State of the Service Report. Helen Williams
prepared the first two reports required under the legislation, developing an
initial framework and infrastructure including a detailed survey of agencies. I
built on this using the grouping of the APS Values I had proposed to clarify the
main areas of performance I wished to focus on (relations with ministers and the
government, relations with the public, workplace relations and personal
behaviour) and adding a weighted random sample survey of APS employees to
complement (and test) the survey of agencies.
Together with the commission’s own database, which tracked all APS employees,
this provided an increasingly comprehensive evidence base to support judgments
on performance against the APS Values and on APS capability. In my last report
in 2004, I also introduced some information on the views of the public collected
by some agencies through their own feedback mechanisms.
The surveys covered sensitive issues such as relations between public servants
and ministers and their advisers, and public servants’ confidence in upholding
the APS Values in this area. The data were fascinating, but caused considerable
angst among my colleagues.
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Table 12.3 Washing hands: handling sensitive data
The initial APS employee survey included questions on relations with
ministers and their officers, whether the employees had had direct contact
in the previous 12 months, whether they had faced challenges in
upholding the APS Values in these contacts and their confidence in
handling challenges.
Peter Shergold, Secretary of the Department of PM&C, asked me to brief
portfolio secretaries in advance on the data collected for the State of the
Service Report. I put together some raw tables that I had not yet fully
analysed and about which I had yet to draft any commentary.
I distributed the tables at a meeting of portfolio secretaries highlighting
what I felt were the most significant results, including that an amazingly
high 26 per cent of all employees (including staff at all levels in all APS
agencies including the Tax Office, Centrelink, Customs, the Bureau of
Statistics, as well as ministerial departments) said they had had direct
contact with the minister or minister’s office and that many had faced
challenges in upholding the values, though most were confident they
could manage them.
There was at first disbelief and then, when I stood by the validity of the
data, unease about what it meant and what should be done with it. The
data confirmed the growing importance of ministerial staff and the extent
of their reach into the Public Service—a matter of some political
sensitivity at the time. One secretary said, ‘If we are not sure what it
means, why are we publishing it?’, to which I responded that ‘“we” are
not publishing it, I am’.
Shergold’s nervousness, and that of most present, led him to propose
that all copies of the data be returned to me there and then so that it was
clearly the commissioner’s responsibility to analyse and report on it;
secretaries then would not feel under any obligation to advise their
ministers of the sensitive information until I reported. I was therefore
given back all the tables and, somewhat bemused, returned to the
commission to continue my analysis and start drafting the report.
While the quality of the reports, and of their underpinning data and analysis,
was improving, I was nonetheless cautious about identifying the agencies whose
performance was weak. I felt I needed to build our reputation for credible analysis
before taking the step of ‘naming and shaming’. Instead, I named examples of
good practice and provided agency heads with data on their agencies compared
with the overall data so they could see where they were or were not performing
well and consider whether action was needed to address weaknesses.
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Succession management
The commissioner has no statutory role in the appointment of secretaries and
agency heads, other than in the case of the Secretary of the Department of PM&C.
I did, however, contribute to succession management by the Secretary of PM&C
by providing a database on potential candidates and on each agency head position
(extending the process developed by Williams). The data were based largely on
interviews I held each year with secretaries about their deputies and equivalent,
and about other SES officers seen as ‘high fliers’, and data the secretaries
subsequently provided on their experience and strengths and suggestions for
future development. I also encouraged confidential discussion at the portfolio
secretaries’ retreats of the capabilities of deputies and equivalent under protocols
that required firsthand evidence to support any view expressed. These
discussions were critical, as they facilitated moderation of the claims of each
secretary about his or her own staff (and they did reveal some very different
assessments of some staff). As commissioner, I generally added my own comments
to the information base held in the commission, drawing in part on these
conversations.
Secretaries quite often contacted me for suggestions about people they might
encourage to apply for senior vacancies, accepting that my advice would reflect
my interests in broader capability building throughout the Public Service and
not only my views on likely strong candidates for the specific vacancies
concerned.
Occasionally, the Secretary of the Department of PM&C and the commissioner
took a highly proactive stance on succession management, setting up a committee
of secretaries to advise on possible rotations of deputies to help their
development. This did not happen while I was commissioner and earlier exercises
had mixed success, with secretaries suspicious that individuals offered for transfer
might not be high-performing ones and that those secretaries pursuing others’
deputies might be motivated by self-interest rather than the broader interests
of the APS.
Performance assessment
Once a year, much of my time was taken up with managing the process of
performance assessment of departmental secretaries and executive agency heads.
This related to the Howard Government’s arrangements for performance pay,
which I am pleased the Rudd Government has dispensed with. I have described
the process in some detail elsewhere.1 With some modification (including the
removal of bonus payments), the process would still be worthwhile in my view.
In summary, secretaries would prepare self-assessments and discuss these with
their ministers. They would then forward these to the Secretary of the
Department of PM&C and to me. The two of us would subsequently meet the
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portfolio ministers and seek comments on the assessments and views on overall
performance. I then drafted a short report on each secretary for the Prime
Minister, which the PM&C Secretary would consider before a final agreed version
went to the Prime Minister. I often checked some of the supporting material,
for example, by examining Auditor-General reports during this process. The
final reports summarised our views against the suggested criteria (support for
the minister, supporting the government as a whole, management, leadership,
upholding the APS Values and implementation of government decisions) and
the ministers’ and our own recommended assessments. The two of us then met
the Prime Minister to discuss the reports (after my meeting the Prime Minister
on my own to discuss the performance of the Secretary of the Department of
PM&C) and I would write to each secretary advising of the Prime Minister’s
decision.
I also managed the process of assessing the CEOs of executive agencies who were
covered by performance pay. In their case, I handled most of the process on my
own, seeking the endorsement of the Secretary of the Department of PM&C only
at a late stage; the Prime Minister usually wanted only my assurance that the
assessments were consistently applied and that the ministers concerned were in
broad agreement (he usually accepted my advice to moderate some excessively
generous ministerial assessments). My process in these cases included discussion
with the relevant portfolio secretary as well as the minister most involved
(generally not the portfolio minister).
Despite my strong criticisms of the overall process, it had some strengths that
should be preserved in future performance feedback processes for secretaries:
• the suggested criteria were sensible, as long as they were all properly
considered and balanced
• a self-assessment based on some agreement with the minister at the beginning
of the year and then discussed with the minister at the end provided some
structure to the process
• the Secretary of the Department of PM&C and the commissioner both
checking with the ministers, and later both talking to the Prime Minister,
ensured there was involvement of the operational and professional heads of
the APS.
The changes I would like to see are:
• a stronger peer review element, where at least one other secretary (or perhaps
a former secretary) participates in the process, making a more careful
judgment of the management, leadership and APS Values criteria as well as
reviewing the ministers’ assessments
• the Prime Minister being asked more to endorse (or not) rather than decide
on the performance assessment
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• the performance assessment distinguishing only between strong performance,
fully competent and not fully competent (the last giving notice that
improvement is required).
Such an approach would line up more closely with the Canadian process; the
New Zealand arrangement (where the State Services Commissioner is the employer
of the secretaries) is even more independent of the political process.
Working with ministers
Governments have policies on public service management and the APS
Commission advises ministers on these policies, seeks clarification of the policies
and consults ministers on the commission’s strategies and programs to ensure
consistency with the government’s policies. In this sense, the commissioner’s
role has similarity to that of a departmental secretary. The ministers concerned,
however, have other portfolio responsibilities, which greatly overshadow those
concerning the commission. The Prime Minister has very limited time to spend
on public service matters and the minister assisting in my time was also Minister
for Employment and Workplace Relations (under the Rudd Government, he is
the ministerial Cabinet Secretary as well as Special Minister of State within the
finance portfolio).
I sought monthly meetings with the minister assisting, partly to remind him we
were there and to ensure a level of comfort with what we were doing. I was
conscious of the risk of others displacing the commissioner as the key adviser
on public service matters, including in particular the secretary of the minister’s
department. I also encouraged the minister assisting (without success) to have
an adviser with clear responsibilities for public service matters, who was not
just the department’s liaison officer (DLO). It was not possible to justify a full-time
officer to be a dedicated DLO for the commission, though I also tried to have the
minister’s chief of staff consider one of my people to play the shared role with
the department. To be fair, the department’s DLO generally played the liaison
role with the commission quite effectively, but I still felt it was not the optimal
solution for us.
Table 12.4 Advising on workplace relations within the APS
The APS Commission did not have responsibility for industrial relations
matters in my time: that was the responsibility of the Employment and
Workplace Relations department. Nonetheless, I did have statutory
responsibilities to explain and promote the APS Values, which included
a number relevant to industrial relations (for example, the merit principle,
fairness, managing performance, consultations), and to develop APS
employment policies and practices and facilitate continuous improvement.
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When the minister, Tony Abbott, was pressing for all public servants
to be on individual AWAs, I was concerned that his department was
encouraging him without adequate advice on the issues and the problems
involved. I became aware that the department had received legal advice
that it would be possible to require all new appointees to the APS to be
on AWAs, though not to require current employees to do so or to apply
this as a condition for promotion. While this advice on the law might
have been technically correct, it did not include consideration of the
broader issues involved in any attempt to push for universal use of AWAs
and I was not amused that it was sought and given without consultation
with me (as required by standing rules on legal advice from the
Attorney-General's Department).
I advised the minister of my statutory role to evaluate the extent to which
agencies incorporated and upheld the values and that wider use of AWAs
would require agencies to satisfy me that they were meeting the
requirement of the merit principle. In my view, they would need clear,
public remuneration policies, consistent with classification principles,
and to demonstrate that open competition for promotion was not being
circumvented by individually negotiated pay deals.
I also advised that organisational performance was not necessarily
enhanced by individual-based pay flexibility even if this enhanced
individual performance (and it was not clear if it did). More important
elements include alignment with the organisation’s objectives; timely,
positive and fair feedback; and management addressing obstacles to
individual and team performance.
Finally, I drew to his attention the views of the CEOs of every large APS
agency (including the Tax Office, Centrelink, Customs and the Bureau
of Statistics) that the administrative workload to manage individual
AWAs for all staff would be excessive.
The minister said he appreciated my advice, but it was clear he was more
appreciative of the advice I believe he received from the secretary of his
department.
I generally only met the Prime Minister each year when advising on agency
heads’ performance and at joint forums such as the portfolio secretaries’ retreat.
While my written communications were usually with the minister assisting, I
did send the Prime Minister some minutes directly, particularly on highly
significant issues (for example, after the 2004 election, I advised him on a range
of public administration matters for the next term of government including
ministerial advisers’ code of conduct and secretaries’ contracts and performance
pay).
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Whole-of-government work
The commissioner is involved in many forums of secretaries, not only those
focused on the APS management matters described above. This serves two
purposes:
• it ensures the commissioner is fully aware of the challenges facing agencies,
and can help to ensure the APS Commission work is relevant and helpful
• the commissioner is usually an experienced senior public servant sometimes
able to contribute to discussions on particular policies, programs and
processes other than through the prisms of the responsible agency heads. I
certainly contributed my views on such matters as population ageing,
Indigenous welfare and Commonwealth–state relations, for example.
Working with the Parliament
My interaction with the Parliament related to both my statutory responsibilities:
as Public Service Commissioner and as Parliamentary Service Commissioner. The
two roles are quite distinct and it is only by convention that the Public Service
Commissioner is invited by the presiding officers (the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate) to be the Parliamentary Service
Commissioner, a role created by the Parliamentary Service Act 1999.
Public Service Commissioner and the Parliament
My interaction with the Parliament as Public Service Commissioner was more
limited than it had been as a departmental secretary. I suspect this is because
there are fewer sensitive political issues involved for Members of Parliament to
pursue.
The APS Commission was always listed on the agenda for Senate Estimates, but
I think we were only once asked to appear during my time as Public Service
Commissioner.
This surprised me given the opportunity my State of the Service Report presented
for senators to explore my views of the performance of individual agencies as
well as the APS as a whole, and the degree to which the APS Values were being
upheld under the Howard Government. Notwithstanding increasing media
interest in the reports, as we introduced a survey of employees that contained
such sensitive issues as relations with ministers and their offices, I was never
asked questions on my reports by the Parliament.
I was asked to contribute to the Senate Committee inquiries into a Certain
Maritime Incident (‘Children overboard’) and ministerial staff. I took the
opportunity in these to argue in favour of a code of conduct for ministerial staff
as part of a process to improve their professionalism given their increasingly
important role. In contrast with my earlier experience as a departmental secretary
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appearing before Senate Committees, these times I was treated far more as a
professional expert rather than as a manager of government programs or an
adviser on government policies.
Parliamentary Service Commissioner’s role
My role as Parliamentary Service Commissioner was initially low-key. I
established regular meetings of the heads of the parliamentary departments to
discuss matters of common interest relating to people management and the
Parliamentary Service Values (which differed in important respects to the APS
Values given the independence of the Parliamentary Service from the executive
arm of government). We canvassed ways in which the parliamentary departments
might adapt some of the public service developments led by the APS Commission
in areas such as leadership development, embedding values, workforce planning
and performance management. I also prepared a very short annual report
describing developments in the Parliamentary Service.
In 2003, however, the presiding officers asked me to conduct a review of the
administration of the Parliament—an exercise that required much more of my
time. I engaged a consultant with financial management experience to assist me
and also drew on some resources within the APS Commission. I was pleased that
the review led to a major restructuring of the departments, after many decades
of failed attempts to do so.
Table 12.5 Parliamentary Service Commissioner’s review of the
administration of the Parliament
In 2003, the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House formally
requested that I review the administration of the Parliament. They were
concerned generally about government criticism of the costs involved
and the need to demonstrate to the government that they had fully
considered opportunities for improvements in efficiency, and they were
specifically concerned that security arrangements had not been reviewed
since 11 September 2001.
Given the APS Commission’s lack of expertise in financial management,
I engaged a former senior finance official, Len Early, to work with me
and my corporate manager, Mike Jones, on the review. We worked in
close consultation with the three heads of the five parliamentary
departments (one headed the three departments serving both houses)
and their offices; we also consulted the Finance department but carefully
maintained our independence from it. With advice from security agencies,
I presented an initial report on security, recommending centralisation
of security services and a strategic reassessment (almost certainly
requiring additional funds), with a ‘common services’ model where the
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different parliamentary departments would purchase services from a
central provider.
In discussion with the two presiding officers, I indicated that the common
services model might not be the optimal solution for the overall
administration of the Parliament, and they invited me to look more
broadly in my final report. I was very conscious, however, that the
alternative of a rationalisation of the five departments had been debated
and rejected many times during the previous 100 years and was
passionately opposed by some, including the Clerk of the Senate.
Accordingly, I asked the commission’s librarian, Jill Adams, to prepare
a research paper reviewing the history of these debates and the arguments
involved. This paper proved to be the critical element of the review: it
identified the two major issues as the separation of the legislature from
the Executive and bicameralism. If my recommendations could
satisfactorily address these concerns, the option of rationalising the
departments was feasible.
I noted in my final report the provisions in the new Parliamentary Service
Act 1999 that protected the independence of the legislature and the
independence of the two clerks. I recommended a move to three
departments (previous reviews had mostly proposed one or two
departments), thereby not threatening bicameralism through the
continued operation of separate departments for each house. I also
recommended a somewhat independent Parliamentary Librarian within
the (combined) Parliamentary Services department, thereby ensuring a
considerable degree of independence in the support given to Members
of Parliament.
The presiding officers firmly supported my recommendations, but the
Clerk of the Senate campaigned strongly against them. The Senate
eventually accepted my recommendations on condition of some further
strengthening of the role of the Parliamentary Librarian, and both houses
agreed to the proposed changes.
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Management of the commission
The commission was far smaller than the departments I managed and I used a
more streamlined approach to structures and plans, and was able to work in
direct contact with most staff.
APSC Executive team in 2004: Lynne Tacy, Andrew Podger and Jeff Lamond (with Podger’s favourite
Garry Shead painting) (photo by kind permission of the Australian Public Service Commission)
Nonetheless, I still found strategic planning very useful. In the initial planning
when I arrived in 2002, we agreed it was important to build on Helen Williams’
achievements in implementing the new Public Service Act 1999, looking to take
advantage of its provisions to enhance the role and contribution of the
commission in enhancing the performance and capability of the APS. Our
approach relied heavily on strengthening relations with APS agencies, which
in turn relied on our credibility and expertise. Later on, we revised the plan to
take advantage of Peter Shergold’s appointment as Secretary of the Department
of PM&C and his interest in reinvigorating the MAC.
Among the developments foreshadowed in our plans that we successfully pursued
during my time as commissioner were:
• major guides on the APS Values and Code of Conduct
• strengthening of the State of the Service Report with the introduction of a
sample survey of employees, allowing more robust and independent
evaluation
• new MAC reports including on organisational renewal and connected
government
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• the extension of the SES leadership capability framework into the broader
Integrated Leadership System and refocusing the commission’s leadership
and management development activities.
Part of this success was due to strengthening what was already a pretty good
team in the commission. When Jeff Lamond became the Merit Protection
Commissioner, we had a strong and united executive team (Lamond, Lynne Tacy
and myself). We were also fortunate to recruit several excellent analysts from
the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR), who were
pleased to transfer away from an environment they felt was not supportive of
traditional APS values, and who complemented the expertise we already had in
human resources and in decision review processes. I also recruited a rather
flamboyant but highly skilled human resources expert from the Queensland
Government. While not every appointment I made was successful, I was able to
pass a very strong team on to my successor.
One aspect of agency management that was very different in the commission
was its reliance on non-appropriation revenue. Just less than half of the
commission’s revenue comes from the services it provides on a user-pays basis.
These include training and development programs and assistance to agencies in
managing staff selection processes. Such revenue is not guaranteed: the
commission must earn it on the basis of the quality of its services. A significant
part of this revenue-raising activity is undertaken in the commission’s state
offices, working where most APS staff are located: outside Canberra. The offices
in Western Australia, South Australia and Victoria were particularly successful,
not only in serving APS staff but in linking with state government agencies and
partnering with the IPAA. In most states, the APS Commission hosted the
Regional Directors’ Forums of APS agencies.
While this market discipline helps the commission to ensure the relevance and
quality of its work, the risks involved constrain management’s capacity to employ
continuing staff and they also require smart investment in developing new and
relevant products and services. We did not always do this well, but I was grateful
to Ian Watt, Secretary of the Department of Finance, who agreed to a capital
injection to allow us to review our leadership development strategy and introduce
a new and revised set of products. In the event, this proved highly successful.
External relations
In the commission, many statutory responsibilities involve working with other
APS agencies. The most time consuming is certifying the processes for SES
appointments or promotion. While much of the workload involved was carried
out by the commissioner’s representative (usually an SES officer from another
agency) on the relevant selection committee and by the deputy commissioner,
agency heads frequently rang me to discuss who might be my representative
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and potential candidates for transfer or promotion; later, they might telephone
to give me advance information on who they were likely to be appointing to the
job. In the event of a potential problem over my certifying a selection process,
there was certainly extensive discussion.
Table 12.6 Protecting the merit principle
My representative on an SES selection committee, and the secretary
concerned, contacted me when a minister made it clear that he would
not work with the preferred candidate for a deputy secretary position.
My representative stated firmly that the preferred candidate had clearly
won the job on merit and the second-ranked candidate fell well behind.
The secretary agreed. The minister’s objections were not based on close
knowledge of the individual, but on an unwillingness to have someone
from an academic institution that had publicly provided expert advice
to the then Opposition.
I provided the secretary with my advice by email. The person concerned
was not partisan and had won the job on merit. I would not certify the
current process if it led to a candidate being appointed other than the
currently preferred one. The job could be readvertised, but if the
currently preferred candidate applied, I would only certify a process
recommending someone else if, on merit, that person was clearly better.
The secretary spoke to the person concerned, noting the minister’s
attitude.
The person decided not to apply when the job was readvertised.
I sent a minute to my minister on the matter noting that, while the
relevant minister had not contravened the Public Service Act by giving
the secretary a direction, he had broken the spirit of the legislation and
the merit principle by indicating refusal to work with the person selected
on merit. The person affected would have been an excellent choice and,
in time, I have no doubt he would have worked well with the minister.
I also advised my intention to refer to the matter in the State of the Service
Report, but without mentioning the department as this could lead to a
breach of privacy.
The reference in the State of the Service Report was evidently too oblique,
as it attracted no public or parliamentary interest.
Other statutory responsibilities include whistleblower cases and investigating
possible breaches of the Code of Conduct by agency heads. It was not often that
such matters were raised, but they did occur once or twice a year where my
personal involvement was necessary. Most of the work was done by commission
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staff under my direction, ensuring procedural fairness, independent assessment
and protection of any whistleblower.
Apart from my statutory responsibilities, I also maintained informal networks
among key agency heads, including a monthly lunch of a selected group of the
‘old guard’ of agency heads. These were not necessarily longstanding secretaries,
but a group with very strong personal commitment to the APS and its traditional
Westminster values.
There is also a forum of commissioners or equivalent from all Australian
jurisdictions. This met at least once a year mostly to share experiences but
sometimes to explore opportunities for joint activities. The commissioners sat
on an industry training and accreditation board to foster accredited vocational
training for public sector employees. They also established a project to develop
improved workforce statistics on public sector employees across jurisdictions
(the APS Commission’s database was the envy of all the other jurisdictions). I
also used the network to collect information on processes for appointment,
contracts and performance assessment of secretaries and the SES across
jurisdictions, which I published in the State of the Service Report.
Unlike the Commonwealth–state forums of secretaries, this forum did not work
to any ministerial council but set its own agenda.
Internationally, I was involved in three networks:
• the Commonwealth Association of Public Administration and Management
(CAPAM), with membership drawn from many Commonwealth countries
• the Pacific Nations’ Public Service Commissioners Forum, a less-structured
network I encouraged with support from New Zealand
• the Eastern Region Organisation for Public Administration (EROPA), a
creature of the United Nations involving practitioners and academics from
Asia.
CAPAM was by far the strongest of these. I was on the boards of CAPAM and
EROPA, but our finances generally allowed me to travel overseas only once or
twice a year. I also had some involvement with the United Nations itself, being
invited to speak at a major conference in Mexico and to receive a major award
on behalf of the APS in New York.
In 2003, we prepared a book for CAPAM on Australia’s Experience with Public
Sector Reform, drawing together not only Commonwealth initiatives but
initiatives across the states. This was a major project in which I took close
personal interest, and the book has attracted considerable international interest.
176
The Role of Departmental Secretaries
Involvement outside the public sector was limited while I was commissioner.
Helen Williams did bequeath me, however, membership of a most useful informal
network of top human resources managers, mostly from big private companies.
I met the group a couple of times a year over lunch, mostly in Melbourne, where
one or two would make a brief presentation on a current issue such as managing
cultural change after a company merger, trends in industrial relations or the use
of AWAs and workforce planning.
Working with the media
As a statutory officer, I did not feel as inhibited as I did as a secretary in
responding to the media. Media interest was, however, generally much more
limited, except from a few aficionados. My speeches and commission publications
were core aspects of our work and we ensured easy access to them by the APS
and the public. On occasions, the media picked them up. I certainly always
briefed the media on the State of the Service Report (Minister Abbott, however,
made it clear he was not too happy about this).
Issues raised: inside or outside the tent?
The issue that was on my mind every day in the commission was the extent to
which I was inside the tent, or outside. I was acutely conscious of the danger of
being too weak, of not standing up when it counted. If the commissioner does
not draw a line in the sand, how can we expect agency heads let alone other
APS employees to behave with integrity in upholding the APS Values?
On the other hand, the commissioner is not like the Auditor-General. He or she
is not an officer of the Parliament but has a minister with policy authority; the
commissioner also has statutory obligations for promoting leadership in the APS
and building capability—obligations that necessarily involve being inside the
tent—helping agencies to manage their responsibilities and helping the
government overall to deliver its policies and programs. These cannot be
exercised if the commissioner does not participate in the many forums of
secretaries discussing current policy and management challenges.
I suspect I was a little more independent than some other commissioners, but it
is interesting that in hindsight my main regrets are that I was not independent
enough.
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Canberra Times/Public Sector Informant 2002 Christmas edition: Podger admonishing while Moore-Wilton
departs, Shergold scooters in and Jane Halton packs away some bandaids in a Christmas stocking. With
kind permission from the Canberra Times and cartoonist, Pat Campbell.
Table 12.7 My guidelines or the minister’s?
The revised Guidelines on Official Conduct I issued in 2003 took a long
time to finalise. They needed considerable work to line up with the new
legislation with its statutory APS Values and Code of Conduct, but I was
also keen to canvass a wide range of practical dilemmas public servants
faced. Among these was working with ministerial offices with many
more advisers than in the past and with wider influence over the Public
Service.
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While the guidelines would be mine, I felt their influence could be
constrained if they did not have broad support among my colleagues or
if the minister did not agree with them. Accordingly, I decided to put a
draft to the MAC, after first getting some level of comfort from the
minister, Tony Abbott.
The minister was not at all impressed with the draft section on working
with ministers and their offices. He wanted me to promote a ‘seamless’
partnership, while I was concerned to clarify the different roles and
responsibilities of public servants and advisers and to highlight that
advisers had no authority to direct public servants. Over several months,
I sent him three different drafts of this section, seeking his reactions and
any suggested amendments. At a meeting to discuss the last of these
drafts, Abbott told Lynne Tacy and me of his experience as a reporter
dealing with a subeditor. ‘Sometimes,’ he said, ‘the subeditor would not
try any more to edit an article, but would simply say he doesn’t like it.
Andrew, I don’t like your draft.’
He was challenging me to see if I would stand on my statutory
independence. I decided, however, to have one further go at getting his
endorsement of our advice, or at least to ask Tacy to do so. Abbott said
he would be willing to look at one more draft, but only if it highlighted
how a good relationship worked, not what the limits should be.
Tacy did an excellent job, keeping all my concerns in (such as the lack
of authority of advisers to direct and the importance of understanding
the distinct roles), but only after first describing the ideal form of
partnership.
Abbott not only endorsed the next version, he gave the revised guidelines
(my guidelines as commissioner) public support when they were released.
(The guidelines ran into some other interference in the MAC, particularly
Max Moore-Wilton’s more liberal views than mine on the propriety of
accepting hospitality from business, but they clearly benefited from the
close scrutiny they received during their development.)
A related issue is the role of the commissioner vis-a-vis that of the Secretary of
the Department of PM&C. My view remains that the commissioner should be
seen as the professional head of the APS and the Secretary of the Department of
PM&C the operational head. In practice, however, that has not been widely
endorsed by the people who matter. The commissioner in my time had no
statutory role in top appointments, for example. I was also aware that
Moore-Wilton was not supportive of the APS Commissioner having equal status
with secretaries; Peter Shergold was known to have expressed a similar view
from time to time, though on at least one occasion he used my formulation of
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the commission as a professional head and he as the operational head. My view
could hold, however, only if the person appointed commissioner had no lower
standing than departmental secretaries, and preferably had significant experience
at that level to be able to advise on appointments and on performance with
credibility among peers.
I am also of the view that the APS Commission should have responsibility for
pay and industrial relations within the APS, not the Department of Employment
and Workplace Relations. The latter’s focus is inevitably on ensuring the
government’s wider industrial relations policies are followed in the APS or,
better still, modelled in the APS. It is not likely to focus on the business objectives
of APS agencies and concern for the capability of the APS as a whole and its
upholding of the APS Values. This is a matter of getting the balances right: the
APS and APS agencies must operate consistently with the government’s wider
industrial relations policies, but they should do so with a view to meeting their
particular policy and program objectives effectively and efficiently, and to
strengthening their capacity to continue to do so into the future.
How prescriptive should the commissioner be in issuing instructions and
guidelines? For the most part, the commissioner’s directions under the act are
not prescriptive, but set out the specific responsibilities of agencies and
employees in order to comply with the principles in the act. Beyond that, the
commission’s approach has been to use guidelines developed cooperatively,
rather than rules set from above. Areas where perhaps a firmer stance could be
warranted include on classification management and the merit principle and on
SES involvement in commission leadership development activities.
The concurrent role of Parliamentary Service Commissioner requires
demonstrating independence from the executive arm of government
—considerably more so than as Public Service Commissioner. Another challenge
is to devote sufficient time and resources to the role. I was assisted by the
provision of additional funds for the consultant who helped with the review of
the administration of the Parliament, but I had to fund resources for the other
work involved from the APS Commission’s budget. There would be benefit if
the funding for the Parliament included a specific allocation to the commission
for the role of Parliamentary Service Commissioner.
Lessons learned as commissioner
Constantly reflecting on whether to be in the tent or outside is healthy. The
commissioner might not always come to the right answer, but keeping the balance
at the front of one’s mind is no bad thing.
Not shirking an issue is an important element of this. If there is an active debate
in the APS about any values issue, the commissioner cannot afford to duck it.
The commissioner’s answer might include a discussion of ‘on the one hand’ and
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‘on the other’, without an unequivocal judgment in a particular case, but should
give genuine guidance on the factors involved and, preferably, a personal
weighing up of the arguments, and a view.
The APS Commission’s credibility requires it to strengthen its evidence base
constantly and to ensure it has top expertise in key areas such as human resource
management. The commissioner’s own credibility is also vital and relies on past
experience and continuing personal learning and development, including through
monitoring and discussing developments in and throughout APS agencies.
Clearly, I would like to see some further strengthening of the role of the Public
Service Commissioner, who needs to be an experienced CEO with the clout among
secretaries to exercise the role. In particular, the commissioner should play a
stronger role in succession management.
Table 12.8 Possible further reform agenda for the Australian Public
Service Commission
The Public Service Act 1999 represents the culmination of more than a
decade of public sector reform in Australia and remains a good model
for a modern public service with a well-embedded culture of
professionalism, impartiality and non-partisan responsiveness to elected
governments.
There is a need now, however, to reflect on our experience and to make
a number of modifications.
1. The commissioner as well as the Secretary of the Department of
PM&C should be required to advise (not just provide a report to)
the Prime Minister on secretary appointments and on
equivalent-level agency head appointments.
2. There should be room to appoint part-time or temporary assistant
commissioners along the lines of the Victorian or the Productivity
Commission arrangements, to help in agency heads’ performance
assessments, mentoring and succession management and to
undertake specific management reviews from time to time at the
request of the minister or the commissioner.
3. The commission should have responsibility for public service pay
and conditions and classification management.
4. The coverage of the act should be widened to include most if not
all non-commercial and non-military/police agencies.
5. Complementary legislation for the Parliamentary Service and staff
of Members of Parliament should be reviewed and updated to
include corresponding provisions on values and codes of conduct
(reflecting the different roles and responsibilities involved).
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6. Policies for those employed by Australian Government agencies
outside these laws should include the need to specify values and
codes of conduct consistent with the public interest.
Endnotes
1  'What Really Happens: Departmental Secretary Appointments, Contracts and Performance Pay in the
Australian Public Service', Australian Journal of Public Administration, June 2007.
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13. Some conclusions
The very writing of this monograph has highlighted some of the modern
challenges for secretaries and for public administration. How much should a
retired secretary reveal about the goings-on in government that were rightly at
the time kept confidential? Does revelation by a former secretary, even after
two or more elections, make current ministers less trusting of their relationship
with current secretaries? Should the rule applying to cabinet papers
(foreshadowed recently to be reduced from 30 years to 20 years) be the
benchmark, or a shorter period, particularly if no genuinely sensitive information
is revealed?
To omit examples of the practices of secretaries and ministers, and the issues
involved, would not only make for dull reading, it would remove the real flavour
involved. I have tried to steer a middle course, being more open than most of
my predecessors have chosen to be in light of the more open society we now
live in, which has inter alia already downplayed the old-fashioned public service
value of anonymity. I have, however, not written a ‘kiss and tell’ story or
revealed anything particularly sensitive, and nearly all my examples relate to
the period before the 2004 election.
Improvements in public administration
During my career in the Public Service, I have seen many changes. Overall, I
have no doubt public administration in Australia has improved in these 40 years.
The Australian Public Service is more professional and capable than in the past.
A simple example illustrates the point: in the 1970s, more than 50 per cent of
the APS was at or below what are now the lowest two classification levels
(comprising less than 5 per cent of the current APS), most of these not having
completed Year 12 schooling, and a small minority of the service were graduates
compared with well more than 60 per cent and still rising today. This primarily
reflects the impact of new technology, but also the demands of a better-educated
and more pluralist society.
In line with the three themes of the Coombs Royal Commission, public
administration is also more efficient and effective, more responsive to
governments and better engaged with the community it serves.
The financial management reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, led by secretaries
such as Ian Castles and Michael Keating, have their detractors, but I have no
doubt that these have made the Public Service much more conscious of the
taxpayer resources it manages and of the purposes to which Parliament and the
public have determined they should be directed. Examples of greater efficiency,
and also greater effectiveness, abound, albeit that many reflect successful
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utilisation of information technology as well as financial management reform.
In terms of service delivery, Centrelink today is a vast improvement on the Social
Security department I joined in 1978, constantly measuring and reviewing its
service performance, utilising the latest technology and linking a wide range of
payments on behalf of various Commonwealth and state agencies; the Tax Office’s
online processes now automatically identify income from many sources, reducing
error and speeding up the process; the Job Network is more effective at placing
longer-term and disadvantaged unemployed people into jobs than the former
Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) and at substantially less cost; even
the budget process has been transformed since the 1970s when I was in the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, when the budget had to be ‘put
to bed’ about six weeks before budget night—now decisions can be taken by
ministers on the weekend before and be fully incorporated in the documentation
tabled on the Tuesday, identifying estimated costs over the forward years along
with expected outputs and impacts.
Responsiveness to government has improved through the financial management
reforms that have clarified government objectives and improved their capacity
to control, and through increased resources for ministers to help them oversee
administration, and better cabinet processes. The tiny office Margaret Guilfoyle
(Minister for Social Security, 1975–80) occupied in the south-west corner of Old
Parliament House in the 1970s had room only for her adviser and a departmental
liaison officer, with no meeting space other than her own small room. Today’s
ministers have large offices, housing several advisers and support staff and a
chief of staff and usually two departmental liaison officers, with a separate
meeting room and a spacious ministerial room. When working well, the minister’s
staff and the department operate as a close team complementing their respective
roles, ensuring the department is responsive to the minister’s requirements in
providing professional advice and implementing the government’s programs
and policies. Cabinet processes are also more elaborate and effective, supported
by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the other central
agencies as well as the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office.
The administrative law reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s gave the public
and those affected by government administration much greater access and
influence, transforming the management of most programs and increasing
consistency and effectiveness. The subsequent financial management reforms
opened up more opportunities for client influence through service charters and,
in some cases, choice of service or service provider through commercialisation,
outsourcing and privatisation. More generally, advances in communications,
increased media power and more sophisticated approaches by interest groups
have contributed to more systematic engagement by agencies with their
stakeholders and with the public.
184
The Role of Departmental Secretaries
Notwithstanding the continuing political debates involved, I believe there has
also been real improvement over the years in public policy in many areas of
government activity. To name a few in the social policy field, I would mention
superannuation, education and health and aged care. Australia has been fortunate
to have successive governments of able and dedicated ministers determined to
improve the wellbeing of Australians and willing to pursue longer-term reforms
despite short-term political pain. They have been supported by a professional
public service led by some remarkable secretaries, notwithstanding some
reduction in policy capacity in recent years.
I have had the privilege of participating in many of these developments—in
management (the financial management reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s
and the people-management reforms of the late 1990s and 2000s) and in policy
(poverty alleviation and family allowances in the 1970s, tax and superannuation,
youth allowances and higher education in the 1980s, housing and health and
aged care in the 1990s and 2000s). Not all have been entirely successful, but my
firm judgment is that real progress has been made.
Universal challenges for senior public servants
Many of the challenges facing public administration in Australia are common
internationally, because they are driven largely by communications technology
and increasing connectedness globally and locally.
Global interdependence, and global ‘governance’, is affecting the concepts of
‘public interest’ and ‘public goods’. Nations and their governments will still
pursue their national interests, but identifying what is truly in the national
interest requires understanding of global public interests and how they might
best be protected and promoted. Harmonisation of government regulation and
policy is increasingly important, whether in social policy fields such as public
health (including food safety and therapeutic goods and managing the risks of
communicable diseases) or in financial markets, and the pressure for world
authorities to ensure justice and human rights or to regulate international trade
and business is also increasing.
Nearly every national agency these days has a substantial and growing
international agenda, requiring the development and maintenance of international
networks of officials to support international forums of ministers and guide the
work of international organisations. Politicians also need to develop their own
international networks.
Departmental secretaries (and their equivalents in other nations) have particular
responsibilities in ensuring the development and nurturing of these networks
and must be personally involved. They must contribute to the international
forums and help their governments respond to emerging policies. This requires
investment, particularly in staff moving into more senior positions and those
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with the potential to be secretaries in the future. I experienced a huge shift over
my career from the days when every overseas visit needed the approval of the
Overseas Visits Committee to when most senior executives would travel overseas
at least once every two years. From my first visit to the OECD in 1980, I found
enormous value in having an international perspective on the policies I was
developing and reviewing. My contributions to international policy development
were modest, but that role will be increasingly important for secretaries and
other senior officials in the years to come and will involve increased mobility
between the Australian public service and international organisations.
Improved communications and a better-educated and wealthier community have
also, as mentioned, led to more systematic engagement by Australian government
agencies with their domestic stakeholders and the Australian public. This will
only continue to grow, with secretaries needing to employ increasingly
sophisticated approaches to communications management. Secretaries’ ability
to manage by Weberian processes of hierarchical control will also continue to
diminish, as staff and those outside their departments expect to be consulted
and to have real influence, and secretaries’ own influence over ministers is
challenged by the contributions of others. Concepts such as ‘governance’ and
‘leadership’, which encompass a more diffused process of decision making, are
likely to grow in importance and in complexity as governments strive to respond
to rapid change and uncertainty. In this environment, values including integrity
and impartiality are fundamental to fostering productive relationships.
The perennial issue of the political–administrative interface, and of the balance
between the responsiveness and independence of the Public Service, has been
affected everywhere by the communications revolution. Australia’s moves since
the 1980s to increase responsiveness have been mirrored in nearly all Western
democracies, with closer control by political leaders, more political staff and
more carefully managed media relations. As I have argued elsewhere,1  there is
reason for concern that the legitimate push for increased responsiveness in
Australia has now gone too far, unduly constraining public service independence.
Recent actions by the Rudd Government on secretaries’ contracts and
performance pay, ministerial staff numbers and conduct, and senior appointments
have gone some way to redress the balance, but the problem is even more acute
among state governments, and the underlying pressures remain, requiring
constant care and attention. It is more common these days for secretaries to be
called on to defend ministers than, as was accepted practice formerly, for
ministers to defend officials.
There is no simple answer here. A key element of public service professionalism
is the democratic responsibility to be responsive; some independence is also
demanded by the values of impartiality and being non-partisan. I always
highlighted the caveat to the view commonly expressed in the 1980s and 1990s
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that public servants did not determine the public interest because that was for
the elected government to decide. The caveat is ‘subject to the law’, and I would
highlight the role of public servants in upholding this through due process as
determined by public service, financial management and administrative law,
and through common law interpretations of that legislation. These laws include
very broad concepts such as values (Public Service Act), ethics (Financial
Management and Accountability Act) and public interest (for example, Freedom
of Information Act), which govern due process. If anything, I would take this
further, suggesting public servants are also responsible for advising on good
processes for policy development as well as program administration, beyond
the strict requirements of the law. In my view, the Public Service does, in this
wide area of due process, truly have responsibility to identify and protect the
public interest.
More recently, the idea of ‘public value’ has gained currency, encouraging public
servants to be more than just responsive and to exercise leadership to ensure
policies and programs add public value in addressing community problems. I
have much sympathy for this but am also mindful that our Westminster system
does require ministers to accept responsibility and be accountable to Parliament;
taking too far public servants’ responsibility to deliver ‘public value’ could
undermine this principle. Secretaries need to guard against their officers being
too independently minded and critical of the political process, as well as against
excessive responsiveness, which can undermine due process.
Particular Australian challenges
Australia’s federal system imposes particular constraints on the national
government and affects most secretaries considerably. Few informed people
argue for abolition of the states, recognising not only history but the extent to
which federalist factors are built into nearly every aspect of the constitution,
including the structure of the legislature, the role and structure of the judiciary,
as well as the responsibilities that can be exercised by the Executive (and the
Parliament). Most also recognise that there are efficiencies in a degree of
devolution and decentralisation, along with greater capacity to respond to the
varying needs of different communities.
Nonetheless, federal arrangements are under increasing pressure, driven again
by communications and transport technology and associated global forces.
Increased international activity inevitably adds to the role of national
governments and changes in the way business is managed within Australia and
the way people move and communicate also add to demand for national




National approaches do not, however, necessarily require exclusive national
government authority: state governments might agree to harmonise their policies
or they might contribute to national policies adding their practical experience
to the deliberative process or they might administer agreed nationally consistent
approaches.
Nonetheless, the purview of the national government is inexorably widening
in my view and reliance on cooperation and goodwill without some fundamental
reconsideration of roles and responsibilities will prove eventually to be too slow
and bureaucratic, and ineffective. Secretaries of Australian government
departments do need to have increased appreciation of the policy and
management issues faced by their state counterparts, whether or not formal
changes in roles and responsibilities are on the agenda.
Another particular issue for Australia concerns the balance of power between
the Executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The role of the judiciary and
quasi-judicial institutions widened substantially with the administrative law
reforms 30 years ago, largely in response to the increasing, and increasingly
complex, role of government administration. Notwithstanding the role of Senate
Committees, it is the legislature that is struggling to keep pace with the
continuing increase in government activity.
Along with most secretaries, I was frustrated by the style of most of the Senate
Committees I attended, which rarely addressed the major policy or performance
issues and mostly pursued more superficial and immediate political matters. I
believe these committees need more professional support from the Parliamentary
Service, rather than from political staff, to probe more deeply and over time
substantial policy and performance matters. House of Representatives Committees
have even further to go to provide the level of scrutiny needed. The media might
be largely to blame, but it too responds to the material provided, including by
Parliament and its committees and individual politicians.
Secretaries might not welcome more scrutiny, but they would welcome a shift
in the scrutiny towards issues of substance. This might also enhance the
understanding by Members of Parliament, including potential future ministers,
of the operation of the Public Service and the capacity of its senior leaders (other
than their political dexterity).
Final comments
I have had the privilege of being a public servant for 37 years, including 12
years as a secretary or equivalent. It was a period of great change in the Public
Service and in government, through the excitement of the Whitlam years, the
steadier hand of the Fraser era, the years of economic and financial management
reform under Hawke and Keating and the conservative pragmatism of the Howard
Government. All were reformist governments in their own way. Each ended up,
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even if not by prior intention, presiding over an extension of the role of the
Australian Government both domestically and internationally. The means of
achieving that role shifted, particularly under the Hawke, Keating and Howard
Governments, towards purchasing and regulating rather than providing.
Governments and the Public Service also responded to increasing community
expectations and advances in technology, with increasing concern for service
delivery and policy implementation as well as policy development and advising,
and with increasing demand for community engagement and responsiveness to
individual circumstances and preferences.
This monograph focuses on the changing role of departmental secretaries, but
the context is of the changing role of government and changing approaches to
public administration. I have included in Appendix B a summary of the main
reforms to which I contributed; Appendix C includes a list of some of my
publications and those official publications to which I made a substantial
contribution.
No doubt changes will continue, particularly as technological development
continues to accelerate. The unique role of the Public Service, however, and of
its leadership is likely to continue based, in my view, on the core values of
professionalism, impartiality, responsiveness, non-partisanship, accountability
and service.
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